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Abstract
This report covers regulatory control of nuclear safety in 2004. Its submission to the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is 
stipulated in section 121 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. Nuclear safety regulation focused 
on the design and operation of Finnish nuclear facilities as well as on nuclear waste man-
agement and nuclear materials.
No events endangering the safe use of nuclear safety occurred at the nuclear power plants. 
The doses of all nuclear power plant workers were below the individual dose limit. The col-
lective occupational dose at the Olkiluoto plant units was low internationally. At Loviisa 1, 
the collective dose threshold per one gigawatt of net electrical power, calculated accord-
ing to STUK’s guidelines, was slightly exceeded. Radioactive releases were low and the 
dose calculated on their basis for the most exposed individual in the vicinity of Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants was well below the limit established by Government 
Resolution.
The operating licence of the reactor pressure vessel of Loviisa 1 was extended in accord-
ance with the licensee’s application until the 2012 refuelling outage. The Loviisa plant 
units are undergoing extensive I&C upgrading the conceptual design plan of which STUK 
has reviewed.
STUK’s safety performance indicators for nuclear power plants, which describe the effec-
tiveness of STUK’s activities, did not indicate changes that would have warranted STUK’s 
immediate reaction.
STUK assessed the safety of the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant unit when preparing its 
statement to the Ministry of Trade and Industry on the construction licence application of 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy. In addition to safety assessment, oversight focused on the manu-
facturing of the plant unit’s main components and earth-moving work onsite. In addition, 
STUK assessed the activities of the licence applicant, vendor and subcontractors.
No events endangering safety occurred at the FiR 1 research reactor. The radiation doses of 
those working at the research reactor and radioactive releases into the environment were 
clearly below set limits as well.
No events endangering safety occurred in nuclear waste management. In the ﬁeld of nu-
clear material safeguards, the use of nuclear materials in accordance with current regula-
tions and the completeness and correctness of nuclear material accounting were veriﬁed.
TOSSAVAINEN Kirsti (ed.). Regulatory control of nuclear safety in Finland. Annual report 2004.  
STUK-B-YTO 241. Helsinki 2005. 58 pp. + Appendices 64 pp.
Keywords: nuclear energy, nuclear facility, nuclear waste, nuclear safeguards,  
regulatory control, safety indicators
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STUK veriﬁed that nuclear liability in the event of nuclear damage has been taken care of 
according to legislation.
The total costs of nuclear safety regulation in 2004 were 10.2 M€. The total costs of opera-
tions subject to a charge were 9.2 M€, the full amount of which was charged to the licen-
sees and licence-applicants.
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1 Preface
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) regulates the use of nuclear energy in 
Finland, as prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act 
(990/1987). STUK’s responsibilities also include 
control of physical protection and emergency plan-
ning as well as control of the use of nuclear energy 
necessary to prevent nuclear proliferation. This is 
a report on regulatory control in the ﬁeld of nu-
clear energy submitted by STUK to the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry as stipulated in section 121 of 
the Nuclear Energy Decree.
It covers the regulatory control of nuclear facili-
ties, nuclear waste management and nuclear mate-
rials, which is the task of two STUK departments: 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Nuclear Waste 
and Materials Regulation.
Nuclear safety regulation mostly focused on the 
Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units owned 
by Fortum Power and Heat Oy and the Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 units owned by Teollisuuden Voima Oy as 
well as their nuclear waste management and 
nuclear materials. The Olkiluoto 3 plant unit of 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy, which is in the planning 
stages, was also subject to control. The planning 
and later implementation of the ﬁnal disposal of 
nuclear fuel is taken care of by Posiva Oy. Subject 
to regulatory control were also the research reactor 
operated by the VTT Technical Research Centre of 
Finland, small-scale users of nuclear materials as 
well as the transport of radioactive materials.
Loviisa 1 began generating electricity to the 
national grid in 1977 and Loviisa 2 in 1981. Their 
operating licences were renewed in 1998 and will 
expire at the end of 2007. The Loviisa plant units 
are light-water PWRs. The highest allowable reac-
tor nominal thermal power for each unit, accord-
ing to a permit granted by the Government, is 
1500 MW. The nominal values for electrical power 
510 MW (gross) and 488 MW (net) correspond to 
this reactor power.
Olkiluoto 1 began generating electricity to the 
national grid in 1979 and Olkiluoto 2 in 1982. 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 are light-water BWRs. The oper-
ating licences of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units 
were renewed in 1998. They will expire at the end 
of 2018 and cover also spent fuel intermediate 
storage as well as low and intermediate level reac-
tor waste storage. According to the licences, the 
highest allowable reactor nominal thermal power 
for Olkiluoto 1 and 2 is 2500 MW. A corresponding 
nominal gross electrical power is 870 MW and net 
electrical power 840 MW. The licence conditions 
require that the licensee makes, by the end of 2008, 
an extensive intermediate safety assessment for 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. Requirements 
for the contents of the assessment are set by 
STUK.
On 8 January 2004 Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
applied to the Government for a construction 
licence for Olkiluoto 3 in accordance with the 
Nuclear Energy Act. The licence was granted by 
the Government on 17 February 2005. The new 
plant unit is a light-water PWR with net electrical 
power of approx. 1600 MW and reactor thermal 
power of 4300 MW.
This report’s section on nuclear reactor regula-
tion describes the assessment of safety analyses for 
the Loviisa plant units and the operating units of 
the Olkiluoto plant; control of plant modiﬁcations, 
of availability of the plant units and of the opera-
tion of organisations. The implementation of new 
or revised YVL guides on operating nuclear power 
plants is described. The efﬁciency and effective-
ness of nuclear safety regulation is analysed using 
STUK’s Safety Performance Indicator System. The 
report’s supplements include a detailed explanation 
of the Safety Performance Indicators (Appendix 1), 
of completed safety improvements (Appendix 2) 
and of signiﬁcant operational events (Appendix 3). 
Radiation safety at the plants is analysed by look-
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ing at occupational and collective doses at the 
facilities as well as the outcome of monitoring for 
radiation in releases and the environment.
This report’s section on Olkiluoto 3, which is in 
the design phase, discusses review of documents 
relating to the application for a construction li-
cence, assessment of the operations of the licence 
applicant and vendor, and regulatory control of the 
manufacturing of main components.
The chapter on nuclear waste management 
deals with spent nuclear fuel intermediate stor-
age, preparation for ﬁnal disposal and treatment 
of low and intermediate level waste. The volumes 
of nuclear fuel as well as low and intermediate 
level waste stored onsite at the end of the year are 
given.
The chapter on nuclear non-proliferation de-
scribes nuclear material control at the Finnish 
nuclear facilities and plans for the safeguarding of 
ﬁnal disposal of spent fuel as well as regulation of 
radioactive materials transport. Strengthening of 
nuclear material safeguards and implementation 
of the CTBT are included.
The report discusses the development of regu-
latory guides and nuclear safety regulation as 
well as functions in support of nuclear safety 
regulation such as safety research, emergency re-
sponse, communications, and development projects. 
Participation in international co-operation in the 
ﬁeld of nuclear safety is described.
STUK-B-YTO 241
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2 Legislation and regulations
Pekka Salminen
Revision and updating of YVL guides contin-
ued. The guides are detailed safety regulations 
for nuclear facilities issued by STUK on the ba-
sis of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) and the 
Government Resolution (395/1991) on the general 
safety regulations for nuclear power plants. The 
guides describe STUK’s regulatory procedures as 
well. STUK decides, case by case, how new guides 
apply to facilities already in operation. Such deci-
sions made in 2004 are discussed in subsections 
3.1.1 and 3.2.1.
A total of about 34 guides were being pre-
pared or reviewed in YVL guide working groups, 
with ﬁve guides completed by the end of the 
year. The number of Finnish language YVL guides 
published in 2000–2004 is given in Fig. 1. Five 
guides were published in English and three in 
Swedish. The guides were available in print and on 
STUK’s web site (www.stuk.ﬁ) and the Finlex por-
tal (www.ﬁnlex.ﬁ). Swedish language translations 
were published as electronic versions only.
The Additional Protocol to the nuclear material 
safeguards of the IAEA, Euratom and non-nuclear 
EU member states as well as the relevant amend-
ment to the Nuclear Energy Act were carried into 
effect by presidential decree on 7 May 2004. On 27 
May 2004 an amendment to the Nuclear Energy 
Decree was passed, into the preparation of which 
STUK participated. The preparation of an YVL 
guide on the Additional Protocol was started.
A new Commission Regulation (2002(99)) 
on safeguards, approved by the Council of the 
European Union in April 2004, partly pertained 
to the aforementioned Additonal Protocol. The 
Regulation came into force in 2005. STUK’s repre-
sentative contributed to the handling of the draft 
regulation in the Atomic Questions Group (AQG) of 
the Council of the European Union.
No amendments were prepared to the general 
regulations on nuclear safety issued in the form of 
Government resolutions in 2004.
The Commission of the European Communities 
prepared directives on the arrangement of nuclear 
waste management in Member Countries and on 
fundamental nuclear safety requirements. STUK 
has followed the status of this work and assessed 
for its part the contents of the drafts.
Towards the end of 2004 the Commission sub-
mitted a draft proposal for a Commission direc-
tive on the control and supervision of radioactive 
waste and spent fuel transfers, which is intended 
to replace Directive 92/3. The draft directive will be 
further discussed in the Atomic Questions Group 
in 2005.
Nuclear safety recommendations are also given 
by international organisations, such as the EU, the 
IAEA and the OECD/NEA. On various forums of 
co-operation STUK follows the work of other coun-
tries’ national authorities in the ﬁeld of rule-mak-
ing. This did not result in any need to update the 
Finnish nuclear legislation. STUK prepared to the 
IAEA statements on two draft safety guides.
Figure 1. Number of yearly published YVL guides.
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3 Nuclear facilities regulation
Kirsi Alm-Lytz, Timo Eurasto, Juhani Hinttala, Tarja K. Ikäheimonen, 
Marja-Leena Järvinen, Seppo Klemola, Tapani Koljander, Jouko Mononen, 
Matti Ojanen, Rainer Rantala, Suvi Ristonmaa, Pekka Salminen, Seija 
Suksi, Heimo Takala, Petteri Tiippana, Keijo Valtonen, Vesa-Pekka Vartti, 
Olli Vilkamo, Reino Virolainen, Tapani Virolainen
• YVL 3.8, Nuclear power plant pressure equip-
ment. In-service inspection with non-destruc-
tive testing methods, 22 September 2003
• YVL 6.3, Regulatory control of nuclear fuel and 
control rods, 28 May 2003
• YVL 6.8, Handling and storage of nuclear fuel, 
27 October 2003
• YVL 7.5, Meteorological measurements of a nu-
clear power plant, 28 May 2003
• YVL 7.11, Radiation monitoring systems and 
equipment in nuclear power plants, 13 July 
2004
• YVL 7.18, Radiation safety aspects in the design 
of a nuclear power plant, 26 September 2003.
Before the decisions to implement the guides were 
made, Fortum Power and Heat Oy gave an assess-
ment of the fulﬁlment of the safety requiremens 
of each guide. The Loviisa plant units meet all 
requirements of guides YVL 1.5, YVL 2.5, YVL 6.3 
and YVL 6.8 and they came into force as such at 
the Loviisa power plant.
Fortum Power and Heat Oy assessed that 
Loviisa nuclear power plant meets the safety re-
quirements of Guide YVL 2.2. The transient and 
accident analyses made for the Loviisa plant units 
meet the requirements of the new guide for the 
most part. The sole shortcoming found was that 
the number of fuel rods sustaining damage in an 
accident was not analysed as required in the new 
guide. The licensee will see to this when analyses 
are updated in connection with the updating of 
emergency procedures and I&C upgrading projects 
at Loviisa nuclear power plant. STUK made no re-
marks on the licensee’s assessment and actions.
3.1 Loviisa 1 and 2
3.1.1 Implementation of regulations
STUK has introduced a procedure for application 
of new or revised YVL guides to operating nuclear 
facilities. According to it, the publication of a YVL 
guide does not, as such, change STUK’s previous 
decisions. It is only after having heard those con-
cerned that STUK will give a separate decision on 
the application of a new or revised YVL guide to an 
operating nuclear facility, or to one under construc-
tion as well as to a licensee’s operation. The guides 
apply as such to new nuclear power plants.
In considering the application of new safety 
requirements given in YVL guides to operating nu-
clear facilities, or those under construction, STUK 
takes into account a principle stipulated in section 
27 of the Government Resolution (395/1991). It 
prescribes that, to further improve safety, meas-
ures shall be implemented that are justiﬁable con-
sidering operating experience, safety research and 
development of science and technology.
Decisions to implement the below YVL guides 
were made in accordance with the new procedure
• YVL 1.5, Reporting nuclear facility operation to 
the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority, 8 
September 2003
• YVL 2.2, Transient and accident analyses for 
justiﬁcation of technical solutions at nuclear 
power plants, 26 August 2003
• YVL 2.5, Pre-operational and start-up testing of 
nuclear power plants, 29 September 2003
• YVL 2.8, Probabilistic safety analyses in safety 
management of nuclear power plants, 28 May 
2003
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In its assessement of Guide YVL 2.8, the licen-
see proposed to draw up in-service piping inspec-
tion programmes for the next ten years using 
risk-informed methods. On STUK’s request the 
licensee further deﬁned its report on the use of risk 
analyses to develop the Technical Speciﬁcations, 
safety classiﬁcation and preventive maintenance 
during operation. The licensee’s schedules for ap-
plication of the new requirements were conﬁrmed 
by STUK’s decision. As a non-conformance to the 
higher-than-before requirement level established 
for nuclear power plant design, it was approved 
that the core melt frequency, which is set as the 
design basis for new nuclear power plants, is not 
attained at Loviisa nuclear power plant. Licensee 
analysis states approx. 1.5·10–4/year as the core 
melt frequency of the Loviisa plant units, where-
as the target value given in Guide YVL 2.8 is 
10–5/year.
As regards Guide YVL 3.8, the licensee pre-
sented a plan for fulﬁlment of the new qualiﬁca-
tion requirements. STUK approved the assessed 
fulﬁlment of safety requirements and the plan for 
inspection qualiﬁcation with remarks. The qualiﬁ-
cation schedule extends until the year 2010.
STUK found the clariﬁcation given about Guide 
YVL 7.5 insufﬁcient and required that the onsite 
weather measurement system has to be developed 
and the number of observation stations on the 
plant’s protective zone to be increased. The licen-
see has submitted a more detailed plan to STUK. 
As regards Guide YVL 7.11, STUK was able to 
establish, based on the licensee’s assessment, that 
the plant fulﬁls the requirements of the new guide, 
particularly owing to its recently renewed ﬁxed ra-
diation measurement system. The licensee’s clari-
ﬁcation about Guide YVL 7.18 mainly corresponds 
to STUK’s view of the fulﬁlment of requirements. 
However, STUK called for further clariﬁcation as 
regards requirements concerning provision for ra-
diation conditions during certain severe accidents.
3.1.2 Assessment of safety analyses
Deterministic safety analyses
The licensees update the nuclear power plants’ de-
terministic safety analyses in connection with the 
renewal of operating licences. The analyses are up-
dated also in connection with plant modiﬁcations, 
or whenever operational events warrant it. STUK 
reviews the licensee’s analyses and conducts, or 
contracts out where necessary, its own reference 
analyses. In 2004, no deterministic safety analyses 
on the Loviisa plant were submitted to STUK for 
review.
Probabilistic safety analyses
STUK made a general review of the weather risk 
analysis for Loviisa plant’s shutdown states. The 
licensee’s analysis assessed the risks of a normal 
month-long annual maintenance outage. According 
to the analysis, weather and other environmental 
phenomena during a shutdown constitute a large 
part of the core melt probability for the Loviisa 
plant. The most risk-important environmental 
phenomena include simultaneously high air and 
sea water temperatures, oil spills or chemicals re-
leases, and the occurrence of algae, which could be 
transported to the sea water channel and prevent 
the plant’s sea water intake.
The licensee assessed the core melt probability 
from weather phenomena as 9.6·10–5 per annual 
maintenance outage. The risk from simultaneously 
high sea water (above 25 °C) and air temperatures 
(above 31 °C) is assessed at approx. 6∙10–5. The core 
melt risk was attributed to the possibility of the 
cooling unit of the air conditioning of the instru-
mentation area tripping from refrigerant pressure 
during high temperatures (air 31 °C, sea water 
25 °C) at a time when the other cooling unit is out 
of service for maintenance.
The outage risk analysis looked at oil or other 
sticky chemicals ending up with sea water to the 
plant’s sea water systems where they could cause 
clogging and endager normal decay heat removal. 
The probability of an accident caused by an oil spill 
is based on global oil spill data. During the last 25 
years, nine oil spills involving thousands of tonnes 
of oil have occurred. The frequency of oil spills in 
excess of 700 tonnes over the the past ten years 
is 7.3/year. Based on these data, the frequency 
of a large accident on the Gulf of Finland, which 
would affect the Loviisa plant, has been assessd 
at 0.002/year. Considering the timeshare of outage 
states in a year and the likelihood of a failed inter-
vention, the licensee assessed the probability of a 
core melt from oil or other chemicals at 2∙10–5 per 
annual maintenance outage.
The licensee assessed the probability of a core 
melt caused by algae, or by simultaneously oc-
12
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curring storm winds and algae, at 1.5∙10–5/annual 
maintenance outage. Sea water cooling systems 
important for the plant’s safety could get clogged 
up by algae. Storm winds could bring about the 
loss of the offsite electricity grid and, at the same 
time, detach algae, which could end up in the cool-
ing system of the emergency diesel generators; in 
the worst-case scenario this would prevent their 
operation and cause total electricity loss.
The share of other initiating events in total is 
approx. 1∙10–6/annual maintenance outage.
Based on a general review by STUK, it was 
required that the licensee submits to STUK a 
plan for measures to reduce weather risks during 
shutdown states. The licensee gave a more detailed 
assessment of the frequency of the loss of air con-
ditioning in the instrumentation area from high 
temperatures of sea water and air, made on the 
basis of systems states follow-up. The new clariﬁ-
cation showed that the cooling units operate even 
if the temperature of outside air and that of the 
sea water would rise up to approx. 35 °C. This is a 
clearly higher temperature than had been assessed 
earlier based on design documents. Based on the 
new assessment, the risk posed by the loss of air 
conditioning is considered low.
In its clariﬁcation the licensee presented also 
a new assessment of the probability of a core 
melt caused by oil spills. It is reduced to a half of 
the previous estimate (from approx. 2∙10–5/year to 
9.9∙10–6/year), which is mainly due to the commis-
sioning of a back-up decay heat removal system 
in the annual maintenance outage of 2004. The 
licensee continues to ﬁnd out about the frequen-
cies, consequences and prevention of oil spills on 
the Gulf of Finland. The probability of an oil spill 
ending up to the Loviisa plant as a consequence 
of a tanker accident on the Gulf of Finland will be 
analysed in more detail in the future. The licensee 
is looking for ways to prevent the access of oil to 
the plant’s sea water channel.
Based on the new data given in the clariﬁcation 
and safety improvements implemented in 2004, 
the probability of a core melt caused by weather 
risks (oil spills included) during an annual main-
tenance outage has decreased from approx. 9.6∙10–5 
to approx. 1.3∙10–5.
STUK will separately review in detail the 
weather risk analysis for plant outage states.
Safety analysis of the Loviisa 1 
reactor pressure vessel
The operating permits of the reactor pressure ves-
sels of Loviisa nuclear power plant are are evaluat-
ed periodically. The licence extending the operation 
of the Loviisa 1 reactor pressure vessel, granted 
in 1996, was valid until the 2004 refuelling out-
age. Towards the end of 2003, Fortum Power and 
Heat Oy submitted to STUK an application for an 
extension of the permit until the 2012 refuelling 
outage.
Neutron radiation negatively affects the mate-
rials of the reactor pressure vessel. It changes the 
microstructure of steel and increases the ductile-
brittle transition temperature representing the 
cleavage behaviour of ferritic steel. In lower tem-
peratures the plastic deformation capability of 
steel decreases and it becomes brittle. If, under 
such a temperature, the structure is exposed to 
high stress, and if a sufﬁciently large crack exists 
in the location in question, crack growth becomes 
quick and the structure breaks. High stresses in 
a low temperature could occur for example during 
emergency cooling. Steel’s impurities increase the 
susceptibility to shift of transition temperatures 
caused by neutron radiation. The core welds of the 
reactor pressure vessel of Loviisa 1 in particular 
contain such impurities (phosphorus and copper).
The material samples tested in 1980, which had 
been inside the Loviisa 1 reactor pressure vessel, 
showed that embrittlement had taken place con-
siderably quicker than indicated in the vendor’s 
forecast. Since then, several modiﬁcations have 
been made at both plant units to slow down em-
brittlement and reduce loading.
The ductility of steel can be restored to almost 
pre-irradiation level by annealing in a temperature 
higher than the irradiation temperature. In the 
1996 refuelling outage a brittle weld nearest to the 
Loviisa 1 reactor core was heated up to 475−500 ºC 
for 100 hrs. After annealing, the microstructure of 
material is not the same as before the ﬁrst irradia-
tion, however, and re-embrittlement mechanisms 
differ somewhat from pre-annealing mechanisms. 
In a safety analysis conducted in connection with 
the 1996 licensing procedure, the rate of re-embrit-
tlement was evaluated more conservatively than 
normally.
The irradiation of new samples inside the reac-
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tor pressure vessel was begun in 1996 after the 
vessel’s annealing. The test pieces were cut from 
the sample weld, which very closely corresponds to 
the brittle weld of the Loviisa 1 reactor pressure 
vessel. After three years’ irradiation the samples 
had incurred a dose almost as high as the pressure 
vessel wall prior to the annealing, and then they 
were annealed. The test pieces were further sub-
jected to irradiation from one to four years prior to 
testing.
The reactor pressure vessel weld transition 
temperature used in the analysis is based on 
the test results (annealing and re-irradiation) of 
both old and new irradiation surveillance samples. 
From the test results, a model for the transition 
temperature has been derived as a function of dose 
and phosphorus concentration, which is conserva-
tive as regards the test results. To deﬁne the tran-
sition temperatures of the samples and to calculate 
the value of fracture toughness depicting the quan-
titative value of toughness, VTT State Technical 
Research Centre’s “Master curve” method has been 
used, which helps reduce uncertainties relating to 
the deﬁnition of fracture toughness. The “Master 
curve” method is about to be launched in several 
countries.
The reactor pressure vessels of the Loviisa plant 
are inspected at least every eight years for poten-
tial defects. The immediate area of the Loviisa 1 
pressure vessel core was inspected by nondestruc-
tive methods (ultrasound and eddy current) in the 
2004 outage.
Fortum Power and Heat Oy submitted a new 
safety analysis to support its application. Loading-
related thermohydraulic analyses and fracture me-
chanical analyses have been completely updated. 
The biggest change, however, is a re-assessment 
of the aforementioned ductile-brittle transition 
temperature.
STUK reviewed and assessed the results and 
analyses of an irradiation programme for the an-
nealed reactor pressure vessel as well as other 
justiﬁcation for the licence extension submitted by 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy. STUK made a safety 
assessment the essential conclusions of which are 
as follows:
• The rate of re-embrittlement is deﬁned sufﬁ-
ciently conservatively.
• A deterministic analysis shows that the reactor 
pressure vessel maintains it’s integrity in all 
postulated loading situations.
• The failure risk derived by probabilistic analy-
sis only accounts for a minor part of severe ac-
cident total risk.
In accordance with the application of Fortum Power 
and Heat Oy, STUK approved the continued opera-
tion of the Loviisa 1 reactor pressure vessel until 
the 2012 refuelling outage.
3.1.3 Oversight of plant modiﬁcations
The most signiﬁcant safety improvement under 
way at the Loviisa plant is the upgrading of the 
I&C systems of the plant units, which reached 
implementation stage towards the end of 2004. 
The project started with the construction of a new 
I&C building and is due for completion in 2014. 
The upgrading takes place phase by phase such 
that upgraded system sections are available for 
commissioning during annual maintenances. At 
the beginning of 2004 an overview project was set 
up at STUK to co-ordinate document review and 
control pertaining to the I&C upgrading. STUK 
approved the I&C conceptual design plan submit-
ted by the licensee with certain supplementary 
requirements, which are to be observed in a later 
phase of the project. Towards the end of 2004 the 
licensee submitted to STUK for review detailed 
plans for Loviisa 1’s new I&C buildings. Based on 
the approved plans, the licensee began construc-
tion of the buildings. STUK oversaw the progress-
ing of the work.
During the 2004 annual maintenance outage, 
modiﬁcations were completed at the plant units 
relating to, among others, the new back-up decay 
heat removal system, a detailed description of 
which can be found in Appendix 2. STUK oversaw 
the implementation of component and structural 
modiﬁcations by inspections onsite and at the 
component manufacturers’ premises as well as 
by reviewing reports submitted by the licensee. 
Modiﬁcations oversight included STUK/licensee 
meetings and STUK internal meetings.
In consequence of the plant modiﬁcations, sev-
eral documents changed describing the plants’ 
operation and structure – such as the Technical 
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Speciﬁcations, the Final Safety Analysis Report 
and the operating and maintenance instructions. 
STUK supervised the document revisions and gen-
erally followed the updating of plant documenta-
tion after the modiﬁcations. The results are given 
in Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.6).
3.1.4 Oversight of plant operability
Compliance with the Technical 
Speciﬁcations
Compliance with the Technical Speciﬁcations 
at the Loviisa power plant was controlled by wit-
nessing operations onsite. Subject to oversight 
were in particular the testing and repair of compo-
nents subject to the Technical Speciﬁcations. After 
completion of the annual maintenance outages, 
the plant unit’s compliance with the Technical 
Speciﬁcations was established before startup. The 
licensee is obliged to immediately report to STUK 
all plant situations in non-compliance with the 
Technical Speciﬁcations.
Two situations occurred at the Loviisa plant 
units during which a plant unit was in non-compli-
ance with the Technical Speciﬁcations (Appendix 1, 
indicator A.I.2). Both situations occurred at 
Loviisa 2 and they were the inoperability of the 
off-gas activity measurements in the secodary cir-
cuit and a brief disturbance in decay heat removal 
during annual maintenance. The events are looked 
into in more detail in Appendix 3. The licensee has 
planned and carried out actions to prevent recur-
rence.
The Technical Speciﬁcations were deviated from 
also by applying in advance for STUK’s approval 
of non-compliances. In 2004, the licensee applied 
for approval of nine deviations from the Technical 
Speciﬁcations (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.2). After 
an analysis of the deviations’ safety signiﬁcance, 
STUK approved the applications. Five exemp-
tions pertained to deviations from the Technical 
Speciﬁcations caused by plant modiﬁcations.
Operation and operational events
The Loviisa plant units operated reliably in 2004. 
The load factor of Loviisa 1 was 87.1 % and that of 
Loviisa 2 was 93.8 %. Fig. 2 gives the plant units’ 
load factors for 1995−2004. The duration of the an-
nual maintenance outage at Loviisa 1 was 47 days 
and 22.5 days at Loviisa 2. In addition, one brief 
production break occurred at both plant units. At 
Loviisa 1 it was due to a scram caused by a protec-
tion system malfuction (see Appendix 3) and at 
Loviisa 2 to the repair of a leaking check valve.
Production losses in nominal output caused by 
component malfunctions were 0.25 % at both plant 
units. Production losses from component malfunc-
tions in a longer time period are depicted by indica-
tors in Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.1g). Figure 3 gives 
the daily average gross powers of the plant units in 
2004. 
At the Loviisa plant units, three events war-
ranted a special report, and one reactor scram and 
nine operational transients to be reported to STUK 
occurred (Appendix 1, indicator A.II.1). The events 
subject to a special report were as follows:
• Fuel handling error at the Loviisa plant spent 
fuel storage (INES Level 0)
• Inoperability of activity measurements at Lovii-
sa 2 (INES Level 0)
• Disturbance in decay heat removal at Loviisa 2 
(INES Level 0)
The reactor scram and the events subject to 
a special report are explained in more detail in 
Appendix 3. Figure 4 gives the number of INES 
Level 1 events in 1995–2004. During this time pe-
riod, no events exceeding INES Level 1 occurred at 
the Loviisa plant.
In addition to event reports, the Loviisa power 
Figure 2. Load factors of the Loviisa plant units.
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plant submitted to STUK daily reports, monthly 
reports, annual reports, outage reports, annual 
environmental safety reports, monthly individual 
dose reports, annual operational feed back reports 
and nuclear safeguards reports.
Annual maintenance outages
The annual maintenance outage of Loviisa 1 was 
an extensive maintenance performed every eight 
years, which included time-consuming primary 
and secondary circuit pressure testing. These ex-
tensive annual maintenances always include other 
extensive inspections, maintenance and modiﬁca-
tions. The Loviisa 1 annual maintenance was on 24 
July to 8 September 2004. Its overall duration, 47 
days, was about ﬁve days longer than planned. The 
extension of the outage was due, among others, to a 
longer-than-planned inspection of the reactor pres-
sure vessel, the installation of ﬂow limiters to the 
reactor instrument line, the replacement of pipe 
and end ﬂanges of make-up water heat exchang-
ers, time-consuming steam generator room clean-
ing and the repair of a leaking pressuriser spray 
valve.
The Loviisa 2 annual maintenance was a refu-
elling outage and took place on 4 to 26 September 
2004. Its duration was 22.5 days, i.e. almost accord-
ing to plan.
During the Loviisa 1 annual maintenance, the 
ﬁrst fatal accident at work during the plant’s op-
erating life occurred at the 6 kV switchgear on 29 
July 2004. A brief disturbance in decay heat remov-
al occurred at Loviisa 2 on 16 September 2004. The 
events are separately described in Appendix 3.
Figure 3. Daily average gross power of the Loviisa plant units in 2004.
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Figure 4. Loviisa plant’s INES classiﬁed events (INES 
Level 1 and higher).
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During the annual maintenance outage of 
Loviisa 1, a safety improvement was made to as-
certain the plant units’ decay heat removal. It is 
described in Appendix 2. Repairs and maintenance 
during the annual maintenances are described un-
der “Repairs and maintenance “.
The collective radiation dose incurred in outage 
work was 1.93 manSv at Loviisa 1 and 0.44 manSv 
at Loviisa 2. Occupational radiation doses are ex-
amined in more detail under “Radiation Safety” 
and in Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.4).
STUK’s oversight activities focused, among oth-
ers, on the administrative arrangements of outage 
work, the work of the operating and maintenance 
personnel, refuelling as well as inspections and 
tests by the licensee and contractors. Attention was 
paid to the implementation of radiation protection, 
control room operations and housekeeping. Prior to 
the start of the new fuel cycle, safety analyses of a 
new fuel charge were reviewed. The loading of the 
fuel assemblies into the reactor according to plan 
was ascertained. The nuclear material inventory 
was veriﬁed prior to the closing of the reactor pres-
sure vessel. STUK controlled the placement of the 
plant units into shutdown state and their post-out-
age start-up.
As regards Loviisa 1, STUK paid attention to 
an insufﬁcient clariﬁcation of the safety implica-
tions of installation work relating to service water 
system piping modiﬁcations and the disorder and 
uncleanliness of certain plant areas. The level of 
housekeeping during the Loviisa 2 annual mainte-
nance gave no cause to remarks. During the annu-
al maintenance outages, shortcomings in personnel 
resources were mostly observed in supervision of 
work.
The regulatory oversight of the Loviisa facility’s 
annual maintenance outages onsite took 172 work-
ing days. One resident inspector worked regularly 
on the site.
Repairs and maintenance
During the Loviisa 1 extended annual mainte-
nance, the licensee performed primary and sec-
ondary circuit pressure tests. Inspections of the 
reactor pressure vessel and reactor internals, one 
high pressure turbine and the corresponding diesel 
generator were carried out as well, among others. 
Inspections of the reactor pressure vessel inter-
nals were made using STUK-approved, qualiﬁed 
inspection methods. No indications exceeding the 
threshold of approval were observed in them or 
any other inspections in accordance with a pre-ap-
proved programme.
Based on the results of the monitoring of the 
Loviisa 1 service water system piping, the licensee 
had decided to renew the piping from pumps to 
heat exchangers. Replacement piping is of carbon 
steel with hard rubber applied on its inner surface. 
Piping diameter was reduced due to installation 
engineering. Due to erosion-corrosion wear, piping 
replacements in the feed water system continued 
both in the steam generator compartment and 
outside it.
The licensee continued inspection of areas 
around the temperature measurement devices of 
the protection pipes of control rod drive mecha-
nisms at both plant units based on previous crack 
indications (Annual Reports 2002 and 2003). At 
Loviisa 1, defects were detected in two protection 
pipes in 2004 and they were replaced. At Loviisa 2, 
ten protection pipes were found defective. Defective 
protection pipes have now been replaced at both 
plant units. Similarly, moisture-collecting and thus 
stress corrosion inducing insulation shield boxes of 
the temperature measurement devices have been 
removed from all protection pipes.
In inspections of the reactor pressure vessel 
head at both plant units during annual main-
tenances, the licensee detected water between 
through-hole assembly and corrosion protection 
sleeve in two penetrations for control rod drive 
mechanisms in the reactor pressure vessel head. 
The inspections were made on the basis of operat-
ing experience feedback from other VVER plants. 
Visual inspection of nozzle inner surfaces by cam-
era showed no bulging or other visible changes in 
the thermal protection sleeves. Before plant unit 
start up, the licensee sent to STUK a report on the 
observations made and their safety signiﬁcance, 
with the conclusion that the event does not call for 
immediate corrective action. Long-term corrective 
action is looked into during the current operating 
cycle.
The heat exchanger piping of two steam genera-
tors were inspected at both plant units. Based on 
the results, 13 and 4 heat exchanger pipes were 
plugged at Loviisa 1 and 2 respectively.
During the annual maintenance outages of the 
Loviisa plant, STUK inspected 26 items of pres-
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sure equipment in Safety Classes 1 and 2 subject 
to registration in accordance with the Pressure 
Equipment Act. The periodic inspection of pres-
sure equipment was controlled by reviewing pro-
grammes pertaining to it. A total of 323 structural 
inspections, repairs and modiﬁcations as well as 
commissioning inspections of mechanical compo-
nents were made. One inspection comprises one 
or more partial inspections such as a results re-
view; an inspection of a component or structure; 
a pressure or leakage test; a functional test; or an 
operational safety inspection. Also 22 inspections 
of electrical and I&C equipment were made, which 
comprise several partial inspections themselves.
STUK witnessed onsite inspections of Safety 
Class 3, 4 and Class EYT nuclear pressure equip-
ment and other mechanical components and struc-
tures carried out by the Loviisa plant inspection 
unit “Inspection Organisation Loviisa YVL”. The 
safety classiﬁcation is based on the STUK Guide 
YVL 2.1 according to which a nuclear power plant’s 
systems, structures and components are assigned 
to the Safety Classes and 1, 2, 3 and 4 as well as to 
Class EYT (non-nuclear). Items with the highest 
safty signiﬁcance are Safety Class 1.
Ageing
The strategic objective for Loviisa power plant’s 
lifetime management is 50 years’ operating life. 
Lifetime management is one of the main tasks 
of the power plant engineering division set up at 
the Loviisa plant in the utility’s re-organisation 
in 2002. The lifetime management procedure was 
revised in early 2003. The administrative proce-
dures contained in it have been developed during 
2004. It is intended to make the system’s use more 
effective in 2005 by means of a new information 
management system, which is under development. 
Guidelines for follow-up reporting on the ageing of 
electrical and I&C systems and components have 
been drawn up in 2004.
Important factors affecting the lifetime of the 
Loviisa plant were the decision made at the end of 
2004 to upgrade the plant’s I&C systems and also 
the choice of the supplier. The plant’s I&C systems 
are due for upgrading in 2006−2014.
STUK’s oversight of lifetime management com-
prised the following actions: review of follow-up 
reports on the ageing of mechanical components 
and electrical and I&C systems and of the lifetime 
management procedures. Lifetime management 
was also overseen during inspections of STUK’s 
periodic inspection programme and in the inspec-
tions of mechanical components, electrical and I&C 
systems and structures.
Inspection methods are to be qualiﬁed to im-
prove the reliability of the in-service inspection 
of the most important mechanical components by 
non-destructive methods. An agreement on the re-
newal of the qualiﬁcation organisation was signed 
by Teollisuuden Voima Oy, Fortum and Inspecta Oy. 
It entered into force on 1 January 2005 and is valid 
until 31 December 2010. According to the agree-
ment, SFS Inspecta Certiﬁcation is the organisa-
tion responsible for the activities of a qualiﬁcation 
body in accordance with Guide YVL 3.8. During 
2004, the national regulations on qualiﬁcation 
were amended to comply with the new organisa-
tion. The implementation of ﬁrst qualiﬁcations in 
2004 was in accordance with the level of require-
ments of the new operations model.
Radiation safety
Occupational radiation doses
The radiation doses of all those who worked at 
Loviisa nuclear power plant in 2004 were below 
the 50 mSv annual limit. The distribution of indi-
vidual doses in 2004 is given in Table I. The high-
est occupational dose to an individual at Loviisa 
nuclear power plant was 16.9 mSv. It accumulated 
during work at Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear pow-
er plants. The highest individual dose incurred at 
Loviisa nuclear power plant alone was 15.8 mSv. 
Individual radiation doses did not exceed the dose 
limit of 100 mSv deﬁned for any period of ﬁve 
years. The highest individual dose to a Finnish 
nuclear power plant worker in the 5-year peri-
od 2000–2004, 65.0 mSv, was received at Loviisa, 
Olkiluoto and Swedish nuclear power plants.
The collective occupational radiation dose was 
2.00 manSv and 0.49 manSv at Loviisa 1 and 
Loviisa 2 respectively, i.e. a total of 2.49 manSv for 
both plant units. The collective occupational dose is 
mostly incurred in outage work. According to STUK 
guidelines, the threshold for one plant unit’s collec-
tive dose averaged over two successive years is 
2.5 manSv per one gigawatt of net electrical power. 
This means a radiation dose of 1.22 manSv per one 
Loviisa plant unit. It was exceeded at Loviisa 1 by 
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0.09 manSv and cannot be considered low by inter-
national comparison. The collective occupational 
dose (1.93 manSv) that accumulated in the extend-
ed 2004 annual maintenance outage of Loviisa 1 
contributed to it. The licensee is obliged to report to 
STUK the causes for this and any measures neces-
sary to improve radiation safety. Collective occupa-
tional radiation doses over the past years are given 
in Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.4).
Radioactive releases
Radioactive releases from Loviisa nuclear power 
plant in 2004 were well below authorised limits. 
Releases of radioactive noble gases were ca 7 TBq, 
i.e. about 0.03 % of authorised limit. The releases of 
radioactive noble gases were dominated by argon-
41, i.e. the activation product of argon, originating 
in the air space between the reactor pressure ves-
sel and the main biological shield. The releases of 
radioactive iodine isotopes were about 11 MBq, i.e. 
approx. 0.005% of authorised limit. Aerosol releas-
es were approx. 0.1 GBq, tritium releases approx. 
0.2 TBq and carbon-14 releases approx. 0.3 TBq.
The tritium content of liquid efﬂuents was ap-
prox. 17 TBq. The total activity of other nuclides 
released into the sea was about 1 GBq, i.e. about 
0.2% of the release limit. Loviisa nuclear power 
plant released low-level evaporation waste to the 
sea according to plan towards the end of 2004. The 
volume of liquid releases from the Loviisa plant 
was thus higher than in 2003. A previous corre-
sponding release was in 2001.
The release limits are to maintain individual 
annual radiation exposure in the surrounding pop-
ulation of plants clearly below the threshold val-
ue (100 microSv) determined by the Government 
Resolution (395/1991). The calculated radiation 
dose of the most exposed individual in the vicinity 
of the plant was about 0.2 microSv, i.e. less than 
0.2% of the set limit. Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.5) 
gives radioactive releases and calculated radiation 
doses to the most exposed individual in the plant 
vicinity over the past years.
Environmental radiation monitoring
Environmental radiation monitoring around a nu-
clear power plant comprises on- and off-site ra-
diation measurements as well as determination of 
radioactive substances to establish public exposure 
and radioactive substances in the environment.
In the environment of Loviisa nuclear power 
plant, 329 samples were analysed in accordance 
with the monitoring programme. Radioactive sub-
stances originating in the Loviisa plant were meas-
ured in two samples of air, six samples of deposi-
tion, one sample of bottom fauna, ten samples of 
aquatic plants, eight samples of sinking matter 
and ﬁve samples of sea water.
Cobalt-60, the dominating radioactive substance 
originating in power plants, was measured in 24 
samples. The next most dominant were silver-110m 
(16 observations), cobalt-58 (10 observations), anti-
monium-124 (8 observations), manganese-54 (8 
observations), and tritium (5 observations). In ad-
dition, chromium-51, iron-59, zirconium-95, nio-
bium- 95 and tellurium-123m were detected in one 
sample of aquatic plants.
All the detected concentrations were low and 
had no bearing on radiation exposure.
Table I. Occupational radiation dose distribution at 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant units in 2004.
Dose range 
(msv)
Number of persons by dose
Loviisa Olkiluoto total*
< 0,5 166 434 557
0.5–1 79 243 296
1–2 120 240 331
2–3 79 148 213
3–4 56 68 109
4–5 36 33 77
5–6 30 15 44
6–7 24 8 36
7–8 21 2 25
8–9 17 – 25
9–10 16 – 12
10–11 15 – 15
11–12 5 – 4
12–13 13 2 17
13–14 13 – 19
14–15 21 – 25
15–16 3 – 4
16–17 – – 2
17–18 – – –
18–19 – – –
19–20 – – –
20–21 – – –
21–25 – – –
> 25 – – –
* The data in this column include Finnish workers who have received 
doses also at Swedish nuclear power plants. The same person may 
have worked at both Finnish nuclear power plants and in Sweden.
 Source: STUK’s dose register
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Radioactive strontium, caesium and plutonium 
isotopes (strontium-90, caesium-134 and -137, plu-
tonium-238, -239 and -240) originating from the 
Chernobyl accident and the fallout from nuclear 
weapons tests are still measurable in environmen-
tal samples. Natural radioactive substances (i.a. 
beryllium-7, potassium-40 as well as uranium and 
thorium with their decay products) are also de-
tected. Their concentrations usually exceed those 
of nuclides originating from the power plant or 
fallout.
External radiation is monitored by 15 auto-
matic radiation measuring stations at a radius of 
two and ﬁve kilometres from the plant. The meas-
urement data are transferred to the power plants’ 
control rooms and to the national radiation-moni-
toring system. In addition, dosimeters for external 
radiation measurement have been placed in about 
ten locations around the nuclear power plants. No 
dose rates exceeding the natural background were 
measured.
3.1.5 Oversight of organisational operation
Safety management
Information accumulated during document review 
and other inspection activity at the Loviisa plant 
was examined in 2004 with a view to plant safety. 
No signiﬁcant problems were observed in plant 
safety management.
Quality management
Loviisa nuclear power plant has systematically 
maintained and developed its quality management 
system according to own plans. In 2002 and 2003, 
the system was updated to correspond to the or-
ganisational and procedural changes implemented 
at the plant. It has been routinely updated since. 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy will in early 2005 up-
date the guidelines describing the quality man-
agement system for the nuclear energy section of 
Fortum corporation.
Over the past years, the licensee has compared 
the quality management system of the Loviisa 
plant with, among others, the standard ISO 9001 
and the safety requirements and guidelines of the 
IAEA. Based on this, the system has been further 
developed by, among others, management reviews 
and self-assessment to help identify improvement 
needs in the management system and operations.
The Loviisa plant regularly evaluates the func-
tionality of its quality management system by 
means of an internal audit programme and a sepa-
rate, independent inspection procedure.
STUK oversaw quality management by docu-
ment reviews and by an inspection of its periodic 
inspection programme. For reasons of schedule, the 
inspection was postponed to January 2005. It dealt 
with the licensee’s organisation, safety manage-
ment, quality management and safety improve-
ments. STUK found quality management by the 
licensee and Loviisa power plant acceptable.
Personnel qualiﬁcations, 
training and resources
The organisation of the Loviisa plant was rear-
ranged in 2002. This was in preparation for, among 
others, change of generation and it was done by of-
fering a chance to knowledge transfer from senior 
to junior personnel in expert tasks and by assign-
ing junior personnel to managerial tasks in the line 
organisation. Several persons, who had worked for 
a relatively short time for the Loviisa plant, par-
ticipated in a 5-week basic professional training 
course on nuclear safety in Finland in 2004.
Within the framework of the periodic inspection 
programme, STUK oversaw the appropriateness 
and adequacy of Loviisa nuclear power plant’s 
organisation and its personnel training. In a sepa-
rate inspection on training, the plant’s procedures 
as regards training arrangements, personnel quali-
ﬁcations and special training pertaining to annual 
maintenances were assessed.
Upon application by the licensee, STUK au-
thorised persons in the licensee’s employ to work 
as shift managers or operators at the power plant. 
Authorisations were reauthorisations and were 
granted to 25 persons employed by the Loviisa 
plant.
No signiﬁcant changes took place in the plant’s 
operating organisation or procedures. Personnel 
changed normally owing to change of genera-
tion, duties and workplace. Deﬁcient personnel 
resources have been observed at Loviisa power 
plant, mostly in work supervision during annual 
maintenances. The organisation’s resources and 
competences are otherwise adequate to safely oper-
ate the plant units.
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Operational experience feedback
In its operational experience feedback work, the 
licensee reviewed events at own and other plants. 
Events at plants abroad were dealt with in special 
operational feedback working groups. The objec-
tive of operational experience feedback work is to 
prevent recurrence of events endangering plant 
safety. Based on operational experience feedback, 
minor improvements were carried out at the plant 
units in 2004 relating to methods and guidelines 
for the most part but including also component 
inspections and additional analyses. Operational 
experience feedback information was passed on to 
the personnel in the form of reports and training.
STUK’s oversight of operational feedback activi-
ties was by review of event reports and the annual 
operational feedback report submitted by the licen-
see. The Loviisa plant has systematic guidelines 
for event investigation, assessment and corrective 
action.
STUK evaluated the feasibility of experiences 
learned from events abroad for consideration at 
Finnish plants. Event information was received 
through the IAEA/OECD Incident Reporting 
System (IRS). Eighty event reports were reviewed 
in 2004, seven of which lead to detailed inspection 
after preliminary assessment. No event in 2004 
warranted immediate action by the licensee. At 
the Loviisa plant, one event led to consideration 
of lessons learnt in connection with normal STUK 
inspection activity.
STUK’s periodic inspection programme
In 2004 STUK carried out 13 inspections of the 
periodic inspection programme at the Loviisa plant 
one of which was postponed to early 2005 for rea-
sons of schedule. Safety management, main proc-
esses and procedures of operation as well as the 
technical acceptability of systems were looked into. 
The compliance of plant safety assessment, opera-
tion, maintenance and protection activities with 
the requirements of nuclear safety regulations was 
veriﬁed by the inspections. The annual inspection 
programme was brought to the attention of the 
licensee and inspection dates were agreed upon in 
early 2004. The inspections contained in the period-
ic inspection programme are given in Appendix 4.
Information was acquired through oral reports 
requested from the licensee’s experts, personnel 
interviews, document reviews, walk rounds, ob-
serving of working as well as various measure-
ments, i.a. to establish the accuracy of measuring 
equipment. None of the observations made had 
an immediate bearing on the safety of the plant 
units. Actions were initiated at the plant to repair 
detected defects.
Event investigation
STUK started no event investigations in 2004. An 
event investigation team is appointed when the 
licensee’s own organisation has not operated as 
planned in connection with an event or when the 
event is estimated to lead to signiﬁcant modiﬁca-
tions in the plant technical layout or procedures. A 
STUK investigation team is set up if the licensee 
has not adequately clariﬁed the root causes of an 
event.
A topical inspection of the use of contractors 
was carried out at Loviisa power plant. The use 
of system, component and services suppliers at 
the plant was assessed as well as the procedures 
applied and practices in their use. The following 
were chosen as examples of contracted work and 
contractors: a routine services purchase (piping 
condition monitoring), spare parts and servicing 
of a highly demanding item of equipment (primary 
coolant pumps) and an engineering service pur-
chase (Fortum Nuclear Services). In the inspec-
tions, deﬁciencies were found in Loviisa power 
plant’s procedures for co-ordination and supervi-
sion of contractor work, supplier evaluation and 
familiarisation with the plant procedures.
Authorisation of pressure equipment 
manufacturers as well as inspection 
and testing organisations
Upon application by Fortum Power and Heat Oy, 
and in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, 
STUK authorised ten manufacturers of nuclear 
pressure equipment.
STUK also authorised, in accordance with the 
Nuclear Energy Act, six testing organisations to 
carry out manufacturing-related nondestructive 
testing of mechanical components and structures 
of the Loviisa plant units. Further, upon applica-
tion by Fortum Power and Heat Oy, testing person-
nel employed by four testing organisations were 
authorised to carry out periodic inspection of me-
chanical components and structures at the Loviisa 
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plant units. Previous decisions on manufacturers 
and testing organisations are valid, as mentioned 
in the decisions. Loviisa power plant’s inspection 
unit “Inspection Organisation Loviisa YVL”, au-
thorised in 2002, continued in operation.
STUK oversaw the operation of manufacturers 
as well as testing and inspection organisations it 
had approved. Their operation was established 
as being in accordance with the requirements of 
Guides YVL 3.4 and YVL 1.3.
In accordance with Guide YVL 5.2, which took 
effect on 1 December 2004, and upon application by 
Loviisa power plant, STUK authorised “Inspection 
Organisation Loviisa YVL, electrical engineering 
and I&C technology” and persons in the employ of 
Loviisa power plant to carry out the commissioning 
inspections of safety classiﬁed electrical and I&C 
equipment at Loviisa nuclear power plant.
Nuclear liability
The users of nuclear energy must have acquired 
liability as stipulated in the Nuclear Liability Act 
(484/1972), or other ﬁnancial guarantee, for a pos-
sible accident at a nuclear facility that would harm 
the environment, population and property. Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy has provided for damage from 
a nuclear accident as prescribed by law by taking 
out an insurance policy for this purpose mainly in 
the Finnish Nuclear Insurance Pool.
In case of accident, funds for compensation 
are available through three sources: the licensee, 
the facility’s country of location and the interna-
tional liability community. In 2004, a total of about 
425 000 000 € was available for compensation from 
all these sources. In the coming years, an increase 
in the sum is expected as international negotia-
tions about the revision of the Paris/Brussels nu-
clear liability agreements were completed in 2004. 
The funds available for compensation will more 
than triple in the near future compared with the 
current situation. In addition, the enactment of 
unlimited licensee liability by law is under consid-
eration in Finland.
The ascertaining of the contents and conditions 
of a licensee’s insurance policy belongs in Finland 
to the Insurance Supervisory Authority. It has ap-
proved Fortum Power and Heat Oy’s liability in-
surance and STUK has veriﬁed the existence of the 
policy in accordance with section 55 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act (990/1987).
The Nuclear Liability Act covers also the trans-
port of nuclear materials. STUK has ascertained 
that all nuclear material transport has liability 
insurance approved by the Insurance Supervisory 
Authority.
3.1.6 Nuclear safety indicators
The requirements set for the safety indicators of 
the effectiveness of STUK’s operations were ful-
ﬁlled at Loviisa power plant as regards individual 
occupational doses, radioactive releases and popu-
lation exposure. The Loviisa 1 collective radiation 
dose incurred during the annual maintenance out-
age, an extended repair and maintenance outage, 
was somewhat higher than estimated. As a result, 
the calculational reporting threshold per one gi-
gawatt of net electrical power, as established in 
Guide YVL 7.9, was exceeded. After the controlled 
release of stored, clariﬁed low-level efﬂuent to the 
sea in late 2004, the total activity of radioactive 
releases into the sea exceeded that of 2003. This 
is a procedure, repeated every few years, requiring 
advance notice to STUK.
No events at the Loviisa plant units endan-
gered plant safety. The number of events reported 
in accordance with Guide YVL 1.5 was on a slight 
increase. No onsite ﬁres occurred. Three events 
warranted a special report and nine an operational 
transient report. The licensee’s report on the elec-
trical accident during the Loviisa 1 annual mainte-
nance is not contained in any of the above classes 
of event reports and thus is not included in the 
nuclear safety indicators. STUK’s safety indicators 
do not depict the number of accidents at work.
The safety indicator system looks also at the 
risk-importance of operational events. Events are 
divided into three categories according to their 
risk-importance, the indicator in each category 
being the number of events. One reactor scram 
initiated by the malfunctioning of the reactor pro-
tection system occurred at Loviisa 1 during which 
all safety systems functioned according to design. 
Since no signiﬁcant safety-endangering events oc-
curred at the Loviisa plant, this scram became the 
most risk-signiﬁcant event. Nine other events in 
the highest risk category occurred at the plant. 
The unavailability of safety systems during these 
events was caused by latent component failures of 
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emergency diesel generators, the emergency feed 
water system and the containment spray system. 
Because of conservative modelling, the annual 
maintenances of the back-up emergency feed wa-
ter system were included in the most signiﬁcant 
events. The number of events in the most risk-sig-
niﬁcant class at the Loviisa plant decreased from 
2003. The events in 2004, which were analysed, are 
considered part of normal operation and called for 
no additional measures by STUK. The differences 
in the number of events, as compared to 2003, are 
normal statistical ﬂuctuation.
The previous year’s decreasing trend for the 
maintenance function of the Loviisa power plant 
slowed down based on the 2004 indicators. The 
number of annual maintenance tasks decreased 
slightly from 2003. This was due to a reduction in 
the total number of failures since the number of 
preventive maintenance tasks at annual level has 
remained a constant. The number of failures re-
quiring an immediate operational restriction dur-
ing power operation has been on the increase over 
the past years at Loviisa 2. The failures occurred 
in such backup systems as do not directly affect the 
operation of the plant units or nuclear safety. Their 
repair is prioritised within available resources and 
according to urgency and safety signiﬁcance. This 
is evident in approximate repair times that have 
been long at the Loviisa plants, particularly at 
Loviisa 2 in 2003 and 2004.
The structural integrity of multiple barriers 
containing radioactive releases has been good. No 
fuel leaks have occurred at the Loviisa plant units 
for years now. The combined leakage rate of con-
tainment penetrations and airlocks increased but 
the set limit was not exceeded. The leaktightness 
of the rubber bellows of the penetrations had been 
problematic and their conversion to metal struc-
tures has been initiated at Loviisa power plant. 
The chemistry indices showed only a low impurity 
and corrosion content in the primary and second-
ary coolants of Loviisa 1 in 2004. The high chemis-
try index value at Loviisa 2 in 2003–2004 was due 
to a service water leak from the condenser of one 
turbine. This was apparent due to the chloride con-
centration of the blow down systems of the steam 
generators. The leak was repaired in the 2004 an-
nual maintenance outage, whereafter the indicator 
values resumed pre-leak level.
Shortcomings in the supervision of work done 
onsite and that commissioned to outsiders were de-
tected at the plant. The objectives set for document 
updating were not fully achieved. Objectives of 
radiation protection planning during the Loviisa 1 
annual maintenance outage were not achieved and 
the collective dose reporting threshold prescribed 
in YVL guides was exceeded. STUK’s safety indi-
cator follow-up showed some deﬁciencies in the 
authenticity of reported laboratory results. Similar 
problems surfaced in the clariﬁcation of mistakes 
observed in the calculation of indicators depicting 
safety systems unavailability. The increase in the 
average repair times of components subject to the 
Technical Speciﬁcations was not unambiguously 
clariﬁed. The long repair times could indicate prob-
lems in ageing management or limited resources in 
the maintenance operations.
The results of STUK’s safety performance indi-
cators for nuclear power plants in 2004 are given 
in Appendix 1.
3.1.7 Overall safety assessment
The annual safety assessment for Loviisa nuclear 
power plant looks at the implementation of YVL 
guides at the plant as well as observations on plant 
safety analyses, modiﬁcations, availability and or-
ganisational operation made in regulatory work in 
2004. The assessment is discussed in more detail 
in sub-sections 3.1.1−3.1.6 and in the appendices 
of this report. No signiﬁcant nuclear safety relat-
ed shortcomings were detected during regulatory 
oversight.
During the implementation of new YVL guides 
on reporting, safety analyses, commissioning of 
nuclear power plants, testing, nuclear fuel and 
radiation protection nothing was found to prevent 
the commissioning of the revised procedures. In 
the case of some guides, the realisation of licensee 
plans, which span several years, calls for deter-
mined and persistent work. As a deviation from the 
set level of requirements in nuclear power plant 
design, it was approved, as regards Guide YVL 2.8, 
that the design-basis core melt frequency estab-
lished for new nuclear power plants is not achieved 
at Loviisa nuclear power plant. According to the 
licensee, the core melt frequency for the Loviisa 
plant units is approx. 1.5·10–4/year, whereas the 
STUK-B-YTO 241
23
target value in accordance with Guide YVL 2.8 is 
10–5/year.
According to Loviisa nuclear power plant’s up-
dated shutdown risk analysis, weather and other 
environmental phenomena account for a major part 
of the core melt probability estimated for the plant. 
The most signiﬁcant environmental phenomena 
from the risk point of view include simultaneous 
high air and sea water temperatures as well as oil 
spills or chemicals releases and the occurrence of 
algae, which could be transported to the sea water 
channel and prevent the plant’s coolant intake. The 
core melt probability from weather risks (oil spills 
included) during an annual maintenance outage is 
approx. 1.3∙10–5.
Important projects relating to plant lifetime 
management were implemented at the Loviisa 
power plant in 2004. A new operating permit was 
granted for the Loviisa 1 reactor pressure vessel 
and a conceptual design plan for the I&C modiﬁ-
cations was approved. A new back-up decay heat 
removal system, shared by the plant units, was 
completed.
The new operating permit for the Loviisa 1 re-
actor pressure vessel was granted until the 2012 
annual maintenance outage. The thermohydraulic 
and fracture mechanical analyses of reactor pres-
sure vessel loadings have been entirely modiﬁed. 
The most signiﬁcant change, however, is the reas-
sessment of the ductile-brittle transition tempera-
ture, using VTT State Technical Research Centre’s 
“Master curve” method to reduce uncertainties re-
lating to the deﬁnition of fracture toughness. It can 
be considered that the rate of re-embrittlement has 
been sufﬁciently conservatively determined; that 
a deterministic analysis shows the reactor pres-
sure vessel maintains its integrity in all postulated 
loadings; and that the fracture risk, as derived by 
probabilistic analysis, accounts only for a minor 
part of the total risk of severe accidents.
The I&C modiﬁcation at Loviisa plant reached 
implementation phase at the end of 2004. The 
project started with the construction of the new 
I&C building and is due for ﬁnal completion in 
2014. Implementation is planned to take place 
phase-by-phase such that modiﬁed sections of the 
I&C system can be commissioned during annual 
maintenances. The different phases of the modiﬁ-
cation are implemented ﬁrst at Loviisa 1 and then 
at Loviisa 2 every two years later. The construction 
of the new I&C building was begun at Loviisa 1.
No signiﬁcant safety-related shortcomings 
were detected during plant operability oversight 
in 2004. No signiﬁcant disturbances occurred dur-
ing the operation of the plant units, which was in 
compliance with the Technical Speciﬁcations with 
the exception of two events. Three operational 
events warranted a special report. The annual 
maintenance outage of Loviisa 1 was an extended 
8-yearly annual maintenance and that of Loviisa 2 
a refuelling outage of short duration. During the 
Loviisa 1 annual maintenance outage, STUK paid 
attention to deﬁcient safety procedures during the 
renewal of decay heat removal system piping and 
inferior plant unit housekeeping. No remarks were 
made on housekeeping during the Loviisa 2 annual 
maintenance outage.
Because the Loviisa 1 annual maintenance out-
age was an extended outage, the periodic inspec-
tion programme of mechanical components was 
highly extensive in scope. The plant’s primary and 
secondary circuits underwent pressure testing ear-
ly in the outage. An internal inspection of the reac-
tor pressure vessel was done by STUK-approved, 
qualiﬁed inspection methods. These, or any other 
inspections in accordance with a pre-approved 
programme, revealed no indications exceeding the 
threshold of approval. The protective sleeves of the 
penetration nozzles of the reactor pressure vessel 
head were inspected based on operational feedback 
data from other VVER-type plants. Water was 
found behind two protective sleeves at both plants. 
This has no immediate effect on the continued safe 
operation of the plants.
An electrical accident occurred during the 
Loviisa 1 annual maintenance outage in which 
one worker died and two were injured. The event’s 
investigation, due for completion in early 2005, is 
headed by the Uusimaa industrial safety district, 
with expert assistance from the Safety Technology 
Authority of Finland (TUKES). The event revealed 
signiﬁcant shortcomings in procedures relating to 
electrical work safety.
The doses of all nuclear power plant workers 
were below the individual dose limit. At Loviisa 1, 
the threshold for one plant unit’s collective dose 
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per one gigawatt of net electrical power, calcu-
lated according to STUK guidelines, was slightly 
exceeded due to work done in the steam generator 
compartment. The collective occupational dose can-
not be considered low by international comparison. 
Radioactive releases were low and the dose calcu-
lated on their basis for the most exposed individual 
in the vicinity of Loviisa nuclear power plant was 
well below the limit established by Government 
Resolution.
The life management procedures of Loviisa 
nuclear power plant were further developed in 
2004. No signiﬁcant safety deﬁciencies surfaced 
in inspections relating to the ageing of mechanical 
components as well as electrical and I&C systems 
and structures. The negative trend shown by the 
indicators for the maintenance function of Loviisa 
nuclear power plant did not continue in 2004. The 
structural integrity of multiple barriers containing 
plant releases has been good.
Qualiﬁcation of the periodic testing of the most 
important mechanical components by nondestruc-
tive methods was developed in 2004. Both licensees 
and Inspecta Oy have agreed upon national ar-
rangements for carrying qualiﬁcation into effect 
and for designating SFS Inspecta Certiﬁcation as 
the organisation responsible for the operation of 
the qualiﬁcation organisation. First qualiﬁcations 
were carried out in 2004 in accordance with the 
level of requirements of the new operations model.
The plant’s operating organisation or proce-
dures did not signiﬁcantly change. The electrical 
accident and the accumulated collective radiation 
dose can be atttributed to scarce personnel re-
sources mostly in work supervision during annual 
maintenances. Apart from these, the organisation 
has sufﬁcient resources and qualiﬁcations to safely 
operate the plant units.
The periodic inspection programme of Loviisa 
power plant, implemented by STUK, revealed no 
signiﬁcant safety defects.
STUK did not start any new investigations into 
the plant’s operation in 2004.
3.2 Olkiluoto 1 and 2
3.2.1 Implementation of regulations
STUK has introduced a procedure for application 
of new or revised YVL guides to operating nuclear 
facilities. A new YVL guide does not, as such, alter 
any previous decisions made by STUK. After hav-
ing heard those concerned, STUK makes a sepa-
rate decision on how a new or revised YVL guide 
applies to operating nuclear facilities, or those un-
der construction, and to licensees’ operational ac-
tivities. New guides apply as such to new nuclear 
facilities.
When considering how new safety requirements 
presented in YVL guides apply to operating nuclear 
power plants, or those under construction, STUK 
takes into account the principle stated in section 
27 of the Government Resolution (395/1991), which 
prescribes that for further safety enhancement, 
action shall be taken which can be regarded as 
justiﬁed considering operating experience and the 
results of safety research as well as the advance-
ment of science and technology.
Implementation decisions in accordance with 
the new procedure were made on the below guides
• Guide YVL 1.5, Reporting nuclear facility op-
eration to the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority, 8 September 2003
• YVL 2.2, Transient and accident analyses for 
justiﬁcation of technical solutions at nuclear 
power plants, 26 August 2003
• YVL 2.5 Pre-operational and start-up testing of 
nuclear power plants, 29 September 2003
• YVL 2.8, Probabilistic safety analyses for 
safety management of nuclear power plants, 
28.5.2003
• YVL 3.8, Nuclear power plant pressure equip-
ment. In-service inspection with non-destruc-
tive testing methods, 22 September 2003
• YVL 6.3, Regulatory control of nuclear fuel and 
control rods, 28 May 2003
• YVL 6.8, Handling and storage of nuclear fuel, 
27 October 2003
• YVL 7.5, Meteorological measurements of a nu-
clear power plant, 28 May 2003
• YVL 7.11, Radiation monitoring systems and 
equipment in nuclear power plants, 13 July 
2004
• YVL 7.18, Radiation safety aspects in the design 
of a nuclear power plant, 26 September 2003.
Prior to the making of the above decisions, 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy assessed how the require-
ments in each guide would be fulﬁlled. Olkiluoto 1 
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and 2 fulﬁl all the requirements of Guides YVL 1.5, 
YVL 6.3 and YVL 6.8 and they entered into force 
as such at the plant.
In its assessment of Guide YVL 2.2, Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy suggested that the transient and ac-
cident analyses for Olkiluoto 1 and 2 fulﬁl, for the 
most part, the requirements of the new guide. The 
deﬁciencies detected by the licensee pertain to 
sensitivity analyses, which have been extensively 
addressed in connection with probabilistic safety 
analyses (PSA). In addition, the assessment of 
severe accident test results on the coolability of 
a core melt is under way. So far, the results have 
not shown any need to update the severe acci-
dent analyses. STUK established in its decision 
that after the completion of a ﬁnal assessment, 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy will have to further deﬁne 
the assumptions used in the anlyses, if necessary.
As regards Guide YVL 2.5, STUK was able 
to establish, based on a report submitted by the 
licensee, that the requirements of the new guide 
are fulﬁlled for the most part. STUK addition-
ally required, however, for the licensee to consider 
whether a separate guide is needed on the drawing 
up of pre-operational testing programmes for modi-
ﬁcations to be made at Olkiluoto 1 and 2.
In its assessment of Guide YVL 2.8, the licensee 
presented schedules for, among others, the develop-
ment of in-service piping inspection programmes 
using risk-informed methods. At STUK’s request, 
the licensee further deﬁned its clariﬁcation on 
the use of risk analyses to develop the Technical 
Speciﬁcations, safety classiﬁcation and the preven-
tive maintenance programme during operation. By 
its decision, STUK conﬁrmed the schedules pro-
posed by the licensee to apply new requirements. 
As a deviation from the level of requirements, 
higher than previously, in nuclear power plant 
design, it was approved that the design-basis core 
melt frequency for new nuclear power plants is not 
achieved at Olkiluoto 1 and 2. Licensee analysis 
gives 1.64∙10–5/year as the core melt frequency of 
the plant units, whereas the target value in Guide 
YVL 2.8 is 10–5/year.
The licensee presented a plan to fulﬁl the 
new qualiﬁcation requirements of Guide YVL 3.8. 
STUK approved the assessment about the fulﬁl-
ment of safety requirements and the plan for in-
spection qualiﬁcation. The qualiﬁcation schedule 
extends until the year 2008.
STUK considered insufﬁcient the clariﬁcation 
on Guide YVL 7.5 and called for an improvement 
of the onsite weather measurement system and 
for more measurement stations in the plant’s pro-
tective zone. The review of a more detailed plan 
submitted by the licensee is under way at STUK. 
As regards Guide YVL 7.11, STUK was able to 
establish, based on the licensee’s clariﬁcation, that 
the guide’s requirements are fulﬁlled when the 
forthcoming renewal of the ﬁxed radiation meas-
urement system is taken into consideration. The 
licensee’s clariﬁcation on Guide YVL 7.18 was in 
line, for the most part, with STUK’s view of the 
fulﬁlment of the requirements. However, STUK re-
quired additional clariﬁcations on certain require-
ments on provision made for radiation conditions 
during severe accidents.
3.2.2 Assessment of safety analyses
Deterministic safety analyses
The licensees update deterministic safety analyses 
for nuclear power plants in connection with the 
renewal of operating licences. The analyses are up-
dated also in connection with plant modiﬁcations, 
or whenever operational events warrant it. STUK 
reviews licensee analyses and conducts, or commis-
sions the conducting, where necessary, of its own 
reference analyses. In 2004 the Olkiluoto plant 
commissioned a new type of fuel the deterministic 
safety analyses for which Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
submitted to STUK for approval. STUK reviewed 
the analyses and approved the use of the new fuel 
type at the Olkiluoto plant as of the 2004 refuel-
ling. No other deterministic safety analyses were 
submitted to STUK for review.
Probabilistic safety analyses
STUK reviewed the ﬂood risk analysis for the 
Olkiluoto plant. Onsite ﬂooding accounts only for 
a small share of the core melt frequency although 
the new ﬂood route found in a previous inspection 
(ﬂooding in the sea water circuit spreads via the 
turbine building to the auxiliary building) accounts 
for a signiﬁcant part of the ﬂood risk. The model-
ling of the new ﬂood route plus the lower ﬂow rates 
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yielded by new fault statistics contribute to the 
outcome. If calculated using the model employed 
in the previous analysis update (rev. 2) and its ﬂow 
rates, the plant’s core melt frequency from ﬂood-
ing of the sea water system would be by a factor of 
approx. ten higher than the analysis outcome now 
updated.
The frequency of the most signiﬁcant ﬂood-ini-
tiating event (a large sea water system pipe leak) 
has decreased only by a factor of approx. 3, i.e. 
relatively less than those of other ﬂood-initiating 
events. This is because analyses of the spreading of 
sea water system ﬂooding brought forth new risk-
increasing factors. The risk from sea water system 
ﬂooding thus increased compared with other ﬂood 
events.
The most signiﬁcant leaks from the sea water 
system are from the system’s leaking rubber seals, 
which lead to the loss of shutdown cooling. The 
major part of the risk in sea water system leaks is 
from the loss of shutdown cooling.
Based on the new analysis data, ﬂooding-in-
duced core melt probability per year has reduced 
from approx. 1.5∙10–6 to approx. 1.6∙10–7. Because 
of the new failure data, the overall frequency/year 
of ﬂood-initiating events has decreased from ap-
prox. 8∙10–2 to 5.5∙10–³. Considerable uncertainties 
still relate to the frequencies of the ﬂood-initiating 
event, particularly as regards ﬂanges and rubber 
sealings.
Teollisuuden Voima Oy has submitted to STUK 
a plan to reduce the risk of ﬂooding in sea water 
systems. It also submitted an updated ﬂood-risk 
analysis (rev. 4) to STUK for review at the end of 
2004.
3.2.3 Oversight of plant modiﬁcations
The Olkiluoto plant is undergoing turbine plant up-
grading, which includes the replacement of steam 
driers in the reactor pressure vessel. This upgrad-
ing is discussed later in this report under “Ageing”. 
Safety improvements at the plant units, completed 
in 2004, are described in Appendix 2.
Plant modiﬁcations oversight consisted of the 
deﬁnition of regulatory scope, the handling of 
documents pertaining to the modiﬁcations as well 
as the supervision of their implementation and 
commissioning. STUK supervised the carrying out 
of component and structural modiﬁcations by in-
spections at the plant sites and the manufactur-
ers’ premises as well as by reviewing documents 
submitted by the licensees. Modiﬁcations oversight 
included STUK/licensee meetings and STUK inter-
nal oversight meetings.
In consequence of the modiﬁcations already 
implemented at the plant, several documents 
changed that describe the plants’ operation and 
structure – such as the Technical Speciﬁcations, 
the Final Safety Analysis Report and the operat-
ing and maintenance instructions. STUK reviewed 
the document revisions and generally followed the 
updating of plant documentation after the modi-
ﬁcations. The results of the follow-up are given in 
Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.6).
3.2.4 Oversight of plant operability
Compliance with the Technical 
Speciﬁcations
Compliance with the Technical Speciﬁcations at 
the Olkiluoto power plant was controlled by wit-
nessing operations onsite. The testing and repair of 
components subject to the Technical Speciﬁcations 
were subject to oversight in particular. After the 
completion of the annual maintenance outages, 
the plant unit’s compliance with the Technical 
Speciﬁcations was ascertained before startup. The 
licensee is obliged to immediately report to STUK 
all plant situations in non-compliance with the 
Technical Speciﬁcations.
One situation occurred at the Olkiluoto plant 
units during which a plant unit was in non-compli-
ance with the Technical Speciﬁcations (Appendix 1, 
indicator A.I.2). This happened when one subcondi-
tion of the reactor protection system was brieﬂy 
bypassed at both plant units. The event is looked 
into in more detail in Appendix 3. The licensee has 
planned and carried out actions to prevent recur-
rence.
The Technical Speciﬁcations were deviated from 
also by applying in advance for STUK’s approval of 
non-compliances. In 2004, the licensee applied for 
approval of nine situations in non-compliance with 
the Technical Speciﬁcations. (Appendix 1, indicator 
A.I.2). After an analysis of the safety signiﬁcance of 
the events, STUK approved the applications. Five 
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exemptions were in preparation for the construc-
tion of the new plant. Two approvals pertained to 
the future operation of the plant units: one to the 
testing of a 12-h operator shift and the other to the 
renovation of pumps in the sea water systems.
Operation and operational events
Both Olkiluoto plant units operated reliably. The 
load factor of Olkiluoto 1 was 95.1% and that of 
Olkiluoto 2 was 96.1%. Figure 5 gives the load fac-
tors of the plant units in 1995−2004. The annual 
maintenance outage of Olkiluoto 1 was 16 days 
and that of Olkiluoto 2 nine days. The progress 
of the outages and the measures carried out are 
separately described in this chapter. At Olkiluoto 1, 
one reactor scram and one partial reactor scram 
occurred, both of which brieﬂy interrupted power 
generation. The ﬁrst scram followed the inadvert-
ent closing of a main steam valve and the second 
was caused by a malfunction in the cooling system 
of a diesel generator. The scrams are explained in 
more detail in Appendix 3.
In addition to the annual maintenance outages 
and the reactor scrams, brief interruptions in pow-
er generation due to component malfunctions oc-
curred at both Olkiluoto 1 and 2. The interruption 
at Olkiluoto 1 was due to trouble shooting pertain-
ing to disturbance peaks in the position indicator 
of a relief system control valve. At Olkiluoto 2 it 
was due to the repair of a component malfunction 
in the cooling system of a diesel generator.
Losses in nominal output from component mal-
functions were 0.8% at Olkiluoto 1 and 1.2% at 
Olkiluoto 2. Appendix 1 looks at production losses 
from component malfunctions for a longer period 
(indicator A.1.1.g). Figure 6 gives the daily average 
gross powers of the plant units in 2004.
Two events warranting a special report, two 
reactor scrams and six operational transients to be 
reported to STUK occurred at the Olkiluoto plant 
units (Appendix 1, indicator A.II.1).
The below events at the Olkiluoto plant war-
ranted a special report:
• A fuel handling error at the Olkiluoto spent fuel 
storage (INES Level 0)
• A non-compliance with the Technical Speciﬁca-
tions when protection limits were bypassed dur-
ing testing (INES Level 0).
The events are described in Appendix 3.
In addition to event reports, Olkiluoto plant sub-
mitted to STUK daily reports, quarterly reports, 
annual reports, outage reports, annual environ-
mental safety reports, monthly individual radia-
tion dose reports, annual operational feedback re-
ports and safeguards reports.
Figure 7 gives the number of INES Level 1 
events in 1995–2004. No events higher than Level 1 
occurred.
Annual maintenance outages
The Olkiluoto 1 maintenance outage was on 9 to 25 
May 2004 and the Olkiluoto 2 refuelling outage on 
25 May to 3 June 2004. Olkiluoto 1 stopped electric-
ity generation for about 16 days and Olkiluoto 2 for 
about 9 days. Both outages lasted for about a day 
longer than planned. At both plant units, refuelling 
machine malfunctions were the main cause for the 
extensions.
In addition to reactor refuelling, the licensee 
carried out maintenance and inspection of compo-
nents, structures and systems during the annual 
maintenances. The inspections are described in 
more detail later under “Maintenance and re-
pairs”. The safety modiﬁcations made during an-
nual maintenance are described in Appendix 2.
One near miss situation occurred during the 
Olkiluoto 1 annual maintenance when three ﬁre 
ﬁghters were exposed to escaped gaseous nitrogen 
onsite. They were taken to hospital by ambulance 
but were sent home the same evening after a 
health inspection.Figure 5. Load factors of the Olkiluoto plant units.
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The collective radiation dose incurred in out-
age work was 0.92 manSv at Olkiluoto 1 and 
0.39 manSv at Olkiluoto 2. Occupational radiation 
doses are discussed in more detail later in the re-
port under “Radiation safety” and in Appendix 1 
(indicator A.I.4).
Regulatory oversight of the annual mainte-
nance outages of Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
focused, among others, on the administrative ar-
rangements of outage work, the activities of the 
operating and maintenance personnel, refuelling 
as well as inspections and tests by the licensee 
and contractors. Attention was also paid to the im-
plementation of radiation protection, control room 
operations and housekeeping. Prior to the start of 
a new fuel cycle, safety analyses for the new fuel 
charge were reviewed. In addition, it was inspected 
that fuel assemblies were loaded into the reactor 
according to plan. The nuclear material inventory 
was inspected prior to the closing of the reactor 
pressure vessel head. In addition, STUK control-
led the placement of the plant units into shutdown 
state and their post-outage start-up.
The regulatory oversight of Olkiluoto facility’s 
annual maintenance outages onsite took 99 work-
ing days. Two resident inspectors were regularly 
working on the site as well.
Repairs and maintenance
A containment leakage test and the replacement 
of feedwater distributors were among the most im-
portant repairs and maintenance carried out dur-
ing the Olkiluoto 1 annual maintenance outage.
Figure 6. Daily average gross power of the Olkiluoto plant units in 2004.
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Figure 7. INES classiﬁed events at Olkiluoto plant (INES 
Level 1 and higher).
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A crack detected in a feedwater nozzle at 
Olkiluoto 2 in 2003 was checked and ascertained 
to have remained the same, i.e. it does not prevent 
the plant’s operation. The most signiﬁcant new 
observation was the cracking of the support plates 
of the lugs of new feedwater distributors that were 
installed in 2003. This matter is separately dis-
cussed in Appendix 3.
During the annual maintenance outages of 
the Olkiluoto plant, STUK inspected 22 Safety 
Class 1 and 2 items of pressure equipment subject 
to registration in accordance with the Pressure 
Equipment Act. In addition, the periodic inspection 
of pressure equipment was controlled by reviewing 
the relevant programmes. A total of 223 structural 
inspections of mechanical components, inspections 
of repairs and modiﬁcations as well as commis-
sioning inspections were made. An inspection com-
prises one or several partial inspections such as 
review of results documentation, inspection of a 
component or structure, a pressure or leakage test, 
a functional test or an operational safety inspec-
tion. In addition, nine inspections of electrical and 
I&C equipment were made, which, too, comprise 
several partial inspections.
STUK witnessed at the plant site inspections of 
mechanical components and structures in Safety 
Classes 3, 4 and Class EYT (non-nuclear) by the 
utility’s inspection unit “Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
inspection organisation”. Safety classiﬁcation is 
based on STUK guidelines, i.e. Guide YVL 2.1, 
which assigns a nuclear power plant’s systems, 
structures and components to the Safety Classes 
1, 2, 3 and 4 as well as Class EYT. Items with 
the highest safety signiﬁcance belong to Safety 
Class 1.
Ageing
In the 2003 organisation of Olkiluoto power plant, 
responsibility for the long-term follow-up of the 
ageing of components, structures and systems has 
been with the engineering department. The opera-
tions department follows and reports on any ageing 
observed in maintenance. The engineering depart-
ment was divided into two in 2004. Responsibility 
for the structural upkeep of production capability, 
considering lifetime follow-up, rests with the new 
department of power plant engineering.
In 2004, a project signiﬁcant for the operat-
ing lifetime of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 was continued: a 
turbine plant upgrading project, which includes re-
placement of steam dryers inside the reactor pres-
sure vessels. Olkiluoto 2 is due for modiﬁcation in 
the 2005 annual maintenance outage. Turbine au-
tomation is replaced by computer-based technology 
and, for the upgraded system sections, new control 
interface technology will be commissioned, which 
was included in the training simulator in the au-
tum of 2004.
STUK reviewed follow-up reports on the ageing 
of mechanical components and electrical and I&C 
systems and assessed structural ageing follow-up 
during inspections. The analysis and management 
of whisker growth in the zinc coated parts of realys 
was an important object of control.
Inspection methods are to be qualiﬁed to im-
prove the reliability of the in-service inspection 
of the most important mechanical components by 
non-destructive methods. An agreement on the re-
newal of the qualiﬁcation organisation was signed 
by Teollisuuden Voima Oy, Fortum and Inspecta Oy. 
It entered into force on 1 January 2005 and is valid 
until 31 December 2010. According to the agree-
ment, SFS Inspecta Certiﬁcation is the organisa-
tion responsible for the activities of a qualiﬁcation 
body in accordance with Guide YVL 3.8. The na-
tional regulations on qualiﬁcation were amended 
in 2004 to comply with the new organisation.
Radiation safety
Occupational radiation safety
The radiation doses of all those who worked at 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant in 2004 were below 
the 50 mSv annual limit. The distribution of indi-
vidual doses in 2004 is given in Table I. The high-
est occupational dose to an individual at Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant was 12.95 mSv. In 2000–2004, 
individual radiation doses did not exceed the dose 
limit of 100 mSv deﬁned for any period of ﬁve 
years.
In 2004 the collective occupational dose was 
1.06 manSv at Olkiluoto 1 and 0.45 manSv at 
Olkiluoto 2; the total for both plant units be-
ing 1.51 manSv. STUK guidelines state that the 
threshold for one plant unit’s collective dose aver-
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aged over two successive years is 2.10 manSv. This 
was not exceeded in either plant unit. The collec-
tive occupational dose was low by international 
comparison. The collective occupational radiation 
doses incurred over the past years are given in 
Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.4).
Radioactive releases
Radioactive releases into the environment from 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant were well below au-
thorised limits in 2004. The releases of noble gases 
and iodine into the atmosphere were below the de-
tection limit. Aerosol releases into the atmosphere 
were approx. 21 MBq, tritium releases into the at-
mosphere approx. 0.3 TBq and carbon-14 releases 
into the atmosphere approx. 0.8 TBq. The tritium 
content of liquid efﬂuents released into the sea 
was 2 TBq. The total activity of other radionuclides 
released into the sea was 0.5 GBq, i.e. approx. 0.2% 
of the plant-site speciﬁc release limit.
The calculated radiation dose of the most 
exposed individual in the environment of the 
Olkiluoto plant was approx 0.04 mSv, i.e. less than 
0.04% of the limit prescribed by a Government 
Resolution (100 mSv). Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.5) 
presents radioactive releases and the radiation 
doses calculated for the most exposed individual in 
the plant’s environment over the past years.
Environmental radiation monitoring
Radiation monitoring in the environment of a nu-
clear power plant encompasses on- and off-site ra-
diation measurements and determination of radio-
active substances to establish population radiation 
exposure and radioactive substances in the envi-
ronment.
In the environment of Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant, 293 samples were analysed in accordance 
with the monitoring programme. Radioactive sub-
stances originating in Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant were measured in two samples of air, one 
sample of bottom fauna, 15 samples of aquatic 
plants and 14 samples of sinking matter. The tri-
tium content of one sea water sample was above 
normal. The dominating power plant based radio-
active substance, cobalt-60, was measured in all of 
the aforementioned samples. The total number of 
observations was 33. Apart from cobalt, cobalt-58 
and manganese-54 were measured in one sample 
of aquatic plants.
All the detected concentrations were low and 
had no bearing on radiation exposure.
For external radiation measurement, 10 au-
tomatic radiation measuring stations have been 
placed at a distance of about ﬁve kilometres from 
the plants. The measurement data from these sta-
tions are transferred to the power plants’ control 
rooms and to the national radiation-monitoring 
system. There are 11 dosimeters in the environ-
ment of the nuclear power plants. No radiation 
doses above background level were measured.
3.2.5 Oversight of organisational operation
Safety management
Information accumulated during document review 
and other inspection activity at the Olkiluoto plant 
was examined in 2004 with a view to the manage-
ment of plant safety.
In the autumn of 2003, several measures to 
improve the plant’s organisation were launched at 
the Olkiluoto plant. The licensee set up a working 
group to develop operations, recruited more person-
nel for tasks pertaining to operational experience 
feedback and commissioned analyses and training 
to external consultants, among others. The licensee 
also conducted a self-assessment of safety culture 
within its organisation based on IAEA guidelines.
Quality management system
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant has systematically 
maintained and developed its quality manage-
ment system according to own plans. A revised, 
ISO 9001-based management system was launched 
in 2001.
The licensee regularly evaluates the function-
ality of its quality management system by an 
internal follow-up programme and a separate, in-
dependent inspection procedure.
STUK oversaw quality management and its 
functionality by document reviews and inspections 
of its periodic inspection programme. The quality 
management system of the licensee was found ac-
ceptable. The operation of Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
was found to be in compliance with the plant’s own 
quality management system. The remarks made 
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during the inspections were mostly on further de-
velopment of the system and deﬁnition of detail.
Personnel qualiﬁcations, 
training and resources
Personnel recruitment by Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
continued, mostly for the purpose of the new nu-
clear power plant unit. Experienced operating per-
sonnel from the operating plant units have moved 
to tasks pertaining to the new plant unit and new 
employees have been recruited in their place. 
Several persons recently employed by Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy participated in a 6-week basic profession-
al training course on nuclear safety in Finland.
STUK oversaw the appropriateness and ad-
equacy of Olkiluoto power plant’s organisation 
and its personnel training within the framework 
of its periodic inspection programme. The plant’s 
procedures pertaining to personnel qualiﬁcations, 
training and resources as well as training relating 
to the personnel of Olkiluoto 3 and the construc-
tion project were evaluated in a separate training 
inspection.
Upon licensee application, several employees 
were authorised to act as shift managers or op-
erators at the nuclear power plant. A total of 22 
Olkiluoto personnel were authorised, most of them 
for a new 3-year period. A person was authorised 
for the Olkiluoto plant with responsibility for 
emergency preparedness and physical protection. 
A deputy for the responsible manager was author-
ised as well.
The plant’s operating organisation or proce-
dures have not signiﬁcantly changed. The con-
struction of the new plant unit has considerably 
increased the number of personnel at Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy as well as their task rotation. A signiﬁ-
cant change for the operating plants is an increase 
in the resources of operational experience feedback 
and the recruitment of an expert in behavioural 
science. Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s organisation has 
sufﬁcient resources and qualiﬁcations to safely op-
erate the plant units.
Operational experience feedback
STUK oversaw operational feedback activities by 
reviewing the event reports and the annual opera-
tional experience feedback report submitted by the 
licensee. The Olkiluoto plant has systematic and 
regulated procedures for event investigation, as-
sessment and corrective action.
The licensee’s operational experience feedback 
consisted of the handling of events at own and 
other plants. Events at plants abroad were dealt 
with in a special operational feedback working 
group. The objective is to prevent recurrence of 
events endangering plant safety. The development 
measures carried out at the plant units in 2004, 
based on operational experience feedback, were mi-
nor improvements to mostly methods of action and 
guidelines as well as component inspections and 
additional analyses. Operational experience feed-
back information was distributed to the personnel 
in the form of reports and training.
The Olkiluoto plant continued improvements 
made due to the higher-than-usual number of 
plant conditions in 2003 in non-conformance with 
the Technical Speciﬁcations. Factors common to 
the events included insufﬁcient compliance with 
guidelines, administration of periodic testing, fol-
low-up of plant states and indentiﬁcation of the 
requirements of the Technical Speciﬁcations. The 
events were throgoughly reviewed at the plant. 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy commissioned an analysis 
of the events to an external expert. The conclusions 
were discussed in the various organisational units 
of the licensee as well as in a STUK/licensee semi-
nar. STUK follows how the licensee incorporates 
the lessons learned into the plant’s procedures.
STUK evaluated the feasiblity of the lessons 
learned from events abroad for taking into account 
at Finnish plants. Data on the events was obtained 
through the Incident Reporting System (IRS) of 
the IAEA and OECD. In 2004, 80 event reports 
were reviewed, eight of which led to a detailed 
inspection after preliminary assessment. No event 
in 2004 required immediate action by the licensee. 
One event led to the taking into consideration 
of a lesson learned at the Olkiluoto plant during 
STUK’s normal oversight activities.
STUK’s periodic inspection programme
Fifteen inspections of the periodic inspection pro-
gramme were conducted at the Olkiluoto plant 
in 2004, one of which was postponed until early 
2005. The inspections contained in the periodic 
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inspection programme are listed in Appendix 4. 
Safety management, main operational processes 
and procedures as well as the technical accept-
ability of systems were looked into. The inspections 
ensured that plant safety assessment, operation, 
maintenance and protection activities comply with 
nuclear safety regulations. The annual inspection 
programme was brought to the attention of the 
licensee at the beginning of 2004 and inspection 
dates were agreed upon with the licensee.
Information was acquired through oral reports 
requested from licensee’s experts, personnel inter-
views, document reviews, walk rounds, witnessing 
of work on site as well as various measurements, 
i.a. to establish accuracy of measuring equipment. 
None of the observations had signiﬁcance for plant 
unit safety. Relevant corrective action was initiated 
onsite.
Event investigation
STUK started no event investigations in 2004. A 
team is set up to investigate an event whenever 
the licensee organisation has not functioned as 
planned in connection with an event or when an 
event is assessed to lead to signiﬁcant modiﬁca-
tions in the plant technical layout or procedures. 
A STUK investigation team is set up also in case 
the licensee has not sufﬁciently analysed the root 
causes of an event.
STUK conducted a topical inspection of the 
use of contractors at Olkiluoto power plant. The 
use of system, component and services suppliers 
at the plant was assessed as well as the relevant 
procedures and practices. Demanding maintenance 
of special components (control rod drive actuator 
maintenance) and engineering service contracting 
(renewal of steam dryers) were chosen as examples 
of contracted work and service suppliers used by 
the power plant. The power plant’s procedures to 
co-ordinate and control the work of suppliers, to 
assess the suppliers and familiarise them with the 
plant procedures were found deﬁcient. Attention 
was paid to the preservation of the know-how of 
an important engineering supplier in particular 
as well as to the assessment and assurance of the 
plant’s own know-how as regards outsourced main-
tenance tasks.
Pressure equipment manufacturers, and 
inspection and testing organisations
Upon application by Teollisuuden Voima Oy, and 
in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK 
authorised two manufacturers of nuclear pressure 
equipment.
In accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, 
STUK also authorised six testing organisations 
to conduct nondestructive testing relating to the 
manufacturing of mechanical components and 
structures for the Olkiluoto plant units. Testers 
employed by four separate testing organisations 
were authorised to carry out in-service inspection 
of mechanical components and structures of the 
Olkiluoto plant units. Previous decisions pertain-
ing to manufacturers and testing organisations are 
valid as mentioned in the decisions.
Inspection Unit “Teollisuuden Voima Oy inspec-
tion organisation”, authorised in 2002, continued 
in operation.
The manufacturers as well as testing and in-
spection organisations authorised by STUK were 
subject to regulatory oversight. Their operation 
was established to comply with the requirements 
of Guides YVL 3.4 and YVL 1.3.
In accordance with Guide YVL 5.2, val-
id as of 1 December 2004, and upon applica-
tion by Teollisuuden Voima Oy, STUK author-
ised Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s inspection unit 
“Teollisuuden Voima Oy, Inspection, electrical and 
I&C inspection” and persons in Teollisuuden Voima 
Oy’s employment to conduct commissioning inspec-
tions of Olkiluoto nuclear power plant’s safety clas-
siﬁed electrical and I&C components.
Nuclear liability
The users of nuclear energy must have acquired 
liability, or other ﬁnancial guarantee, as stipulat-
ed in the Nuclear Liability Act (484/1972) for a 
possible accident at a nuclear facility that would 
harm the environment, population and property. 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy has prepared for damage 
from a nuclear accident as prescribed by law by 
taking out an insurance policy for this purpose 
mainly in the Finnish Nuclear Insurance Pool.
In the case of an accident, the funds available 
for compensation come from three sources: the 
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licensee, the country of location of the facility and 
the international liability community. In 2004, 
a total of about 425 000 000 € was available for 
compensation from all these sources. An increase 
in the sum is expected in the near future since 
international negotiations about the revision of 
the Paris/Brussels agreements on nuclear liability 
were completed in 2004. The funds available for 
compensation will more than triple in the coming 
years compared with the current situation. In ad-
dition, the enactment of unlimited licensee liability 
by law is under consideration in Finland.
The revision of the contents and conditions of 
a licensee’s insurance policy in Finland belongs 
to the Insurance Supervisory Authority. It has 
approved Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s liability insur-
ance and STUK has veriﬁed the existence of the 
policy in accordance with section 55 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act (990/1987).
The transport of nuclear materials is subject 
to the Nuclear Liability Act. STUK has seen to 
it that all nuclear material transport has had 
liability insurance approved by the Insurance 
Supervisory Authority, or in accordance with the 
Paris Convention, and approved by the authorities 
of the sending country.
3.2.6 Nuclear safety indicators
The requirements set for the indicators on the ef-
fectiveness of STUK’s activities were fulﬁlled at 
Olkiluoto power plant as regards occupational ra-
diation doses, collective radiation doses, radioac-
tive releases and population exposure.
No safety-endangering events occurred at the 
Olkiluoto plant units. The number of events re-
ported in accordance with Guide YVL 1.5 was 
on a marked decrease. No ﬁres occurred on the 
Olkiluoto site. A special report was written on two 
events and an operational transient report on six 
events.
The indicator system looks at the risk-impor-
tance of operational events. Based on their risk-sig-
niﬁcance, events are divided into three categories, 
the indicator being the number of events in each 
category. One reactor scram occurred at Olkiluoto 1 
and all safety systems operated as designed. Since 
no events at Olkiluoto power plant signiﬁcantly 
compromised safety, the scram in question became 
the event most signiﬁcant from the risk point of 
view in 2004. Eight other events belonging in the 
highest risk category occurred at the plant. They 
were caused by both planned unavailabilities and 
failures relating to latent emergency diesel genera-
tors at both plant units and, at Olkiluoto 2, to the 
shutdown reactor intermediate cooling system. The 
number of the most risk-signiﬁcant events was on 
the increase at Olkiluoto. The events analysed for 
2004 are part of nuclear power plant normal opera-
tion and required no additional action by STUK.
The annual maintenance volume of components 
subject to the Technical Speciﬁcations at Olkiluoto 
power plant has been on the decrease over the past 
two years, which is affected by the downward trend 
in the total volume of preventive maintenance 
work for several years now. Correspondingly, the 
number of failures has grown linearly. The volume 
of operation restriction work during power op-
eration showed an increasing trend for the second 
year in succession. The number of failures of Tech 
Spec components causing operation restrictions 
was speciﬁcally high at Olkiluoto 1 in particular. 
The growing trend in failures would indicate a 
weakening plant condition. A simultaneously de-
creasing volume of preventive maintenance jobs 
could indicate problems in component lifetime 
management. Average failure repair times were 
short at the Olkiluoto plant units. Production loss-
es from them were higher than over the past years 
on average. The coming years will show whether 
an actual change has occurred in the trend.
The structural integrity of multiple barriers 
containing radioactive releases has been good. 
Small fuel leaks have occurred at the Olkiluoto 
plant units almost annually. The status of the 
leaks has been followed during power operation 
and leaking fuel assemblies have been removed 
from service in forthcoming annual maintenance 
outages. The number of identiﬁed and unidentiﬁed 
primary circuit leaks at both plant units was small 
during the operating cycle 2003−2004. The indica-
tors for primary circuit chemistry at Olkiluoto 1 
showed a low impurities and corrosion product 
content in 2004. High chloride concentrations at 
Olkiluoto 2 indicated turbine condenser leaks. No 
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unambiguous explanation was found for the sul-
phate concentration of Olkiluoto 2 reactor water, 
which exceeded threshold value in the third an-
nual quarter. Concentrations of corrosion-inducing 
impurities, which brieﬂy exceed normal level, have 
not been shown to negatively affect structural ma-
terials.
The indicators show improvement in the op-
eration of the Olkiluoto plant. Set objectives were 
achieved in quality assurance and radiation pro-
tection. Indicators for failure of components sub-
ject to the Technical Speciﬁcations, maintenance 
and unavailability of safety systems indicated 
possible problems in the maintenance strategy or 
in the plant’s lifetime management. This observa-
tion is supported by technical causes for events 
and growth in the number of the most risk-sig-
niﬁcant events and their underlying component 
failures. Fuel integrity has been problematic at the 
Olkiluoto plants almost every year.
The results of STUK indicators for 2004, which 
depict plant safety, are given in Appendix 1.
3.2.7 Overall safety assessment
The annual safety assessment for the operating 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 units looks at the implementa-
tion of new YVL guides at the plant as well as 
observations made in regulatory oversight in 2004 
on plant safety analyses, modiﬁcations, availability 
and organisational operation. These are discussed 
in more detail in sub-sections 3.2.1−3.2.6 and in 
the appendices of this report. No signiﬁcant nu-
clear safety related shortcomings surfaced during 
STUK’s oversight activities.
During the implementation of new YVL guides 
on reporting, safety analyses, commissioning, test-
ing, nuclear fuel and radiation protection nothing 
prevented the commissioning of the revised proce-
dures. In the case of some guides, the realisation 
of licensee plans several years of duration calls 
for determined and persistent work. As a devia-
tion from the set level of requirements in nuclear 
power plant design, it was approved, as regards 
Guide YVL 2.8, that the design-basis core melt fre-
quency established for new nuclear power plants 
is not achieved at Olkiluoto 1 and 2. According to 
a licensee analysis, the core melt frequency for 
the Olkiluoto plant units is approx. 1.64·10–4/year, 
whereas the target value in accordance with Guide 
YVL 2.8 is 10–5/year.
According to Olkiluoto nuclear power plant’s 
new, updated ﬂood risk analysis, ﬂood-caused core 
melt probability is approx. 1.6∙10–7/year. The licen-
see has devised a plan to further decrease the ﬂood 
risk.
A project signiﬁcant for the lifetime of Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant, i.e. turbine plant upgrading, 
continued in 2004, and it includes the replacement 
of steam driers inside the reactor pressure vessels. 
The modiﬁcations will be ﬁrst implemented in the 
Olkiluoto 2 maintenance outage of 2005. Turbine 
automation will be realised by computer-based 
technology. At the same time, new operator inter-
face technology for the upgraded sections of auto-
mation will be introduced in the control room.
No signiﬁcant disturbances occurred during the 
operation of the plant units, which was in compli-
ance with the Technical Speciﬁcations, with one 
exception. The number of events requiring report-
ing to STUK was small. Two events warranted a 
special report and six operational disturbances 
were reported. The construction of the new plant 
unit required special measures to ascertain the 
safety of operating plant units. These mostly had to 
do with supervision of blasting operations, physi-
cal protection and supply of electrical power and 
cooling water. The construction work also made it 
necessary for the operating plant units to deviate 
from the Technical Speciﬁcations i.a. due to electri-
cal cable routing work.
The annual maintenance outages of the 
Olkiluoto plant units were short and mostly con-
sisted of refuellings and normal maintenance and 
inspection. At Olkiluoto 1, also a containment leak 
test was made and a condensate puriﬁcation proc-
ess was modiﬁed. Of the observations made during 
the annual maintenances, the detection of a new 
crack in the feed water distributors warrants a 
mention. The administration of the annual main-
tenances complied with the licensee’s procedures 
and no major deviations were made. One near-miss 
event occurred at the Olkiluoto 1 annual main-
tenance when three ﬁre ﬁghters were exposed to 
nitrogen gas that escaped inside the plant.
The radiation doses of all nuclear power plant 
workers were below the individual dose limit. The 
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collective occupational dose was low internation-
ally. Radioactive releases were low and the dose 
calculated on their basis for the most exposed in-
dividual in the vicinity of Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant was well below the limit established by 
Government Resolution.
In consequence of an organisational renewal in 
2004, a task important for the plant’s ageing man-
agement, i.e. lifetime follow-up, rests with the new 
department of power plant engineering. No spe-
ciﬁc safety shortcomings surfaced in inspections 
of the ageing management of mechancial compo-
nents, electrical and I&C systems and structures. 
Respective indicators show an unfavourable trend, 
however. Indicators depicting the malfuctioning of 
components subject to the Technical Speciﬁcations, 
the maintenance function and safety system una-
vailability show possible problems in the mainte-
nance strategy or in the plant’s lifetime manage-
ment. An important matter under clariﬁcation is 
whisker growth in the zinc coatings of relays of the 
reactor protection system, which relates to ageing 
of I&C systems. The structural integrity of multi-
ple barriers containing radioactive releases is good, 
although problems in fuel integrity have occurred 
almost every year.
Qualiﬁcation of the in-service testing of the most 
important mechanical components by nondestruc-
tive methods was improved in 2004. Both licensees 
and Inspecta Oy have agreed upon national ar-
rangements for carrying qualiﬁcation into effect 
and for designating SFS Inspecta Certiﬁcation as 
the organisation responsible for the operation of 
the qualiﬁcation organisation. First qualiﬁcation 
operations were carried out in 2004 in accordance 
with the level of requirements of the new opera-
tions model.
The plant’s operating organisation or proce-
dures did not signiﬁcantly change in 2004. The 
safety indicators show an improvement in the op-
eration of Olkiluoto power plant. The construction 
of the new plant unit has markedly increased the 
number of Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s personnel and 
their job rotation. The many measures started in 
2003 to improve the operation of the organisation 
were continued. A signiﬁcant change for the oper-
ating plants is an increase in the resources of the 
operational experience feedback function and the 
recruitment of an expert in behavioural sciences. 
In addition, a self assessement of safety culture 
was conducted in 2004. Teollisuuden Voima Oy has 
sufﬁcient resources and qualiﬁcations to safely run 
the plant units.
The periodic inspection programme of Olkiluoto 
power plant, implemented by STUK, revealed no 
signiﬁcant safety defects.
STUK did not start any new investigations into 
the plant’s operation in 2004.
3.3 Olkiluoto 3
Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO) applied to the 
Government for a licence, in accordance with the 
Nuclear Energy Act, for the construction of a nucle-
ar power plant unit called Olkiluoto 3 in Eurajoki, 
Olkiluoto. The plant unit is a European pressu-
rised water water reactor (EPR) with a 4300 MW 
reactor thermal power and a net electrical capacity 
of approx. 1600 MW. The licence application was 
submitted to the Ministry of Trade and Industry on 
8 January 2004. On 16 January 2004, the Ministry 
requested statements on it from STUK, among oth-
ers.
The plant unit is supplied by a consortium of 
Framatome ANP and Siemens AG, CFS. When 
preparing its statement to the Ministry, STUK as-
sessed the plant unit’s safety. The manufacturing 
of main components and earth-moving operations 
on the site were supervised. STUK evaluated the 
operation of the licence applicant, vendor and sub-
contractors by inspections and audits.
Review of documents pertaining to the 
construction licence application
In early 2004 Teollisuuden Voima Oy submit-
ted to STUK documents, as referred to in section 
35 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, relating to the 
construction licence application. The documents 
include a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, a 
draft classiﬁcation document, an analysis of qual-
ity assurance during construction, plans for physi-
cal protection and emergency preparedness, a 
plan for the arrangement of control necessary to 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
a description of arrangements to enable STUK’s 
control. The licensee also submitted to STUK a 
Preliminary Probabilistic Safety Analysis and 
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safety assessments for the plant and its systems. 
A part of an analysis of quality assurance during 
construction, STUK reviewed the project’s quality 
management system. The licensee complemented 
these documents several times during 2004 due to 
observations made by STUK during reviews and 
the progress made in planning. These document 
reviews were the basis for an assessment of plant 
safety; the results can be found in a safety assess-
ment attached to the statement.
The plant unit’s safety was mostly assessed 
at STUK but also external experts were used to 
review the plans. In support of its own inspection 
activity, STUK commissioned i.a. independent ref-
erence analyses of the plant’s behaviour during 
disturbances and accidents and the radiation ef-
fects of events. The work was mostly commissioned 
to VTT State Technical Research Centre in Finland 
and some of it to the German research institute 
ISaR. To complement own inspections, STUK com-
missioned an expert opinion on reactor primary 
circuit design and a study of aircraft impacts in de-
sign to the German research institute Gesellschaft 
für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH. 
In addition, expert opinions were requested on i.a. 
I&C systems, emergency cooling systems, prima-
ry coolant water chemistry, buildings design, ﬁre 
safety and provision made for weather and elec-
tromagnetic phenomena. In addition to VTT, ISaR 
and GRS, other domestic and foreign independet 
experts and enterprises were used.
To evaluate the acceptability of technical solu-
tions, STUK commissioned analyses and tests on 
severe accident management and the examination 
of the effects of aircraft impacts. In addition, i.a. 
plans for emergency preparedness and ﬁre safety 
were discussed with other authorities (authorities 
of the Eurajoki municipality, the Ministry for the 
Interior, among others).
STUK required modiﬁcations to the plant de-
sign to fulﬁll Finnish safety requirements. These 
focused on the improvement of the reliability of 
safety functions: increased redundancy of systems 
important to safety, more extensive utilisation of 
the diversity principle in the implementation of 
safety functions and improvement of the physical 
separation of systems.
STUK required TVO to make its quality man-
agement procedures more speciﬁc to fulﬁl the 
requirements of YVL guides. Physical protection 
and emergency preparedness arrangements need 
to state in more detail the consideration of the 
Olkiluoto 3 construction site in the Olkiluoto 1 and 
2 guidelines for physical protection and emergency 
preparedness.
Vendor evaluation
Evaluation of vendor performance was based on 
a review of the quality management programme, 
quality plans and manuals as well as audits to 
verify operations. STUK participated in almost 
all audits of vendor performance conducted by 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy. The audits were conducted 
to establish the vendor’s capability to high-quality 
planning and construction. The audits focused on 
quality management, project administration and 
planning in various technical ﬁelds (electrical, I&C, 
process, mechanics, air conditioning, structural en-
gineering, safety and strength analyses).
STUK participated in the audits of some of the 
vendor’s subcontractors important to safety. STUK 
reviewed the vendor’s radiation protection plan and 
the compilation of the probabilistic safety analysis 
and its utilisation in the plant’s planning. As a 
result, several observations were made requiring 
corrective action. The status of the measures was 
checked and ascertained acceptable prior to the is-
suing of the statement.
Control of the manufacturing 
of main components
Control of the manufacturing of primary circuit 
main components and review of related documents 
continued in 2004. STUK witnessed the manufac-
turing of the forged parts of the reactor pressure 
vessel and steam generators at the Japan Steel 
Works.
Upon their completion, STUK conducted a 
structural inspection and granted permission for 
consignment to the Chalon factory in France and to 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) in Japan. The 
welding of ﬁrst steam generator components was 
started at the Chalon factory in September 2004. 
STUK authorised manufacturing in September 
2004 after having reviewed 1st phase construc-
tion plans for steam generator manufacturing and 
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technical documents. The licence was conditional 
since the plant design bases were under review at 
the time. Upon receipt of STUK’s permission, MHI 
started the manufacturing of the reactor pressure 
vessel in January 2005. STUK’s inspectors wit-
nessed the manufacturing of the reactor pressure 
vessel and the steam generators at Chalon and 
MHI.
In addition to the above manufacturers, STUK 
audited the manufacturers of other, mostly prima-
ry-circuit related components (primary circulation 
pumps, pressuriser, reactor pressure vessel inter-
nals, primary circuit piping, steam generator heat 
transfer pipes) to ascertain that the requirements 
of YVL guides are fulﬁlled. In relation to the manu-
facturing of main components, STUK audited and 
approved testing and inspection organisations.
Inspection of TVO’s operations
Inspection of TVO’s operation was based on an as-
sessment of its quality management system, the 
quality of its documents and the results of its safe-
ty assessments. STUK inspected also Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy’s project operation in Olkiluoto dur-
ing the autumn. The objective was to ascertain 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s readiness to realise the 
plant project safely and in high-quality. Inspection 
was focused on project management and resources, 
handling of safety-related matters, project admin-
istration, quality management and document ad-
ministration. As a result, STUK required that the 
procedures for safety assessment and handling of 
safety-related matters, such as the identiﬁcation 
and handling of safety problems within the organi-
sation and decision-making in particular be made 
more speciﬁc. STUK underlined the assurance of 
the safety of the operating units against the poten-
tial effects of the Olkiluoto 3 construction work.
STUK controlled preparatory work on the site 
by inspecting excavated rock surfaces and wit-
nessing the construction of sea water inlet and 
outlet structures. STUK approved the construction 
plans in July 2004. The approvals were conditional 
because the plant design basis review was still 
under way. STUK witnesssed the attachment of 
the technical area circling the Olkiluoto 3 site to 
the construction site of the new plant. The area 
provides i.a. electricity, ﬁre water and drainage for 
the construction site. STUK drew up an inspection 
programme for inspection of TVO’s operations after 
the start of construction.
Approval of the inspection and 
testing organisations of pressure 
equipment manufacturers
Upon application by Teollisuuden Voima Oy, and 
in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK 
approved two manufacturers of nuclear pressure 
equipment.
STUK approved, in accordance with the Nuclear 
Energy Act, three inspection organisations to con-
duct nondestructive testing relating to the manu-
facturing of mechanical components and struc-
tures and three testing organisations to conduct 
destructive testing relating to the manufacturing 
of Olkiluoto 3 mechanical components and struc-
tures. The scope of activities of Olkiluoto plant’s 
inspection unit “Teollisuuden Voima Oy inspection 
organisation”, approved in 2002 upon application 
by Teollisuuden Voima Oy, was extended to include 
assessment and approval of the design and manu-
facturing of mechanical components and structures 
for Olkiluoto 3.
STUK authorised three inspection organisa-
tions to conduct third party inspections relating to 
the manufacturing of components for Olkiluoto 3.
STUK oversaw the operation of the manufac-
turers and testing and inspection organisations 
it had approved. Their operation was established 
as being in compliance with the requirements of 
Guides YVL 3.4 and YVL 1.3.
Statement
Prior to the submission to the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry of its statement on the construc-
tion licence application, STUK approved docu-
ments as referred to in section 35 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree. The statement was forwarded to 
the Ministry in January 2005. Attached to it were 
a safety assessment and a clariﬁcation of the re-
view of documents in accordance with section 35 
of the Nuclear Energy Act and a statement by the 
Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety.
According to STUK’s assessment, it is possible 
to construct a safe plant unit based on the submit-
ted conceptual design plan. STUK brought forth 
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observations and restrictions, however, as regards 
fuel burn-up, inspection of planning details, ar-
rangement of regulatory control during construc-
tion, radioactive waste ﬁnal disposal plans, devel-
opment of Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s expertise, and 
societal commitment to the safe use of nuclear 
energy. STUK’s statement, the safety assessment 
and the statement by the Advisory Committee on 
Nuclear Safety can be accessed on the STUK web 
site (www.stuk.ﬁ).
3.4 FiR 1 research reactor
In addition to the electricity-generating nuclear 
power plants, STUK regulated the FiR 1 research 
reactor operated by the VTT Technical Research 
Centre of Finland. The reactor is located in 
Otaniemi, Espoo, and its maximum thermal power 
is 250 kW. The reactor is used for fabrication of 
radioactive tracers, activation analysis, student 
training and the development of Boron Neutron 
Capture Therapy (BNCT).
STUK’s periodic inspection in 2004 focused 
on i.a. the reactor’s ﬁre protection, emergency 
preparedness and safeguards. No signiﬁcant prob-
lems were observed in the reactor’s operation. 
Occupational radiation doses and radioactive re-
leases into the environment were clearly below set 
limits.
STUK conﬁrmed by its decision the licensee’s 
(VTT Processes) proposal for the application of 
the requirements of Guide YVL 1.5 to the FiR 1 
research reactor. An additional requirement was 
made, however, about the reporting of operational 
experience feedback to STUK in accordance with 
the guide’s requirements.
3.5 Other nuclear facilities
The regulatory control of nuclear facilities relat-
ing to nuclear waste management, such as storage 
space, is dealt with in Chapter 4.
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4 Nuclear waste management regulation
Esko Ruokola
4.1 Nuclear waste 
management programmes
Posiva Oy, Teollisuuden Voima Oy and Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy published in early 2004 a re-
port called “Nuclear waste management of the 
Olkiluoto and Loviisa power plants. Programme 
for research, development and technical design for 
2004–2006”. It is an overview of the R&D and tech-
nical design in the ﬁeld of nuclear waste manage-
ment by Posiva and its owners in the recent years 
and also a plan for future activities. It is focused on 
the years 2004–2006. This new practice of issuing 
an extensive nuclear waste management report 
every three years is based on a Ministry of Trade 
and Industry letter of 3 December 2002.
STUK extensively reviewed the report with the 
assistance of an external team of experts, and com-
mented it to its writers and the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry. STUK’s review suggested several 
improvements to the programme. STUK’s annual 
statement to the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
about the licensees’ nuclear waste management 
actions and plans, as referred to in section 78 of 
the Nuclear Energy Decree, was also based on the 
review.
STUK gave statements, as referred to in section 
90 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, about ﬁnancial 
provision made for the costs of nuclear waste man-
agement. The statements addressed the technical 
plans on which ﬁnancial provision is based.
4.2 Spent nuclear fuel
STUK’s regulatory control of spent nuclear fuel 
storage included regular inspections and reviews of 
plans of storage systems and practices. No safety-
endangering events occurred in the operation of 
the storage facilities. The volume of spent fuel on-
site the Olkiluoto plant in the end of 2004 was 6050 
assemblies (1065 tU, tonnes of original uranium) 
with an increase of 262 assemblies (46 tU) in 2004. 
Corresponding accumulation in the Loviisa plant 
was 2947 assemblies (351 tU) with an increase of 
192 assemblies (23 tU).
Posiva continued technical R&D on spent fuel 
encapsulation and ﬁnal disposal. At Metso Oy’s 
Rautpohja factory, casting of the insert of the 
waste canister (mode of spheroidal graphite iron) 
was successful as regards dimensions, and quite 
successful as regards material characteristics. A 
full-scale pressure test performed on the insert, 
which had been manufactured earlier, showed 
that its strength complied with the requirements. 
At Outokumpu Oy’s Pori factory, ten castings of 
the billets of the copper shell were done quite suc-
cessfully. In Germany, one waste canister with an 
integrated bottom was fabricated by the pierce and 
draw method. Progress was made in the manufac-
turing technology but the desired particle size in 
the canister bottom/wall junction was not reached. 
Joint ventures headed by the Swedish nuclear 
waste company SKB included copper canister man-
ufacturing tests based on forging and extrusion.
The tests on the electron beam welding of the 
lid of the copper canister, commissioned by Posiva 
in Germany earlier, were moved to Patria Oy’s 
Linnavuori factory in 2004 and the test programme 
was launched in the autumn of 2004. Friction stir 
welding is an alternative method, which is being 
developed under SKB. In addition, SKB has princi-
pal responsibility in the development of the copper 
canister’s non-destructive testing methods.
The development of ﬁnal disposal technology 
will mostly be at the Äspö rock laboratory. A test 
programme aiming at full-scale demonstration of 
the horizontal disposal of waste canisters (the so 
called KBS-3H concept) was launched in 2004.
Posiva continued research programmes in 
Olkiluoto to assure the suitability of the reposi-
tory site. Diamond core drilling from the surface, 
drillhole logging and sampling were carried out 
to complement research and extend its scope. The 
underground research facility ONKALO is the 
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most important project relating to the geological 
research programmes in Olkiluoto and its con-
struction began in mid-2004. The research facility 
is subject to control at this stage already since it 
will most probably be part of the ﬁnal disposal 
facility proper later. STUK in 2004 drew up a plan 
for control of the geological research programmes 
in Olkiluoto, which gives the objectives, organisa-
tion and procedures of control. Control measures in 
accordance with the plan were launched by STUK.
In its planning report Posiva brought forth its 
strategy for the long-term safety case of the ﬁnal 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The reports in ques-
tion will form a safety case portfolio comprised of 
ten major reports. Posiva have completed their ﬁrst 
report belonging to this entity.
Safety research is mostly based on long-term bi-
lateral or multilateral collaboration projects. Most 
of the bilateral research projects are contained in 
the Posiva/SKB (Sweden) collaboration. The most 
signiﬁcant multilateral projects are the integrat-
ed projects NF-PRO (Near Field Processes) and 
ESRED (Engineering Studies and Demonstrations 
of Repository Design), launched in early 2004, which 
are contained in the EU’s sixth framework pro-
gramme. Included is also FUNMIG (Fundamental 
Processes of Radionuclide Migration), launched in 
early 2005, into which Posiva participates together 
with Finnish research institutes. Research projects 
contained in the EU’s ﬁfth framework programme 
are in the reporting stage.
4.3 Low and intermediate level 
waste and decommissioning
The utilities followed earlier practices in carry-
ing out their intermediate and low-level waste 
maintenance activities in 2004. No safety-related 
problems occurred in the treatment, storage or dis-
posal of low and intermediate level waste. STUK’s 
inspection of the handling, storage and disposal 
of low and intermediate level waste at both plant 
sites revealed no shortcomings requiring immedi-
ate action.
The volume of low and intermediate level waste 
onsite the Loviisa plant at the end of 2004 was 
2677 m³, which is 60 m³ less than in 2003 due 
to a reduction in the volume of liquid waste. 
Corresponding waste accumulation at the Olkiluoto 
plant was 4683 m³ , which includes an additional 
348 m³ in 2004. Currently approx. 46% of the waste 
from the Loviisa plant and 88% of that of the 
Olkiluoto plant has been disposed of.
Low and intermediate level waste subject to 
long-term storage at the Olkiluoto plant mostly 
includes components removed from inside the reac-
tor pressure vessels, which are stored in the fuel 
pools. The cutting up and ﬁnal disposal of steam 
separators was begun in 2004. At the Olkiluoto 
plant, some large components with a relatively low 
radiation level are also stored for whose treatment 
a decontamination chamber and a crusher have 
been purchased. A new storage building is under 
construction at the site to accommodate turbine 
plant steam reheaters due for removal in 2005 and 
2006. The Olkiluoto plant in 2004 cleared from con-
trol maintenance waste taken to the local landﬁll 
and recyclable metal sent to the local scrap metal 
collector Eurajoen Romu Oy .
The most important low and intermediate level 
waste projects at the Loviisa plant are the con-
struction of a solidiﬁcation facility and the exten-
sion of the ﬁnal disposal facility. These projects 
were started in 2004 and are due for completion 
by early 2007. After the ﬁnal disposal of solidiﬁed 
wastes has been launched, the Loviisa plant site 
still has to accommodate for the long-term stor-
age of high activity components, which have been 
removed from inside the reactor pressure vessels, 
and of approx. 200 m³ of other waste.
The Loviisa plant in 2004 cleared from control 
maintenance waste taken to the Kymenlaakson 
Jäte Oy landﬁll in Anjalankoski and recyclable 
scrap metal sent to the Imatra steelworks. In the 
scrap metal consignments, objects were detected 
twice which exceeded the alarm limit applied by 
the steelworks and were returned to the plant. To 
avoid corresponding problems in the future, the 
Loviisa plant is developing its practices for the 
sorting, activity measurement and storage of scrap 
metal cleared from control.
Both utilities put forward their updated decom-
missioning plans at the end of 2003. STUK in its 
statements to the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
in 2004 assessed these plans. According to the 
statements, the feasibility of the basic decommis-
sioning concepts was good, with the exception of the 
Olkiluoto plant for which an analysis of a shorter-
than-planned controlled storage time prior to the 
plants’ decommissioning was recommended.
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5 Nuclear non-proliferation
Marko Hämäläinen, Arto Isolankila, Erja Kainulainen, 
Elina Martikka, Olli Okko, Jaakko Tikkinen
5.1 Safeguards of nuclear materials
5.1.1 Safeguards at Finnish nuclear facilities
International safeguards are implemented by 
the IAEA and EU safeguards by the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Transport 
and Energy, Directorates H and I. IAEA safeguards 
are based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
and the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/193) 
signed by the non-nuclear EU member states, 
European Atomic Energy Agency and the IAEA. 
EU safeguards are based on the Euratom Treaty 
and Commission Regulation 3227/76 given by vir-
tue of the Treaty. STUK’s safeguards activities aim 
to assure regulatory control of the use of nuclear 
energy necessary to prevent nuclear proliferation. 
In addition, STUK’s tasks include control related 
to international agreements in the ﬁeld of nuclear 
energy signed by Finland.
In so far as nuclear power plants are concerned, 
STUK’s safeguards activities are mostly focused on 
fuel import, transport, storage, internal transfer 
and refuelling. The utilities submit to STUK activ-
ity programmes, advance notiﬁcations and reports.
A total of nine inspections were carried out at 
Loviisa power plant in 2004 and 16 inspections at 
Olkiluoto plant. Euratom participated in 21 and 
the IAEA in 22 of these inspections. The IAEA’s in-
spectors visited the Olkiluoto repository construc-
tion site twice.
In addition to nuclear power plants, minor 
amounts of nuclear materials are used at other 
facilities. The most signiﬁcant of these is FiR 1, the 
research reactor operated by the VTT, where one 
inspection was carried out in 2004 by STUK, the 
IAEA and Euratom. In addition, the Laboratory of 
Radiochemistry at the University of Helsinki, OMG 
Kokkola Chemicals, the University of Jyväskylä, 
the Geological Survey of Finland and STUK have 
small amounts of nuclear materials in their posses-
sion. The amounts of nuclear materials are given in 
Table II and licences and approvals in accordance 
with the Nuclear Energy Act in Appendix 5.
Nuclear material safeguards employ several 
methods to verify that the data on nuclear materi-
als reported by the operator, such as burn-out and 
cooling time, are correct and complete. Other nu-
clear-safety related data, from operational safety 
Table II. Amounts of nuclear material in Finland 31 December 2004.
Location
Natural uranium 
(kg)
Enriched uranium 
(kg)
Depleted uranium 
(kg)
Plutonium
(kg)
Thorium  
(kg)
Loviisa plant – 433 058 – 3 474 –
Olkiluoto 1 – 217 723 – 1 042 –
Olkiluoto 2 – 180 974 –    750 –
Olkiluoto / Spent fuel storage 
(KPA)
– 824 342 – 6 771 –
VTT/FiR 1 -research reactor 1 511 60 < 1 – –
OMG Kokkola Chemicals 1 687.2 – – – –
Others (non-nuclear) 83.7 1,7 612.5 0.006 4.4
42
STUK-B-YTO 241
to ﬁnal disposal, can also be veriﬁed by measure-
ments. In 2004 STUK veriﬁed by non-destructive 
methods 148 and 129 spent fuel assemblies at 
Olkiluoto and Loviisa power plants respectively. In 
addition, the IAEA, Euratom and STUK veriﬁed by 
non-destructive methods 13 fuel assemblies that 
had been in the reactor hall of Loviisa 1.
Every material balance area operated in com-
pliance with STUK-approved manuals and in a 
way facilitating STUK’s fulﬁlling of the obligations 
of international agreements in the nuclear ﬁeld 
signed by Finland.
In 2004 STUK approved ﬁve Euratom and 199 
IAEA inspectors to make inspections in Finland. 
STUK also approved the responsible manager, 
and his deputy, of the accelerator laboratory in 
the Department of Physics at the University of 
Jyväskylä.
5.1.2 Strengthening of IAEA safeguards
Measures to strengthen the IAEA safeguards be-
gan after the disclosure of the Iraqi nuclear weap-
ons programme. By way of administration, safe-
guards strengthening is based on the Additional 
Protocol (INFCIR/540). Finland signed the Protocol 
together with other EU countries in September 
1998 and ratiﬁed it in the summer of 2000. Other 
EU member countries completed ratiﬁcation to-
wards the end of 2003. The Protocol was ratiﬁed by 
the Commission in April 2004, and it entered into 
force on 30 April 2004 − just prior to the enlarge-
ment of the EU.
In preparation for safeguards in accordance 
with the Protocol, STUK in March 2004 negoti-
ated with the IAEA a procedure for the provision 
of declarations, i.e. notiﬁcations as required in the 
Protocol, and chose for this purpose the “Protocol 
Reporter” -software developed by the IAEA. During 
the same visit STUK familiarised itself with the 
IAEA’s system to assure the data security of con-
ﬁdential data contained in the declarations. In 
April STUK visited Luxembourg to agree with the 
Commission about formalities relating to the sub-
mission of declarations on the Commission.
After the Additional Protocol had entered into 
force, the Act amending the Nuclear Energy Act 
(12 May 2004) and the Decree amending the 
Nuclear Energy Decree (31 May 2004) entered 
into force in Finland. Commission Regulation No 
302/2005 did not come into force during 2004 but 
the Commission asked in writing licensees and the 
representative of the site (STUK) to act as if it had 
already taken effect where measures relating to 
the Protocol are concerned. At the same time, the 
Regulation No 302/2005 is the Commission’s judi-
cal tool for collecting data for control activities in 
accordance with the Protocol.
STUK prepared declarations required in the 
Protocol, the most important of which were de-
scriptions of plant sites and of R&D pertaining 
to the nuclear fuel cycle. These were delivered to 
the IAEA and the Commission on 8 July 2004. 
Finland’s declaration was the ﬁrst EU declaration 
delivered to the IAEA of which the IAEA expressed 
satisfaction in writing. Finland submitted to the 
IAEA and Euratom 11 declarations in 2004. On 21 
December 2004 the IAEA conducted a complemen-
tary audit in accordance with the Protocol to the 
Laboratory of Radio Chemistry at the University 
of Helsinki.
STUK was active in discussions to develop the 
Commission’s new approaches. A STUK repre-
sentative participated in an IAEA seminar on the 
strengthened safeguards in Hungary in November 
and in the Working Party on Atomic Questions’ 
meetings on safeguards or related topics. A 
Commission information seminar in Luxembourg 
in December was also attended.
STUK arranged several discussion and training 
events in co-operation with licensees on control in 
accordance with the Protocol.
5.1.3 Safeguards for ﬁnal disposal
The ﬁnal disposal of nuclear fuel in an under-
ground respository presents new challenges to 
safeguards implementation since, after encapsula-
tion, nuclear material veriﬁcation will be impos-
sible in practice. In so far as safeguards on ﬁnal 
disposal are concerned, STUK has started work on 
creating national requirements for an encapsula-
tion and ﬁnal disposal facility. The objective is to 
establish safeguards criteria to cover both national 
and international regulatory needs for the entire 
lifetime of the repository. The excavation of the 
underground research facility, which is planned to 
be part of the repository, was begun in the summer 
of 2004. Therefore, the framework for international 
safeguards were established.
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In accordance with Comission Regulation 
(EURATOM 3227/76), the European Commission 
obliges licensees to submit reports on nuclear ma-
terials, and facilities handling them, not later than 
200 days prior to the transfer of the nuclear ma-
terials to new premises. The Commission further 
reports to the IAEA. Based on the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, the government (i.e. STUK) 
is obliged to facilitate effective IAEA safeguards 
in Finland. Thus, based on talks between STUK 
and the Ministry of Trade and Industry on 29 
September 2004, it was considered appropriate to 
oblige Posiva Oy, who is looking into ﬁnal disposal, 
to take care in the manner of a nuclear facility of 
the implementation of nuclear safeguards during 
the construction of the underground research fa-
cility of the ﬁnal repository. This obligation aims 
to assure the IAEA of Finland’s capability to im-
plement sufﬁcient safeguards and plan national 
control and inspection procedures. The IAEA’s ﬁrst 
visit to the repository under construction was on 4 
October 2004. During a visit to STUK, the experts 
gave a preliminary plan for the regulation of ﬁnal 
disposal by a national system and for realisation of 
co-operation with the IAEA.
5.2 Control of radioactive 
materials transport
About 20 000 radioactive packages are transported 
in Finland every year. STUK is not aware of any 
transport accidents involving radioactive materi-
als, or of any other safety hazards in 2004. The 
transport of nuclear materials requires a licence 
from STUK. The conditions for the licence include 
nuclear liability insurance and sufﬁcient physical 
protection. STUK approved three transport plans 
for the import of fresh fuel. In addition, six types of 
packaging were approved for use in Finland. One 
of these was applied for a potential transit that did 
not take place, however. The most signiﬁcant forms 
of nuclear material transport in 2004 were the 
import of fresh nuclear fuel to the Finnish nuclear 
power plants from Germany, Sweden, Spain and 
Russia. In addition, two consignments of radioac-
tive material were approved for transport subject 
to special arrangements.
The import of radioactive and nuclear materials 
is subject to a licence. No smuggling attempts were 
detected at the Finnish border in 2004.
No illicit trafﬁcking of radioactive materials 
was detected at the border in 2001−2004. The high-
est number, 23 consignments, was turned back 
in 1997. The reason was typically radioactivity 
measured in scrap metal. The decrease in number 
is partly due to the most signiﬁcant consignors now 
measuring the radioactivity of their scrap metal. 
On the other hand, also consignments of scrap 
metal to Finland have decreased.
Safeguards as well as supervision and control of 
nuclear material transport are looked into in detail 
in the report Nuclear Safeguards in Finland 2004 
(STUK-B-YTO 238).
5.3 The Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) prohibits all nuclear testing. The Treaty 
was opened for signing in 1996. It enters into 
force after ratiﬁcation by 44 separately designated 
states. Finland ratiﬁed it in 1999. Compliance with 
the Treaty is monitored by an international obser-
vation network, which will comprise 321 monitor-
ing stations. Of the stations, 80 measure radioac-
tive particles in the atmosphere. The results are 
available for use by all member states.
A special preparatory committee, which assem-
bles in Vienna, is preparing for the Treaty’s com-
ing into force. All signatory states are represented 
in it. In Vienna, also the Provisional Technical 
Secretariat is operating.
The National Data Centre (NDC) in conjunction 
with STUK, which is based on the CTBT, contrib-
uted to the work of the preparatory committee 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organisation (CTBTO) in establishing a cost-ef-
fective organisation that is functional from the 
Finnish point of view. The NDC’s own automatic 
routine monitoring was in operation for the whole 
year analysing the results of stations detecting 
radioactive particles in the atmosphere. Routine 
monitoring is facilitated by an alarm system trans-
mitting data on unusual observations to the NDC 
personnel. The NDC did not observe any abnormal 
activities in 2004.
The NDC’s analyses yield a high number of 
data ﬁles for whose management a system was 
developed. For improved availability, the results 
are fed into a database. The database and its 
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user interface were developed in co-operation with 
STUK’s Laboratory of Airborne Radioactivity, 
the Helsinki University of Technology and the 
Canadian National Data Centre.
In 2002 STUK signed an agreement with the 
developers of the analysis programme used by the 
NDC about its handing over to the national data 
centres of other countries for use in CTBT work. In 
2004 the programme was delivered to the national 
data centres of Romania, Iceland, Algeria, Libya, 
Burkina Faso, the Philippines, Brazil, Vietnam, 
Uganda and Indonesia.
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6 Safety research
Esko Eloranta, Harri Heimbürger
In support of regulatory decision-making, STUK 
commissions independent safety analyses and re-
search to research institutes and expert organi-
sations. Independent research is commissioned, 
where necessary, to develop the regulatory control 
effort. In addition to these, STUK contributes to 
the oversight of the national safety research pro-
grammes SAFIR and KYT on nuclear power plants 
and nuclear waste management. Corresponding 
previous programmes were FINNUS and JYT. The 
basis for these public nuclear safety research pro-
grammes is to create prerequisities for the pres-
ervation of know-how to ascertain the continued 
safe use of nuclear power, the development of new 
know-how and international co-operation. The pro-
gramme planning period is four years. The KYT 
programme started in 2002 and the SAFIR pro-
gramme in 2003.
Assignments commissioned in support of regu-
latory decisions mostly related to the review of the 
construction permit application for the new nucle-
ar power plant and are addressed in this report’s 
section on regulatory control.
In accordance with an amendment to the 
Nuclear Energy Act, passed by Parliament in 2003, 
funds are collected from the licensees to the State 
nuclear waste fund (VYR), to two separate assets, 
kept separate from other assets of the Fund, to 
ﬁnance nuclear safety research and nuclear waste 
research. The funds available for distribution every 
year are used to ﬁnance research projects which, 
as an entity, support the cause for which the funds 
are collected. In 2004 projects under SAFIR recived 
2.7 M€ and those under KYT 1.0 M€. The SAFIR 
programme is ﬁnanced not only by VYR and its 
total ﬁnancing in 2004 was approx. 5 M€ and that 
of the KYT programme approx. 1 M€.
STUK’s experts controlled and monitored the 
ongoing SAFIR and KYT programmes and contrib-
uted to the support and managing group work of 
the programmes. STUK submitted to the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry statements, as referred to 
in the Nuclear Energy Act, on the annual plans of 
these programmes.
The general plan for the SAFIR research pro-
gramme is based on safety challenges identiﬁed 
for this decade, which are many due to the ageing 
of operating nuclear power plants, their mod-
ernisation and the new plant under way. The 
general research themes of the SAFIR research 
programme were fuel and the reactor core, the 
reactor circuit and structural safety, the contain-
ment and process safety functions, I&C, the control 
room and information technology, organisations 
and safety management as well as risk-informed 
safety management. In the ﬁeld of reactor safety, 
the programme entailed participation in several 
international projects within the framework of the 
OECD/NEA and the US regulatory authority the 
NRC. The research programme comprised a total 
of 18 research projects. Information on the SAFIR 
programme is available at http://www.vtt.ﬁ/pro/
research/saﬁr/.
The focus of the KYT programme in 2004 was 
in geosciences, technical barriers, migration of ra-
dioactive substances, safety analyses and technical 
solutions. Information on the programme can be 
found at www.vtt.ﬁ/pro/research/kyt.
Appendix 6 lists STUK-ﬁnanced safety research 
and commissioned work completed in 2004.
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Figures 8 and 9 give the costs of nuclear safety 
research in 2000−2004. The diagrams differenti-
ate between work commissioned in support of 
regulatory decisions and that channelled via the 
STUK budget i.e. publicly funded safety research. 
Owing to an amendment to the Nuclear Enegy Act, 
no publicly ﬁnanced nuclear safety research has 
rested with STUK as of the beginning of 2004. In 
this respect, the costs incurred come from delayed 
research projects commissioned earlier and post-
poned billing dates.
Figure 8. The cost of research and commissioned work 
pertaining to the safety of nuclear power plants.
Figure 9. The cost of research and commissioned work 
pertaining to nuclear waste management and nuclear 
non-proliferation.
�
���
�����
�����
�����
���� ���� ���� ���� ����
��
�������������������������������������������������������
������������������������������������������ �����
������������
�
���
�����
�����
�����
���� ���� ���� ���� ����
��
�������������������������������������������������������
������������������������������������������ �����
�������
STUK-B-YTO 241
47
7 Nuclear facilities regulation 
and its development
Marja-Leena Järvinen, Kaisa Koskinen, Pekka Salminen, 
Arja Tanninen, Reino Virolainen
7.1 Processes and structures
Document handling
A total of 1568 documents were submitted to 
STUK for review in 2004. The number of docu-
ments submitted in 2004 and earlier, whose re-
view was completed in 2004, was 1663. The ﬁgure 
includes licences granted by STUK in accordance 
with the Nuclear Energy Act, which are listed in 
Appendix 5. Average document review time was 
47 days. The number of documents and their aver-
age review times in 2000−2004 are given in Fig 10. 
Figs 11 and 12 give the distribution of the review 
times of documents on the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
plant units.
Figure 10. Number of documents received and reviewed as well as average document review time.
Figure 11. Distribution of time spent on preparing deci-
sions on the Loviisa plant units.
Figure 12. Distribution of time spent on preparing deci-
sions on the Olkiluoto plant units.
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STUK’s own operation
The development of STUK’s own operation focused 
on processes. During the year, the four working 
processes in nuclear reactor regulation (overall as-
sessment of safety, oversight of plant projects and 
modiﬁcations, oversight of plant availability, over-
sight of organisational operation) were described 
and the relevant internal quality guidelines pre-
pared. Descriptions and guidelines were completed 
for subprocesses as well. Two entirely new process 
guidelines for nuclear non-proliferation were es-
tablished and three others were updated. The new 
guidelines were about nuclear material inspections 
and inspection criteria and the upkeep of the nu-
clear material accounting system. A new guideline 
on the declarations contained in the Additional 
Protocol is under way as well. At the same time, 
process indicators were developed that will be test-
ed in 2005.
In a self-assessment conducted at the depart-
ment of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, which com-
plied with the a quality award criteria, the most 
important development object was the completion 
of ongoing projects i.e. the development of work-
ing processes and expertise. The results of the 
self-assessment slightly improved compared with 
the previous assessment. Its results were sepa-
rately discussed with the personnel and, in addi-
tion to the above two projects, the development of 
new working processes for the department, knowl-
edge management and internal feedback culture 
were discussed. A self-assessment conducted at 
the department of Nuclear Waste and Material 
Regulation brought forth a number of minor devel-
opment objects, which were discussed at a depart-
mental meeting. The majority of the jointly agreed 
measures were carried out in 2004.
Document management
A long-term document management project has 
been under way at STUK. In 2003 the supplier and 
the application software were chosen. The main 
components are portal, knowledge management, 
document management, collaboration module and 
records management. In 2004 the was work con-
tinued by analysing more closely the STUK func-
tions needed to determine in detail the system re-
quired and the resultant functional requirements. 
Extensive software test plans were drawn up fol-
lowed by multiple-phased testing.
Owing to the need for further deﬁnition and 
development, which surfaced during testing, the 
system’s commissioning had to be postponed until 
2005.
Risk-informed regulatory control
The FinPSA program
The risk assessment program FinPSA was fur-
ther developed to contain the basic functions for a 
level 1 PSA. The Olkiluoto 1 and 2 risk model was 
transferred to a new program. The features and 
numerical calculation routines (minimal cuts, their 
importance measures and those of basic events) 
relating to the management and calculation of a 
Level 1 PSA code were tested. After the testing pe-
riod, the FinPSA Level 1 beta version was released 
towards the end of 2004. The Swiss authority HSK 
purchased a Level 1 beta version was delivered to 
the buyer towards the end of 2004. Program devel-
opment continues for a Level 2 risk analysis, the 
objective being the preparation of a commercial, 
integrated Level 1 and 2 PSA program.
PSA information system
STUK continued the development of the 
Probabilistic Safety Analysis Information System 
(PSAIS) as a tool for risk-informed nuclear safety 
regulation. The system will provide general and 
detailed data on the results and methods of risk 
analyses, the conclusions made, their application 
and utilisation in nuclear safety regulation. From 
the PSAIS information system, simpliﬁed risk-in-
formation can be extracted without the need for a 
profound knowledge of risk-analysis.
In the ﬁrst phase of PSAIS, the below thematic 
entities for Olkiluoto 1 and 2 were developed:
• PSA level 1 main results
• Systems analyses
• Accident progression and plant response
• General (initiating events, success criteria in 
various initiating events, etc)
System programming was done in 2004 and the 
system’s pilot version was completed.
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7.2 Renewal of competence 
and human resources
The development of competence in nuclear reac-
tor regulation, which began a few years ago, was 
continued. The central theme was improvement of 
competence relating to nuclear power plant system 
knowledge and quality management. Two training 
courses on system knowledge were arranged. They 
dealt with both the operating plant types and the 
one under design. Eight inspectors passed quality 
management training required of a lead auditor. 
Several junior personnel from nuclear safety regu-
lation participated in a national nuclear training 
programme. Several recruitments were done to as-
certain competence. New experts were employed in 
the ﬁelds of reactor safety, construction engineer-
ing, electrical engineering, strength analysis and 
pressure vessel manufacturing and, at the same 
time, no one in nuclear reactor regulation resigned 
from STUK’s service.
The development of competence in nuclear 
waste management regulation mostly related 
to the modelling tools used. In early 2004, VTT 
trained three inspectors in the use of Porﬂow, a 
simulation software application for spent fuel ﬁnal 
disposal, and one inspector acquainted himself 
with two different geological modelling softwares. 
Assessing Posiva’s plans together with external 
experts offered an opportunity for hands-on experi-
ence. The most important competence deﬁciency in 
nuclear waste management is in safety analyses.
The coming into force of the Additional Protocol 
and the establishment of safeguards criteria for 
spent fuel ﬁnal disposal posed new challenges in 
IAEA safeguards. No external training is available 
for either but learning is mostly by orientation 
together with colleagues internationally and by 
putting into practice matters thus learned. Liaison 
with international organisations and participation 
in international meetings has been an important 
mode of learning. The oversight of radioactive 
materials transport and, over the past years, the 
implementation of CTBT has rested too heavily on 
one individual. Therefore, training of people pro-
viding back-up for them was started.
7.3 Finances and resources
The duty area of nuclear safety regulation includ-
ed basic operations subject and not subject to a 
charge. Basic operations subject to a charge mostly 
comprised of the regulatory control of nuclear fa-
cilities, with their costs charged to those subject 
to control. Those basic operations not subject to a 
charge included international and domestic co-op-
eration as well as emergency response and commu-
nications. Basic operations not subject to a charge 
are publicly funded. Overheads from rule-making 
and support functions (administration, develop-
ment projects in support of regulatory activities, 
training, maintenance and development of exper-
tise, reporting and participation in nuclear safety 
research) were carried forward into the costs of 
both types of basic operation and of contracted 
services in relation to the number of working hours 
spent on each function.
In 2004, the costs of the regulatory control of 
nuclear safety subject to a charge were 9.2 M€. 
The total costs of nuclear safety regulation were 
10.2 M€. Thus the share of activities subject to a 
charge was 90%.
The 2004 income from nuclear safety regula-
tion was 9.2 M€. Of this, 1.7 M€ and 6.7 M€ came 
from the inspection and review of Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plants, respectively. In 
addition to the operating plant units, the income 
for Olkiluoto’s part includes regulatory control of 
the new plant unit. The regulation of Posiva Oy’s 
operations yielded 0.8 M€. Figure 13 gives the an-
nual income and costs of nuclear safety regulation 
in 2000−2004.
The time spent on the inspection and review of 
Loviisa nuclear power plant was 9.7 man-years, 
i.e. 10.2% of the total working time of the regula-
tory personnel. For Olkiluoto nuclear power plant’s 
operating units it was 8.8 man-years, which ac-
counts for 9.3% of total working time. In addition 
to the oversight of the operation of nuclear power 
plants, the ﬁgure includes nuclear material control. 
The time spent on the inspection and review of 
Olkiluoto 3 was 23.2 man-years, i.e. 24.5% of total 
working time. The time spent on nuclear waste 
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management inspection and review was 3.1 man-
years and that spent on the FiR 1 research reac-
tor 0.03 man-years. The working time spent on 
small-scaler users of nuclear material was 0.01 
man-years.
The distribution of yearly working time of the 
nuclear regulatory personnel according to duty 
areas is given in Table III. Figure 14 presents the 
distribution of working time spent on main func-
tions in 2000−2004.
The number of inspection days onsite and at the 
component manufacturers’ premises totalled 1570. 
Not only inspections pertaining to the safety of 
nuclear power plants but also nuclear waste man-
agement and safeguards inspections are included. 
Two resident inspectors worked at Olkiluoto nu-
clear power plant and one at the Loviisa plant. The 
number of inspection days in 2000−2004 is given in 
Figure 15.
Table III. Distribution of working hours (man-years) of the regulatory personnel in each duty area.
Duty area 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Basic operations subject to a charge 26.4 26.3 27.6 29.2 44.7
Basic operations not subject to a charge 7.5 7.4 6.9 6.4 5.1
Contracted services 5.4 4.4 3.8 4.9 5.1
Rule-making and support functions 25.5 28.5 27.1 28.2 22.7
Holidays and absences 15.0 16 16.2 15.9 16.9
Total 79.8 82.6 81.6 84.6 94.5
Figure 13. Income and costs of nuclear safety regulation.
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Figure 14. Working time spent on main functions.
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Figure 15. Number of inspection days onsite and at component manufacturers’ premises.
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8 Emergency preparedness
Tuulikki Sillanpää
STUK arranged several training events and ex-
ercises to test and develop its own emergency re-
sponse. In addition, STUK supervises the emergen-
cy preparedness of the operating organisations of 
nuclear power plants to act in abnormal situations. 
No such situations occurred in 2004.
The emergency response systems of nuclear 
power plants are developed during plant operation 
and regularly tested in emergency exercises as 
part of emergency preparedness training. Other re-
lated training by the licensees encompasses prac-
tical exercises for radiation measurement teams, 
sampling during accidents and measurement of 
samples, assessment of accident situations and 
review and development of emergency guidelines 
in seminars. STUK has approved the emergency 
contingency plans of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
plants and yearly reviews the implementation of 
emergency preparedness, including training and 
emergency exercises.
In 2004, two domestic emergency exercises were 
arranged in which STUK participated. Both were 
combined ﬁre drills and emergency excerices. Their 
aim was to test co-operation between the emer-
gency organisation and the ﬁre service and to de-
velop the operation of the emergency organisation 
during an emergency in which a plant’s technical 
safety is assured but the plant’s personnel and the 
environment are not in danger.
The exercise was carried out at Loviisa power 
plant on 10 November 2004 such that the ﬁre bri-
gade operated in real time in accordance with the 
exercise event during a hypothetical ﬁre onsite and 
the emergency organisation in its own rooms. A 
separate ﬁre drill was carried out at Loviisa power 
plant on 12 May 2004.
The exact starting time of the emergency ex-
ercise, which was part of an exercise arranged at 
Olkiluoto on 22 November 2004, was not told to the 
participants in advance. The starting up of the op-
eration of emergency organisations was thus tested 
and so was the management of status analysis out-
side actual ofﬁce hours, when most personnel have 
left their work places.
STUK participated in international nucle-
ar power plant emergency exercises in 2004. In 
September Sweden arranged Havsörn, a rescue 
services exercise at Forsmark power plant, into 
which STUK and the Åland Islands, a province of 
Finland, participated from Finland. In February 
and August STUK participated in the IAEA’s in-
formation exchange exercises via the Agency’s pro-
tected web site. The latter exercise dealt with a 
hypothetical nuclear power plant accident. STUK 
also contributed to the support given to the emer-
gency preparedness activities of the Commission of 
the European Communities (RESPEC).
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9 Communications
Risto Isaksson
In 2004 STUK issued eight press releases on nu-
clear safety regulation. Two were about events at 
nuclear power plants. One was about a produc-
tion break due to a reactor scram at Olkiluoto 1 (7 
March 2004) and the other about a repair outage 
at Loviisa 2 (19 October 2004). One routinely re-
ported the annual maintenance of Loviisa nuclear 
power plant. In 2004 information about the annual 
maintenance of Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was 
given only on STUK’s web site and on the radiation 
safety pages of teletext.
Two press releases were issued on nuclear 
material safeguards. The one put out in February 
reported that no radioactive consignments were 
caught at the Finnish border in 2003. A June press 
release was about an amendment to the Nuclear 
Energy Decree and the strengthening of nuclear 
nuclear material safeguards.
Press releases were issued about the nomina-
tion of a STUK head of ofﬁce to membership in the 
French nuclear safety council, the ﬁrst national 
course aimed at the enhacement of professional 
competence in nuclear safety and the publication of 
the book “Nuclear safety”, which is one in a STUK 
series of books called “Radiation and nuclear safe-
ty”. The 418 paged book came out in April.
The press releases were sent to the media and 
partners in co-operation and they were avail-
able on the STUK web site. An abstract was 
available on the radiation safety pages of YLE’s 
teletext. Nuclear safety did not become big news 
or give cause for signiﬁcant societal discussion. 
Even Finland’s new nuclear power plant project 
was mostly written about on the economic pages of 
the press.
In addition to the press releases, the operation 
of and events at the Finnish nuclear power plants 
were explained in quarterly nuclear safety reports 
sent to the media and interest groups. The reports 
were available on the STUK web site as well.
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10 International co-operation
Juhani Hyvärinen, Kaisa Koskinen, Elina Martikka, Matti Ojanen, 
Hannu Ollikkala, Rainer Rantala, Esko Ruokola, Pekka Salminen, 
Seija Suksi, Arja Tanninen, Kirsti Tossavainen, Olli Vilkamo
Co-operation with the IAEA
The IAEA continued revision of its nuclear safety 
guidelines (formerly Nuclear Safety Series NUSS). 
The revision is almost done and is expected to be 
completed in the coming years. STUK prepared for 
the IAEA statements on draft guidelines requested 
from Finland. It also contributed to the work of 
teams preparing the draft guidelines. A representa-
tive of STUK continued as chairman of the NUSSC 
(nuclear safety) committee. In addition, STUK’s 
representatives were active in the WASSC (waste 
safety) and RASSC (radiation safety) committees.
The Nuclear Safety Convention requires the 
submission, every three years, of a report on the ful-
ﬁlment of the Convention’s obligations. STUK was 
responsible for the drawing up of Finland’s country 
report submitted to the IAEA, the Convention’s 
secretariat, in accordance with an agreed schedule 
in the autumn of 2004. Corresponding reports were 
drawn up in 1999 and 2002. This latest report will 
be reviewed at an international meeting of the par-
ties to the Convention in Vienna in the spring of 
2005.
STUK was Finland’s liaison organisation for 
the below information exchange systems for nu-
clear facilities maintained by the IAEA:
• Incident Reporting System (IRS)
• Incident Reporting System for Research Reac-
tors (IRSRR)
• International Nuclear Event Scale (INES)
• Power Reactor Information System (PRIS)
• Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System 
(NFCIS)
• Net enabled Waste Management Database 
(NEWMDB)
• Directory for Radioactively Contaminated Sites 
(DRCS)
• Illicit Trafﬁcking Database (ITDB)
• Events that have arisen during the Transport of 
Radioactive Material (EVTRAM).
The Director General of STUK was the Vice 
Chairman of the International Nuclear Safety 
Advisory Group INSAG. The Group provides in-
formation and advice in nuclear safety issues to 
the Director General of the IAEA and gives recom-
mendations for safety improvements in the IAEA 
member countries.
STUK’s Director General participated in the 
work of the “Expert group on multilateral ap-
proaches to the nuclear fuel cycle” summoned by 
the Director General of the IAEA. The group as-
sessed the establishment of multilateral facilities 
for nuclear material treatment to reduce the need 
for national facilities. The international facilities 
would be aimed at limiting the risk of nuclear pro-
liferation.
The IAEA safeguards support programme, 
launched in 1988, continued in 2004. It is ﬁnanced 
by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, STUK being re-
sponsible for co-ordination and project implemen-
tation. The objective is development of the IAEA’s 
veriﬁcation methods, training of inspectors and 
provision of expert assistance. The most important 
project in 2004 was the planning of IAEA inspec-
tor training relating to the implementation of the 
Additional Protocol and the arrangement of the 
ﬁrst course in Finland.
In IAEA expert capacity, a STUK representative 
participated in the development of the regulatory 
effectiveness indicators intended for use by nuclear 
safety authorities. The work started in 2003 and it 
will continue in 2005.
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Co-operation with the OECD/NEA
STUK was represented in all of the OECD’s main 
committees dealing with radiation and nuclear 
safety. The main committees are as follows
• Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installa-
tions (CSNI)
• Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities 
(CNRA
• Committee on Radiation Protection and Public 
Health (CRPPH), and
• Radioactive Waste Management Committee 
(RWMC).
STUK’s Director General acted as chairman of the 
CNRA.
STUK took part in the work of the below CNRA 
and CSNI Working Groups. The CNRA Working 
Groups’ ﬁelds of activity were as follows
• Working Group on Inspection Practices (WGIP)
• Task Group on Regulatory Effectiveness Indica-
tors (TGRE) and Task Group on Safety Perform-
ance Indicators (Joint CNRA/CNSI/TGSPI)
• Task Group on Regulatory Decision Making
• Working Group on Public Communication of 
Nuclear Regulatory Organisations (WGPC)
The CSNI Working Groups’ ﬁelds of activity were 
as follows
• Working Group on Operating Experience 
(WGOE)
• Working Group on Integrity of Components and 
Structures (IAGE)
• Working Group on Accident and Analysis 
(GAMA)
• Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRISK)
• Special Expert Group on Human and Organisa-
tional Factors (SEGHOF)
• Special Expert Group on Fuel Safety Margins 
(SEGFSM).
STUK participated in the work of the RWMC’s 
Integration Group for the Safety Case (IGSC) as 
well.
Co-operation with the EU
STUK participated in the work of a working group 
of the NRWG. The group looked into the suitability, 
from the regulatory point of view, of Risk Informed 
In-Service Inspection (RI-ISI) for the drawing up of 
a piping inspection programme for nuclear power 
plants. The working group has been in close con-
tact with the utilities’ ENIQ working group, cor-
responding working groups of the OECD and the 
IAEA as well as the organisations that developed 
the methods (Westinghouse and EPRI) and utili-
ties. The working group’s draft report describes the 
contents of various RI-ISI methods, European and 
American applications, differences/similarities be-
tween traditional methods and RI-ISI methods as 
well as the pros and cons of the RI-ISI procedures 
from a regulatory point of view. In 2004 the draft 
report was completed to a ﬁnal report due for pub-
lication as an EUR report .
STUK took part in the operation of an NRWG 
working group on safety-critical software. The 
group’s task is to gather views common to EU 
authorities on what is required of safety-critical 
software.
STUK contributed to the work of the advi-
sory Expert Group A31 of the Commission of the 
European Union. It’s main tasks pertain to radia-
tion protection regulations.
In the ﬁeld of nuclear material safeguards, 
STUK participated in the operation of the European 
Safeguards R&D Association (ESARDA). ESARDA’s 
task is to promote and harmonise European R&D 
in nuclear material control. ESARDA offers a fo-
rum for an exchange of information and ideas to 
authorities, researchers and nuclear power plant 
operators.
Via the activities of the Regulatory Assistance 
Management Group (RAMG) of the EU, STUK 
participated in Phare and Tacis co-operation in 
support of East European regulatory organisations 
and their support organisations. The group evalu-
ated the appropriateness of projects, which support 
regulatory oversight, prepared by the EU. STUK 
contributed to the then-ongoing Phare and Tacis 
projects. STUK participated in the work of the 
CONCERT working group consisting of the heads 
of nuclear safety authorities of the EU member 
states and applicant countries.
NKS co-operation
The 4-year research programme of NKS, Nordic 
co-operation in nuclear safety, commenced in 2002. 
It is headed by two programme managers. STUK’s 
representatives participated in the programme’s 
sub-area of reactor safety and in the work of the 
programme of emergency preparedness and envi-
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ronmental safety. In addition, STUK has a repre-
sentative in the NKS steering committee.
Projects on reactor safety relate well to 
Finland’s national research programme and needs. 
The emergency preparedness and environmental 
safety programme includes focus areas important 
to Finland such as development of data manage-
ment and communication during emergencies.
The entire programme content serves well co-
operation between the Nordic authorities, which is 
a permanent objective of NKS co-operation.
Bilateral co-operation
A representative from STUK was a permanent 
member of the Reactor Safety Committee assist-
ing the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI). 
A representative of SKI was an invited expert in 
the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety that 
functions in conjunction with STUK. Co-opera-
tion with SKI continued, with regular meetings 
during which current questions of nuclear safety 
regulation and waste management were discussed. 
Information exchange with the Swedish Radiation 
Safety Authority (SSI) continued as regards doses 
to Finns who had worked at nuclear power plants in 
Sweden and to Swedes who had worked at Finnish 
plants. STUK’s representatives participated in an 
international seminar on regulatory strategies ar-
ranged by SKI.
STUK’s Director General was chairman of a 
nuclear safety committee that supports the organi-
sation conducting regulatory activities in Belgium 
and participated as a permanent member in the 
work of the advisory committee of the Lithuanian 
nuclear regulatory authority.
STUK’s co-operation with the USNRC focused 
on information exchange in nuclear safety matters 
of interest to both parties. In co-operation with the 
USNRC and VTT, STUK continued development of 
the FRAPTRAN/GENFLO code for fuel transients. 
STUK participated in LOCA tests that the USNRC 
commissioned to Argonne National Laboratory 
(ANL). Licensing of new nuclear power plants and 
experiences in their construction were discussed 
with US authorities.
The Director General of Autorité de Sûreté 
Nucléaire (ASN), the French nuclear safety author-
ity, invited a representative of STUK as a member 
in the Groupe Permanent des Reacteurs (GPR), 
a permanent advisor to the ASN. Of the rather 
numerous GPR meetings, a STUK representative 
attended those dealing with plans for an EPR facil-
ity, operational experience feedback from operating 
plants and selected safety improvements planned 
for operating plants.
Discussions were had with the French author-
ity (DGSNR) on the licensing of new nuclear power 
plants and related special questions.
A representative of the Argentinian author-
ity ARN worked in STUK for three months. The 
topic of the visit was oversight of the planning and 
construction of the new nuclear power plant and 
reactor pressure vessel embrittlement of which 
Argentina is obtaining experiences for utilisation 
in the future.
Co-operation between STUK and the Russian 
nuclear safety authority Federal Service for 
Ecological, Technological and Atomic Supervision 
(formerly Gosatomnadzor GAN) in nuclear mate-
rial and waste control continued, based on a co-
operation arrangement signed in 1998. The devel-
opment of regulatory guidelines was of particular 
interest.
Safeguards co-operation between STUK and 
the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation 
Ofﬁce (ASNO) continued. According to agreed prac-
tice, STUK provided ASNO with information on 
nuclear materials of Australian origin imported to 
and kept in Finland.
Other forms of co-operation
STUK participated in the work of the Western 
European Nuclear Regulators’ Association 
(WENRA). In 2000, a working group on harmoni-
sation was set up to develop a method for drawing 
up uniform nuclear safety requirements. In accord-
ance with the recommendations of the working 
group’s ﬁnal report, an extensive nuclear safety 
requirements and nuclear waste management de-
velopment project was commenced in early 2003. 
It establishes nuclear safety requirements for 17 
safety areas and the status of two areas of nuclear 
waste management in the 15 participating coun-
tries. STUK contributed actively to the harmonisa-
tion project. In 2004 work meetings continued to 
put the ﬁnishing touches to these European refer-
ence requirements and to review member state 
self-assessments evaluating coverage of national 
regulations against reference level and the realisa-
tion of the requirements in practice.
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VVER Regulators Forum is a body of co-opera-
tion for the nuclear safety authorities of countries 
operating VVER plants. The objective of a risk 
assessment working group, set up in 2002, is to 
compare the results of the Probabilistic Safety 
Analyses (PSA) of VVER plants and analyse the 
causes of possible differences. In 2004 each par-
ticipating country drew up a summary report on 
the analysis of a small diameter pipe leak and the 
loss of offsite grid as dealt with in the PSAs of their 
own country’s VVER plants. In addition, the par-
ticipants prepared a report on the risk-informed 
oversight and safety management of VVER plants. 
In 2004, a VVER working group was set up to look 
into the utilisation of lessons learned from nuclear 
power plant operational experience feedback.
STUK participated in the work of the Network 
of Regulators of Small Nuclear Programs (NERS).
STUK arranged a Nordic nuclear material safe-
guards seminar in Helsinki in October. About 50 
individuals participated from Sweden, Norway and 
Finland as well as the invited representatives of 
the IAEA, Hungary and Lithuania.
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11 The advisory committee 
on nuclear safety
Pekka Salminen
In accordance with section 56 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act (990/1987), the preliminary prepara-
tion of matters relating to the safe use of nuclear 
energy is vested with the Advisory Committee on 
Nuclear Safety. It is appointed by the Government 
and functions in conjunction with STUK. Its term 
of ofﬁce is three years. The Committee was ap-
pointed on 10 September 2003 and its term of ofﬁce 
ends on 9 September 2006.
The Committee’s Chairman was Professor 
Pentti Lautala (Tampere University of Technology) 
and its Vice-Chairman was Head of Research 
Rauno Rintamaa (VTT Technical Research Centre 
of Finland). In 2004 the members were Professor 
Riitta Kyrki-Rajamäki (Lappeenranta Technical 
University), Director Ulla Koivusaari (Pirkanmaa 
Regional Environment Centre), Director Timo 
Okkonen (TUKES), Senior Researcher Ilona 
Lindholm (VTT), Branch Manager Paavo Vuorela 
(the Geological Survey of Finland) and Research 
Professor Runar Blomqvist (the Geological Survey 
of Finland). Professor Jukka Laaksonen, Director 
General of STUK, was a permanent expert to 
the Committee. Invited experts were Dr Antti 
Vuorinen and Director Christer Viktorsson (the 
Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate).
Branch manager Paavo Vuorela left the 
Committee in 2004. In his place the Government 
assigned Research Professor Runar Blomqvist.
The Committee convened nine times in 2003. 
At its meetings it prepared statements to STUK 
on the continued operation of the Loviisa 1 reactor 
pressure vessel, the construction licence applica-
tion for Olkiluoto 3, Finland’s national report as 
required in the Nuclear Safety Convention and six 
YVL guides due for revision, among others. The 
Committee followed regularly operational events 
at nuclear facilities and arranged an annual nu-
clear energy seminar together with the Advisory 
Committee on Nuclear Energy.
The Committee has three divisions for pre-
paratory work: a Reactor Safety Division, a 
Nuclear Waste Division as well as an Emergency 
Preparedness and Nuclear Material Division. In 
addition to the Committee members proper, dis-
tinguished experts from various ﬁelds have been 
invited to the Divisions. A total of 18 Division 
meetings were held in 2004.
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Summary of the results of STUK’s 
safety performance indicators
Background to the indicators
The overall assessment of nuclear power plant safe-
ty by inspection and safety reviews is complement-
ed by the STUK indicator system. The system indi-
cators can be used to illustrate that certain safety 
factors under scrutiny have remained at a desired 
level or to gain insight into their possible changes 
and trends in the short and the long run. Declining 
trends indicate a possible need to enhance the 
performance and organisational operation of the 
plants and STUK’s regulatory effort in those areas. 
Even the effectiveness of actions commenced based 
on indicator results can be monitored by means 
of these indicators. No speciﬁc action or threshold 
limits have been deﬁned for the indicators. Rather, 
the aim is to recognise trends in the safety-signiﬁ-
cant functions of a nuclear power plant or STUK 
as early as possible. The limit values set in the 
legislation, in the YVL guides and in the Technical 
Speciﬁcations (Tech Specs) of the plants, as well as 
the target values contained in the objectives of the 
department of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), 
will be applied where available.
The indicator system is divided into two prin-
cipal groups: external indicators for the safety of 
nuclear facilities and internal indicators for the 
regulatory effort. External indicators are divided 
into three principal subgroups: safety and quality 
culture; operational events; and structural integ-
rity. These principal subgroups have a total of 14 
indicator areas having 51 speciﬁc indicators.
Guide YTV 1.4, “Calculation, assessment and 
utilisation of the NRR indicators”, in the NRR 
Quality Manual deﬁnes the responsibilities and 
procedures for data collection and calculating in-
dicators for the NRR; and for assessing, reporting 
and utilising their values. Appendix 1 to the guide 
describes the NRR’s external indicators (indicators 
for safety of nuclear facilities); their deﬁnitions 
and data acquisition; the person responsible for 
the updating of each indicator (person in charge of 
indicator); and the person who maintains the indi-
cator system (administrator). Indicator deﬁnitions, 
graphs and results interpretation can be found on 
the NRR site in STUK’s intranet.
The STUK indicators were included in the re-
vised strategy of early 2003. Of the effectiveness 
indicators for STUK’s activities, the below apply to 
the NRR: occupational doses, radioactive releases 
from nuclear facilities and the resultant popula-
tion exposure in the vicinity of the plants, safety-
endangering events at nuclear facilities, condition 
of components relevant to the accident risk of nu-
clear facilities, updating of YVL guides, customer 
satisfaction and number of complaints. The last 
three indicators describe the NRR’s own activities 
and are incorporated in the indicator area for regu-
latory activities. Indicators for plant safety, incor-
porated in the STUK strategy, have quantitative 
limits contained in the regulations or the NRR’s 
own objectives.
All nuclear plant safety indicators are con-
tained in the effectiveness sector of the NRR 
strategy. Their values are updated quarterly and 
the deviations and their reasons are tracked down 
immediately. The development trends of indicators 
and indicator areas are assessed in the annual 
summary. The summary is utilised in conjunction 
with other assessments and inspection observa-
tions in the overall assessment of nuclear plant 
safety conducted by STUK. The annual summary 
of the indicators is attached to the annual report 
on regulatory control of nuclear safety submitted 
to the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
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Actions decided on the basis of 
the indicator results for 2003
The results of STUK’s safety performance indica-
tors for nuclear power plants in 2003 have been 
presented in Appendix 1 to the annual report on 
regulatory control of nuclear safety 2003 (STUK-
B-YTO 230). After the completion of the summary, 
the conclusions presented in the report concern-
ing indicator results, as well as their justiﬁcations, 
were reviewed with the people responsible for the 
indicators and the management of NRR and STUK 
in a joint meeting early in 2004. The indicator 
results were presented to all of NRR in a common 
departmental meeting. Issues discussed at these 
meetings included factors affecting the results of 
the indicators that show a deteriorating trend, the 
reasons behind them and measures to discontinue 
the trend.
There was reason for a closer evaluation of the 
deteriorating trend of the maintenance function of 
the Loviisa power plant. It was decided to evaluate 
in more detail the development of the indicators 
depicting maintenance operations in 2004 in con-
nection with the quarterly update. In addition, the 
departmental management decided on directing 
the focus of the periodic inspection programme 
towards the maintenance operations and ageing 
management of the Loviisa plant. Also, the Nuclear 
Safety Committee of the Loviisa nuclear power 
plant took notice of the growing trend in defects 
and repair time, and asked the plant for an expla-
nation.
The deterioration of the safety and quality cul-
ture of the Olkiluoto power plant, especially in op-
erations, was, on the grounds of the indicators, no 
longer considered a reason for further measures or 
directing resources because Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
(TVO) had taken the necessary development meas-
ures on the basis of the discussions triggered by the 
INES Level 1 events that occurred within a short 
period of time towards the end of the year 2003. 
During the planning of the periodic inspection pro-
gramme, it had been decided early in the year that 
a B-level inspection concerning operations would 
be included in the periodic inspection programme 
of the Olkiluoto plant in 2004. In connection with 
the A inspection (Safety Management), likewise in 
the 2004 programme, there was reason to evaluate 
the development measures presented by TVO and 
their realisation. The ofﬁce of NRR responsible for 
controlling operations (TUR) decided to intensify 
the monitoring and evaluation of the operations of 
Olkiluoto. The structure of the periodic inspection 
programme and the inspections in 2004 are listed 
in Appendix 4.
STUK evaluated the increased need to delib-
erately deviate from the technical speciﬁcations 
that became evident in 2003. The main reason for 
the increase in the exemptions granted by STUK 
at the Loviisa power plant was the replacement of 
ﬁxed radiation measurement system (the MONU 
project). The number of exemptions granted to the 
Olkiluoto plant had remained at the level of the 
previous years. The exemptions did not warrant 
re-evaluation of the Tech Specs at either plant. 
From STUK’s point of view, the increased number 
of applications for exemptions means an increased 
amount of work in handling and assessing them.
Indicator results for 2004
Safety and quality culture
According to the indicators for 2004, there was a 
deceleration in the previous year’s deteriorating 
trend in the maintenance functions of the Loviisa 
power plant. The maintenance operations were 
evaluated by plant unit concerning yearly volume 
of maintenance work, preventive maintenance and 
failure repairs of Tech Spec components, and on the 
basis of the volume of repair work during power 
operation, the average time spent on failure re-
pairs and the production losses caused by failures. 
In Loviisa the total volume of the yearly mainte-
nance work of Tech Spec components, including 
both failure repairs and preventive maintenance, 
has been increasing for three consecutive years. 
In 2004 the volume of failure repairs decreased 
slightly. The volume of preventive maintenance 
has remained steady on the yearly level. The vol-
ume of failure repairs during power operations has 
increased slightly in the last few years, especially 
at Loviisa 2. However, signiﬁcant numbers of fail-
ures have been in such back-up systems that have 
no direct inﬂuence on the operation of the plant 
units or nuclear safety. This also had an effect on 
the average repair time of the Tech Spec compo-
nents, which was high in 2003 and 2004, especially 
at Loviisa 2.
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The total yearly volume of maintenance work of 
Tech Spec components at the Olkiluoto plant has 
been decreasing during the past two years, which 
is partly caused by the total volume of preventive 
maintenance, which has been on the decrease for 
several years. The distribution of preventive main-
tenance between plant units has been determined 
by the length of the annual maintenance outages. 
During the corresponding monitoring period, the 
number of failure repairs has been increasing in 
a linear fashion. The number of failures during 
power operation also indicated an increasing trend 
for the second successive year. At Olkiluoto 1 there 
were an exceptionally large number of failures of 
Tech Spec components causing immediate opera-
tion restrictions in 2004. The average repair times 
remained low at Olkiluoto.
Production losses due to failures at the Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto plants remained relatively small in 
2004. The minor production loss at Loviisa 1 was 
mainly due to power reductions caused by failures 
in reactor protection systems and, eventually, a 
scram during the second quarter. The minor pro-
duction loss at Loviisa 2 in the last quarter was 
caused by the repair of the check valve in the feed 
water line of the secondary circuit. At the plant 
units of Olkiluoto the production losses due to fail-
ures were higher than the average of the past few 
years. The most signiﬁcant production losses were 
caused by the repair of the generator water cooling 
system at Olkiluoto 2 – for which purpose the plant 
unit was brought to a hot shutdown in the third 
quarter – and by the deterioration of the isolation 
resistance of the primary coolant pump, which 
caused the plant to be operated with ﬁve pumps 
and the power to be restricted for more than a 
month until the annual maintenance outage. The 
most signiﬁcant production loss at Olkiluoto 1 in 
the ﬁrst quarter was partly due to the failures and 
replacement of the position indicator of the control 
valve of the relief system during hot shutdown and 
the reactor scram during the subsequent start-up, 
caused by the inadvertent closing of the isola-
tion valve of the main steam line. The plant was 
brought to a cold shutdown in order to repair the 
valve.
Safety systems’ unavailability was followed by 
means of international indices provided by the li-
censees. The high pressure safety injection system, 
the auxiliary feed water system and the emergency 
diesel generators were monitored at the Loviisa 
power plant; Olkiluoto monitored the containment 
spray system, the auxiliary feed water system and 
the emergency diesel generators. According to the 
indicators for 2003, the diesel generator unavail-
ability index showed a deteriorating trend for the 
third year in succession. In the ﬁrst half of 2004 
the emergency diesel unavailability index at the 
Loviisa power plant indicated that the unavailabil-
ity level was still increasing. STUK investigated 
factors having an impact on the unavailability 
and asked the Loviisa power plant to survey the 
validity of the international unavailability index. 
After correction of the errors detected in the calcu-
lations, the value of the indicator representing the 
emergency diesel unavailability for 2004 fell to the 
pre-2001 level.
The indicator representing the emergency die-
sel unavailability at the Olkiluoto plant for 2004 
was considerably higher than the very small value 
of 2003. Some of the factors that had an impact on 
the increasing unavailability were the stoppages of 
diesels caused by various reasons. The unavailabil-
ity of the containment spray system of Olkiluoto 2 
also increased from 2003 due to vibration problems 
in the system’s pumps. The unavailability index of 
the auxiliary feed water system dropped from the 
2003 values to a normal low level at both plant 
units.
There were two plant conditions in non-com-
pliance with the Technical Speciﬁcations at the 
Loviisa plant and only one at the Olkiluoto plant 
in 2004, so there was a change for the better in the 
deteriorating trend of Olkiluoto, which had gone on 
for the three previous years. There was a condition 
in non-compliance with the Technical Speciﬁcations 
at Loviisa 2 when the activity measurements of 
the exhaust pipelines of the turbine condenser’s 
main ejectors were not in an operational condition 
because of a design error in the modiﬁcation of 
measurements carried out the previous summer. 
The other condition in non-compliance with the 
Technical Speciﬁcations was a short-term disorder 
in the reactor’s decay heat removal during the an-
nual maintenance of Loviisa 2 in cold shutdown. 
The condition in non-compliance with the Technical 
Speciﬁcations at Olkiluoto involved bypassing the 
protection limit that monitors condensate conduc-
tivity within the reactor protection system. This 
was done as a safety precaution for a preventive 
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maintenance check of the safety valve at both units 
of the Olkiluoto plant. Adherence/non-adherence 
to the Tech Specs shows the safety attitude of the 
plants and the ability of the plant operating or-
ganisations to follow the rules and their own guide-
lines. The non-compliances at Loviisa were caused 
by defects in supervision of the contracted work.
The need for the Loviisa power plant to delib-
erately deviate from the Tech Specs fell in 2004 
from the relatively high level of the previous year 
to a level corresponding to the long-term average. 
The nine exemptions granted to the Loviisa plant 
were for the most part concerned with the need to 
deviate from the Tech Specs caused by modiﬁca-
tion and improvement work. At the Olkiluoto plant 
there were also nine exemptions granted, which is 
slightly more than in the year before. Five of these 
exemptions were concerned with the construction 
of the new plant unit. The exemptions granted did 
not warrant re-evaluation of the Tech Specs.
The indicator describing the currency of plant 
documentation shows the document revisions, 
which relate to safety-signiﬁcant or extensive mod-
iﬁcations carried out in the 2004 annual mainte-
nances of Loviisa and Olkiluoto and which must 
be implemented before the plant is started up after 
the annual maintenance in question. After the 
plant modiﬁcations carried out in the annual main-
tenance, the plant documentation at the Olkiluoto 
plant had once again been updated with regard to 
all documents that had to be updated by the start-
up. With regard to the Loviisa power plant, the re-
sult can be considered reasonable as well, although 
there were more deviations than previously. The 
numbers do not yet include any monitoring with 
regard to plant documents that only need to be up-
dated by the next annual maintenance.
The plant units’ safety performance indicator 
for investments on improvements and modiﬁca-
tions indicates relative ﬂuctuation in investments. 
Sums given in euro are the utilities’ business se-
cret not to be published here. This safety perform-
ance indicator was included in the STUK indicator 
system in 2000 to indicate the potential effect 
of deregulated electrical markets on investment. 
The ﬂuctuation in the indicator clearly shows the 
investments made in 1997–2000 in the plants’ 
power upgrades and modernisation projects. The 
investments of 2004 indicate the increasing trend 
at both the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto plants. The 
main investments at the Loviisa plant during the 
past couple of years have been the provisions for 
severe reactor accidents and the modernisation 
of the turbine. In the latter part of 2004 the con-
struction of areas related to the upgrading of I&C 
systems, as well as the planning of the automation 
renewal project, began at Loviisa. One of the main 
investments in the Olkiluoto plant in 2004 was the 
turbine plant renewal project, which also includes 
renewal of the steam dryers.
STUK works to affect, both directly and indi-
rectly, the radiation doses for nuclear power plant 
workers and the calculated radiation exposure for 
the surrounding population arising from releases. 
This involves low radioactive releases into the en-
vironment, clearly below set limits. Releases into 
the air and water at the Olkiluoto plant remained 
low in 2004, as did the calculated radiation dose 
for the most exposed individual in the population 
surrounding the Olkiluoto plant. Releases of iodine 
and aerosols into the atmosphere indicated a slight 
increase at the Loviisa plant. Releases into the sea 
at Loviisa were greater than in the previous year 
because towards the end of 2004 the plant released 
clariﬁed evaporation residues from storage tanks 
into the sea (so-called controlled liquid discharges) 
in a controlled manner. This procedure, which reoc-
curs every few years and requires a prior notice to 
STUK, raised the calculated radiation dose to the 
most exposed individual in the vicinity of Loviisa, 
while the dose still remained clearly below the limit 
set in the Government’s resolution. The individual 
doses for the workers were below the personal dose 
limits at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa plants. The col-
lective doses for the workers were small and below 
the set limits at the Olkiluoto plants and Loviisa 2. 
During the long repair and maintenance outage 
the collective occupational dose for Loviisa 1 be-
came slightly greater than estimated, e.g. in reac-
tor and insulation work, exceeding the calculatory 
reporting threshold conﬁned to net electric power 
speciﬁed in the Guide YVL 7.9.
Operational events
The numbers of operational events at the Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto power plants in 2004 were on the 
average level of the past few years. There was a 
change for the better in the deteriorating trend of 
operational events at the Olkiluoto power plant 
implied by the indicators for 2003. Two events war-
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ranting a special report occurred at the Olkiluoto 
plant and three at the Loviisa plant. In addition to 
non-compliances with Tech Specs, spent fuel han-
dling malfunctions that occurred in the spent fuel 
storages at both plants warranted a special report. 
The factors behind the events included design er-
rors in modiﬁcations, non-compliance with instruc-
tions, and defects in work management. In 2004 
six operational transient reports were submitted 
from the Olkiluoto plant and nine from the Loviisa 
plant. The disorders did not focus on any speciﬁc 
system or an individual device. No ﬁres occurred 
at either plant. In 2004 technical failures were 
the determining causes of events at both plants. 
The number of events is on a slight increase at the 
Loviisa plant. The report made by the plant on a 
fatal accident in electrical work during the annual 
maintenance of Loviisa 1 is not included in any of 
the aforementioned event reporting categories and 
therefore does not show in the indicators. Neither 
does STUK follow the numbers of occupational ac-
cidents with its indicators.
The indicator system also reviews the risk-sig-
niﬁcance of operational events. For this, the events 
are divided into three groups: 1) unavailabilities 
due to component failures, 2) planned unavail-
abilities, and 3) initiating events. The events in 
each group have been further divided by their risk-
signiﬁcance into three categories, and the indicator 
is the number of events falling into each category. 
The events analysed for 2004 are considered part 
of normal nuclear power plant operation and no 
further measures were required from STUK.
One reactor scram occurred at both plants in 
2004. The scram at Loviisa 1 was due to a failure 
in the reactor protection system. At Olkiluoto 1 
there was a reactor scram caused by the closing of 
the steam line valve. All safety systems functioned 
according to design during the scrams. Because 
no essentially hazardous events occurred at the 
plants, these scrams became the most risk-signiﬁ-
cant events. Nine other events of the highest risk 
category occurred at the Loviisa plant and eight at 
the Olkiluoto plant. The unavailability at Loviisa 
was caused by latent defects in the emergency 
diesel generators, the auxiliary feed water system 
and the containment spray system. In addition, the 
events in the most signiﬁcant category include the 
annual maintenances of the back-up emergency 
feed water system because of the conservative 
method of modelling. At Olkiluoto the events in-
cluded in the most risk-signiﬁcant category were 
caused both by planned unavailability and by 
latent defects in the emergency diesel generators 
of both plant units, and the component interme-
diate cooling system of the shut down reactor of 
Olkiluoto 2. The numbers of the most risk-signiﬁ-
cant events showed an increase from the previous 
year at Olkiluoto and a decrease at Loviisa.
The number of events falling into the middle 
category of risk-signiﬁcance was clearly below the 
previous year at Loviisa: seven events due to fail-
ures. At Olkiluoto the number was on the level of 
the previous year: approximately twenty events, 
two-thirds of which occurred at Olkiluoto 1. The 
Olkiluoto events were mostly planned unavail-
abilities, including those caused by work executed 
under exemption from the Tech Specs and preven-
tive maintenance. The number of analysed events 
falling into the least risk-signiﬁcant category has 
increased because there has been a shift in the 
reporting towards a policy in accordance with the 
Guide YVL 1.5 (the unavailabilities of all Tech 
Spec components are presented in monthly or 
quarterly reports). There were more than a hun-
dred events of this risk category at both plant 
units of Loviisa, 266 altogether, and dozens at the 
Olkiluoto units, 148 in total. The Loviisa events 
were mostly planned unavailability; the Olkiluoto 
events were mostly caused by failures. The kind of 
events analysed now were partly eliminated from 
the analysis in previous years.
Structural integrity
In the safety performance indicator area, the leak-
tightness of multiple barriers (fuel, primary circuit, 
secondary circuit, containment) is monitored. The 
objective is that leaktightness complies with the 
requirements and deteriorating trends are neither 
allowed, as assessed according to STUK’s safety 
performance indicators.
Based on the 2004 indicators, the set limits 
on barriers preventing the spread of radioactive 
releases were not exceeded. There have been no 
fuel leaks at the Loviisa plant units for years now. 
Minor fuel leakages have occurred almost every 
year at the Olkiluoto plant units. The development 
of the leakages has been monitored during power 
operation, and the leaking fuel bundles have been 
removed from use in the annual maintenance out-
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age following the leak detection. A minor fuel leak 
was observed at Olkiluoto 2 in the third quarter.
Primary and secondary circuit integrity is mon-
itored by international chemistry indices used by 
the utilities or by indices designed by the plants, 
and by the concentration levels of corrosive impuri-
ties and corrosion products. The chemistry indices 
indicated that process chemistry control had been 
successful at the Loviisa 1 and Olkiluoto 1 plant 
units in 2004. At Loviisa 2 the high value of the 
chemistry index in 2003 and 2004 was due to a sea-
water leak in a turbine condenser, which was also 
indicated by the chloride content of the steam gen-
erator’s blow down. The leak was repaired in the 
annual maintenance outage in 2004, after which 
the indicator values were restored to pre-leak level. 
No signiﬁcant changes took place in the cobalt-60 
and iron contents of the primary coolant or the iron 
content of the feed water during the monitoring 
period.
The chemistry index value of Olkiluoto 2 in the 
third quarter, which is substantially higher than 
the target value, is due to a leak in the turbine 
condenser, which is also indicated by a higher than 
normal chloride content. The leak was repaired 
within a couple of days of its detection. Since the 
power uprates, both Olkiluoto plant units have had 
the problem of a sulphate content higher than the 
reactor water target value. After the system modi-
ﬁcations which lowered the temperature of clean-
ing the condensate, the sulphate concentration has 
remained below the target level (5 µg/l) at both 
plant units, not including the third quarter of 2004 
when the maximum content at Olkiluoto 2 was 8.3 
µg/l. There is no straightforward reason for the sul-
phate content being higher than normal. No signif-
icant changes have taken place at either Olkiluoto 
plant unit in the cobalt-60 activity concentration of 
the primary coolant or the iron content of the feed 
water during the monitoring period.
At the Olkiluoto plant, leakages from the pri-
mary circuit are monitored by operating cycle as 
well. During the operating cycle 2003–2004, the 
volumes of identiﬁed and unidentiﬁed leaks in 
the primary circuit were low at both Olkiluoto 
plant units. During the previous operating cycle of 
2002–2003, the volume of unidentiﬁed leaks was 
fairly high at Olkiluoto 1, which was due to leaks 
from check valves in the blow down system of the 
main steam lines, which took place for the whole 
operating period. The utility is planning on a new 
seal structure for the valves.
Containment integrity has been good in both 
Olkiluoto and Loviisa. The overall as-found leak-
age of the containment outer isolation valves was 
below the set limits. The overall as-found leakage 
of the Loviisa 1 outer isolation valves has grown 
for the second year in succession. Nearly half of 
the overall leakage was caused by group tests of 
the isolation valves in the tank lines of the emer-
gency cooling system, where the leak measured for 
the group in question is recorded as the result for 
all valves. However, the multiple entries are not 
taken into account when calculating the overall 
leakage. A more valid picture of the containment 
leakage would result from reducing group tests or 
modifying the calculation method so that it would 
correspond to that of TVO. The overall leakage of 
isolation valves has decreased at Olkiluoto 2 and 
slightly increased at Olkiluoto 1 from that of the 
previous year. Approximately one-half of the leak-
age at Olkiluoto 1 is due to leaks in two isolation 
valves, apparently caused by impurities that began 
to move during a scram.
The percentage of isolation valves that passed 
the leaktightness test at ﬁrst attempt has re-
mained high, although there is a decrease from the 
previous year at both Loviisa and Olkiluoto.
The overall as-found leakage of containment 
penetrations, which at Loviisa includes leaktight-
ness tests of the bellows seals of the personnel air-
lock, the emergency personnel airlock, the material 
airlock, the reactor pit, inward relief valves, cable 
penetrations, the containment maintenance venti-
lation systems, the main steam line and the feed 
water system, has still grown at Loviisa 2, but the 
set limit remains clearly unexceeded. At Loviisa 2 
approx. 88% of the overall leakage comes from a 
leaking penetration bellows seal in the mainte-
nance ventilation system. The leaktightness of the 
rubber bellows has been problematic over recent 
years, and they will, therefore, be transformed into 
a metal structure. The overall as-found leakage 
rate of containment penetrations, which at the 
Olkiluoto plant includes leakages in the upper and 
lower personnel airlock, the maintenance dome 
and the containment dome, has been small.
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Conclusions drawn from the 
results of the 2004 indicators
The data gathered from 2004 for nuclear plant 
safety indicators did not indicate such changes in 
individual indicators, indicator areas or the three 
main areas as would have warranted an immediate 
reaction from STUK, with the exception of indica-
tors pertaining to the unavailability of emergency 
diesels at the Loviisa plant, which were restored 
to the normal level after correction of the errors 
detected in the calculation of the international in-
dices at the Loviisa plant.
The requirements set for the indicators of the 
effectiveness of STUK’s activities were fulﬁlled as 
regards individual occupational dose, radioactive 
releases and population exposure. During the long 
repair and maintenance outage the collective ra-
diation dose for Loviisa 1 became slightly greater 
than estimated, exceeding the calculatory report-
ing threshold conﬁned to net electric power speci-
ﬁed in the Guide YVL 7.9.
The releases of radioactive substances at the 
nuclear power plants were clearly below the set 
limits. Releases into the atmosphere were small at 
both the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto plants. Releases 
into the water decreased further at the Olkiluoto 
plant. Since the Loviisa plant made a controlled 
low-activity waste water discharge from storage 
tanks into the sea towards the end of 2004, re-
leases into the water were slightly greater than 
the year before at Loviisa. As in the previous years, 
the dose in Loviisa and Olkiluoto for the most ex-
posed individual in the vicinity due to releases by 
nuclear power plants was small and clearly below 
the threshold value set in the Government resolu-
tion. In the vicinity of Loviisa the dose for the most 
exposed individual was slightly increased by the 
controlled discharge of low-activity evaporation 
residues into the sea.
The plants were mainly used according to the 
Technical Speciﬁcations. Two situations in non-
compliance with the Tech Specs occurred at the 
Loviisa plant and one at the Olkiluoto plant. The 
deviation concerning both Olkiluoto plant units 
and one of the deviations at Loviisa 2 were caused 
by incorrect working methods due to non-adherence 
to guidelines. The other deviation at Loviisa 2 was 
due to an error in the design of modiﬁcations. The 
events at the Loviisa plant also involved defects 
in the supervision of contracted work. There was a 
change for the better in the deteriorating trend in 
the compliance with the Technical Speciﬁcations, 
which had gone on for the three previous years at 
the Olkiluoto plant.
The need for the Loviisa power plant to delib-
erately deviate from the Tech Specs fell in 2004 
from the relatively high number of the previous 
year to nine, which corresponds to the long-term 
average. The exemptions granted by STUK were 
for the most part concerned with the need to devi-
ate from the Tech Specs caused by modiﬁcations 
and improvement work. At the Olkiluoto plant 
there were also nine exemptions granted, which is 
slightly more than in the year before. Five of these 
exemptions were concerned with the construction 
of the new plant unit. The exemptions granted did 
not warrant re-evaluation of the Tech Specs.
No events endangering nuclear safety occurred 
at the nuclear facilities. The numbers of opera-
tional events at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto power 
plants in 2004 were on the average level of the 
past few years. There was a change for the better 
in the deteriorating trend of operational events at 
the Olkiluoto power plant implied by the indica-
tors for 2003. The Olkiluoto power plant submit-
ted eight event reports in 2004, while the Loviisa 
plant submitted twelve. Technical failures were 
the determining causes of events at both plants in 
2004. The number of events is on a slight increase 
at the Loviisa plant. The report made by the plant 
on the electrical accident that led to one person’s 
death during the annual maintenance of Loviisa 1 
is not included in any of the aforementioned event 
reporting categories and therefore does not show in 
the indicators. Neither does STUK follow the num-
bers of work accidents with its indicators. Owing to 
the event, STUK has launched conversations with 
the Safety Technology Authority (TUKES) super-
vising electrical safety and the other authorities 
that investigated the fatal accident. The Loviisa 
plant has also been asked for accounts of matters 
including compliance with occupational safety reg-
ulations and development of work order practice 
in the operation of a nuclear power plant. Fortum 
has launched development measures with regard 
to work procedures. The long-term improvement 
measures, and the measures launched by STUK, 
are still under evaluation.
According to the indicators for 2004, the previ-
ous deteriorating trend in the maintenance func-
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tion of the Loviisa power plant came to a halt. The 
volume of yearly failure repairs decreased slightly 
from the previous year. This is due to the decrease 
in the overall volume of failures because the yearly 
volume of preventive maintenance has remained 
constant. The volume of failures during power op-
eration causing an immediate operation restriction 
has increased in the last few years at Loviisa 2. 
However, the failures have been in such back-up 
systems that have no direct inﬂuence on the opera-
tion of the plant units or nuclear safety. The repair 
of the failures is prioritised in the realms of the 
resources available on the basis of their urgency 
and safety signiﬁcance. This shows in the average 
repair times, which are high at the Loviisa plant, 
especially at Loviisa 2. However, the production 
losses caused by failures have remained small at 
the Loviisa plant. The most risk-signiﬁcant events, 
such as the reactor scram at Loviisa 1, and the 
other signiﬁcant events were caused by component 
failures. The numbers of events falling into these 
risk categories were smaller than in the previous 
year. The unavailability of safety systems during 
the events in question was caused by latent defects 
in the emergency diesel generators, the emergency 
feed water system and the containment spray 
system. In addition, the most signiﬁcant events in-
clude the unavailability of the back-up emergency 
feed water system in annual maintenance because 
of the conservative method of modelling.
The total yearly volume of maintenance work of 
Tech Spec components at the Olkiluoto plant has 
been decreasing during the past two years, which 
is partly caused by the total volume of preventive 
maintenance, which has been on the decrease for 
several years. In proportion, the number of fail-
ures has been on a linear increase. The volume of 
operation restriction work during power operation 
showed an increasing trend for the second suc-
cessive year. There were an exceptionally large 
number of failures of Tech Spec components caus-
ing immediate operation restrictions at Olkiluoto 1 
in particular. An increasing fault trend would indi-
cate a degrading plant condition. The simultaneous 
decreasing trend in preventive maintenance may 
indicate problems with component lifetime man-
agement. The average failure repair times were 
short at the Olkiluoto plant units. The production 
losses due to failures were higher than the average 
of the past few years. The future will show whether 
an actual change has occurred in the trend. The 
most risk-signiﬁcant events, such as the reactor 
scram at Olkiluoto 1, and the other signiﬁcant 
events were caused both by component failures 
and planned unavailability. The number of events 
falling into these risk categories was greater than 
in the previous year. The unavailability of safety 
systems during the events in question was caused 
by latent defects in the emergency diesel genera-
tors of both plant units and the shut down reactor 
intermediate cooling system of Olkiluoto 2. The in-
ternational indices describing the unavailability of 
the emergency diesels at both Olkiluoto plant units 
and the containment spray system at Olkiluoto 2 
indicated an increase in the unavailability levels.
The structural integrity of multiple barriers 
containing the release of radioactive substances 
has remained good, although a slight deteriora-
tion can be observed. Fuel leaks have been rare at 
the Loviisa plant units in the past few years, and 
there were none in 2004. Fuel leaks have occurred 
almost every year at the Olkiluoto plant units; a 
fuel leak was observed at Olkiluoto 2 at the end of 
August.
In addition to the international chemistry per-
formance indices depicting water chemistry, new 
indicators were introduced in 2004 depicting impu-
rities causing corrosion in the primary and second-
ary circuits as well as the concentration levels of 
corrosion products in the circuits. The chemistry 
indices indicated that chemistry control had been 
successful at the Loviisa 1 and Olkiluoto 1 plant 
units in 2004. The leaks in the turbine condens-
ers of Loviisa 2 and Olkiluoto 2 showed as high 
chloride contents. No straightforward explanation 
was found for the sulphate concentration being 
higher than the target value for the third quarter 
at Olkiluoto 2. Short-term corrosive impurity con-
tents higher than normal have not been proven 
to have a damaging impact on the construction 
materials.
Containment integrity has remained good in 
both Olkiluoto and Loviisa. The overall as-found 
leakage of the Loviisa 1 outer isolation valves in-
dicates an increasing trend, which is mainly due to 
group tests and the method of calculating the over-
all leakage. A more valid picture of the contain-
ment leakage would result from reducing group 
tests or modifying the calculation method so that 
it would correspond to that of TVO. The percentage 
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of isolation valves which passed the leaktightness 
test at ﬁrst attempt has decreased at both Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto. Overall leakage through contain-
ment penetrations grew at Loviisa 2 but the set 
limit was not exceeded. The leaktightness of the 
rubber bellows of the penetrations had been prob-
lematic and the Loviisa power plant has initiated 
their replacement with metal bellows. The overall 
leakage of containment penetrations has remained 
small at the Olkiluoto plant units.
The investments at both Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
in 2004 indicate an increasing trend, which is 
inﬂuenced in Loviisa by the preparation for exten-
sive safety improvement projects and in Olkiluoto 
by the preparation for a new plant unit project, in 
addition to modernisation projects for the units 
currently in operation. The updating situation of 
document revisions needed after plant modiﬁca-
tions (entered into the register) in 2004 was tolera-
ble for the Loviisa units and good for the Olkiluoto 
units by the start-up of the plants.
Judging by the indicators, there has been im-
provement in the operation of the Olkiluoto plant. 
Quality assurance and radiation protection reached 
the goals deﬁned. The indicators depicting faults in 
Tech Spec components, maintenance and unavail-
ability of safety systems indicate potential problems 
in the maintenance strategy or the plant’s lifetime 
management. This observation is supported by the 
technical reasons for the events and the increase in 
the most risk-signiﬁcant events, as well as the com-
ponent failures behind them. There are problems 
every year with fuel integrity at the Olkiluoto units.
At the Loviisa power plant there were defects in 
monitoring the performance of the plant’s internal 
units and in the supervision of contracted work. 
The set target was not fully reached in the updat-
ing of documents. The objectives of the radiation 
protection during the annual maintenance outage 
at Loviisa 1 were not achieved, and the report-
ing threshold for collective dose prescribed in the 
YVL Guide was exceeded. Certain defects were 
detected in connection with the indicator control 
of STUK with regard to the validity of laboratory 
results reported. Similar problems also occurred 
in connection with sorting out the errors detected 
in the calculation of indicators depicting unavail-
ability of safety systems. No straightforward expla-
nation was found for the increase in the average 
failure repair time of Tech Spec components. It 
remains to be determined whether the long repair 
times relate to ageing management or mainte-
nance resources.
The number of operational events is slightly 
increasing in Loviisa and decreasing in Olkiluoto. 
The number of the most risk-signiﬁcant events 
showed a decrease from the previous year at 
Loviisa and an increase at Olkiluoto. At Loviisa the 
most signiﬁcant failures occurred in the emergency 
diesel generators, the emergency feed water system 
and the containment spray system. In addition, the 
most signiﬁcant events include the annual mainte-
nance of the back-up emergency feed water system. 
At Olkiluoto the most signiﬁcant failures were 
related to diesel generators. The unavailability of 
the emergency diesels at both Olkiluoto plant units 
and the containment spray system at Olkiluoto 2 
indicated an increase in 2004.
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Introduction to indicators and their deﬁnition
Given next in the report are the deﬁnitions, data 
acquisition, calculation responsibilities and pur-
pose of the indicators for nuclear power plant safe-
ty in the STUK indicator system; and indicator 
values updated on the basis of the 2004 data, their 
interpretation and assessment of change.
The NRR has assigned persons responsible for 
the acquisition of indicator data as well as for their 
calculation and analysis. In 2004 resident inspec-
tors of the ofﬁce of safety management (TUR) were 
responsible for indicators concerning failures and 
preventive maintenance of Tech Spec components 
and safety systems availability. TUR was also re-
sponsible for production losses due to failures. The 
data on primary circuit leakages for the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant was provided by the resident 
inspector. The inspectors of TUR gathered and 
assessed indicators describing the quality of the 
maintenance function at the Olkiluoto plant. TUR 
maintained an operational events follow-up ta-
ble and was responsible for indicators based on 
operational events and reports. The ofﬁce of risk 
assessment (RIS) assessed the risk-signiﬁcance of 
the events. Inspectors in the ofﬁce of power plant 
technology (VLT) were responsible for indicators 
describing the functioning of the ﬁre alarm system 
as well as the integrity of fuel and the primary cir-
cuit. The ofﬁce of reactor and safety systems (REA) 
gathered and calculated indicators describing con-
tainment leaktightness. The ofﬁce of radiation pro-
tection (SÄT) gathered dose and release data and 
the corresponding indicators. The ofﬁce of plant 
projects (HAN) was responsible for the follow-up 
of documentation updating and investments indi-
cators. The nuclear power plant safety indicator 
system was maintained in the unit of management 
support (YJT) and co-ordinated by the event inves-
tigation manager.
As a result of the intermediate assessment of 
the STUK indicator system conducted in 2003, it 
was decided to specify the deﬁnitions of certain 
speciﬁc indicators to improve their reliability and 
to ﬁnd ways of enhancing the indicator process. The 
deﬁnitions of certain indicators were also changed 
as of the beginning of 2004, such that they would 
support, as well as possible, NRR’s regulatory work 
and its sub-processes.
New indicators concerning the risk-signiﬁcance 
of events were introduced for 2003. In indicator 
areas describing the maintenance of safety-sig-
niﬁcant components (failures in Tech Spec com-
ponents, maintenance, and repair time) and the 
integrity of the primary and secondary circuits, 
existing indicators were modiﬁed and new indica-
tors introduced as of the beginning of 2004. The 
indicators in accordance with the new deﬁnitions 
have been calculated retrospectively over the pre-
vious few years to gain a base for comparison with 
the 2004 indicator values.
As of the beginning of 2004, the following indi-
cators or their deﬁnitions were modiﬁed:
I.1a Failures of components subject 
to the Technical Speciﬁcations:
As the indicator, the number of failures causing 
unavailability of components deﬁned in the Tech 
Specs during power operation is followed by plant 
unit. The failures are divided by plant unit into 
two groups: failures causing an immediate opera-
tion restriction and failures causing an operation 
restriction in connection with repair work.
Previously, the total number of failures of com-
ponents deﬁned in the Tech Specs during power 
operation was followed as the indicator for the 
whole plant.
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I.1b Maintenance of components subject 
to the Technical Speciﬁcations:
As the indicator, the numbers of failure repairs and 
preventive maintenance work on components de-
ﬁned in the Tech Specs and their ratio are followed 
by plant unit.
Previously, only the ratio of preventive main-
tenance jobs to failure repair work orders was 
followed by plant. Because the numerical value 
as such indicated no deﬁnite variation or trend, 
and it was difﬁcult to interpret the reasons for the 
variation, a change was made to follow the ratio of 
failure repairs to preventive maintenance jobs by 
plant unit as the indicator.
I.1c Repair time of components subject 
to the Technical Speciﬁcations:
As the indicator, the average repair time of failures 
causing unavailability of components deﬁned in 
the Tech Specs is followed (as an average of the 
repair times of all failure repairs).
Previously, the average of the percentage values 
of repair times in relation to repair time allowed 
in the Tech Specs was followed at the Olkiluoto 
plant. For the Loviisa plant, only those components 
whose allowed repair time is three days were in-
cluded. There was a wish to unify the deﬁnition of 
the indicator so that it would be the same for both 
plants. Even now, the values given by the indicator 
are not comparable because the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant has a multiple number of Tech Spec 
components compared with the Olkiluoto plant, so 
in Loviisa repairs need to be prioritised within the 
framework of repair times allowed and resources 
available.
I.1d Maintenance errors, 1e Common 
cause failures preventing operation, 
1f Potential common cause failures:
The indicators were combined for 2004 into a sin-
gle indicator: Realised common cause failures in 
components or systems reported in the sphere of 
an operation restriction under Tech Specs.
Previously, as regards all Olkiluoto systems, the 
number of maintenance errors were followed as the 
indicator, containing maintenance-error induced 
common cause failures and individual mainte-
nance errors. Common cause failures arising dur-
ing operation have also been included. The number 
of technical common cause failures causing the un-
availability of equipment or systems and number 
of potential common cause failures had their own 
indicators.
The indicators still require re-evaluation and 
development. Deﬁnition of the indicator for the 
Loviisa plant is under way.
III.1. Fuel integrity:
As new unit-speciﬁc indicators, the below param-
eters are followed:
• The maximum activity concentration level of 
iodine on even, steady-state operation during 
the monitoring period. As regards the Loviisa 
plant, it means the sum of the iodine isotope ac-
tivity concentrations as I-131 equivalents in hot 
standby, start-up state or power operation. With 
regard to the Olkiluoto plant, the indicator is 
the mere I-131 activity concentration in power 
operation. The maximum values are compared 
with the Tech Spec limit in a graphic presenta-
tion.
• The maximum activity concentration of I-131 
during depressurisation while entering shut-
down or after reactor scram
in addition to the old parameters:
• The maximum activity concentration on even, 
steady-state operation as I-131 equivalents 
(kBq/m³) (Olkiluoto; I-131 only), and
• The number of leaking fuel rod bundles re-
moved from the reactor in each annual mainte-
nance outage.
III.2. Integrity of primary and 
secondary circuits:
In addition to the earlier international chemistry 
indices, the following new unit-speciﬁc indicators 
were introduced:
• Corrosive impurities:  
The maximum chloride concentration of the 
steam generator blow down (Loviisa) and the 
reactor water (Olkiluoto) compared with the 
Tech Spec limit is followed in the monitoring 
period. At the Olkiluoto plant the maximum 
sulphate concentration of reactor water is fol-
lowed as well.
• Corrosion products released from the surfaces 
of the reactor circuit and the secondary circuit 
into the coolant:
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For the Loviisa plant, the iron concentration of the 
primary coolant solid material and the secondary 
circuit feed water (maximum value of the monitor-
ing period) are followed. For the Olkiluoto plant, 
the iron concentration of the reactor water (maxi-
mum value of the monitoring period) is followed. In 
addition, the maximum Co-60 activity concentra-
tion of the reactor coolant while bringing the plant 
to a cold shutdown is followed for both plants.
Instead of the international chemistry index, 
a new secondary circuit chemistry index was in-
troduced at the Loviisa plant in 2003. The values 
of this index have been calculated retrospectively 
from 2002 onwards. This new index observes cor-
rosive factors and contents of corrosion products 
in steam generator blow down and feed water. For 
steam generator venting, the calculation includes 
the chloride, sulphate and sodium concentrations.
In 2003 two types of indicators were used to fol-
low the risk-signiﬁcance of events (indicator II.2):
• Earlier the risk-signiﬁcance calculated using 
the PSA of operational events was followed. The 
areas under scrutiny included exemptions to the 
Tech Specs, Tech Spec component failures, pre-
ventive maintenance of Tech Spec components 
and other planned isolations. As indicators were 
both the contribution of each follow-up area and 
the combined total risk of unavailabilities to an-
nual core damage risk.
• As new indicators, the risk-importance of events 
caused by component unavailabilities began to 
be followed. As the risk measure, an increase 
in the Conditional Core Damage Probability 
(CCDP) associated with each event is employed. 
Events are divided into three groups: 1) unavail-
abilities due to component failures, 2) planned 
unavailabilities, and 3) initiating events. In ad-
dition, events are grouped into three categories 
according to their risk-signiﬁcance (CCDP): the 
most risk-signiﬁcant events (CCDP≥1E–7), oth-
er signiﬁcant events (1E–8≤CCDP<1E–7) and 
other events (CCDP<1E–8). The indicator is the 
number of events in each category.
Unavailabilities caused by work for which STUK 
has granted exemption orders are in group 2. 
Possible non-compliances with the Tech Specs (in-
dicator A.I.2) are in group 1, if they can be utilised 
for this indicator.
The previously used event risk indicators were 
dropped from the indicators for 2004.
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Safety performance indicators
A.I Safety and quality culture
A.I.1 Failures and their repairs
A.I.1a Failures of components subject 
to the Technical Speciﬁcations
Deﬁnition
As the indicator, the number of failures causing un-
availability of components deﬁned in the Technical 
Speciﬁcations (Tech Spec components) during pow-
er operation is followed. The failures are divided by 
plant unit into two groups: failures causing an im-
mediate operation restriction and failures causing 
an operation restriction in connection with repair 
work.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the work order systems 
and operational documents of the power plants.
Purpose of indicator
The indicator is used to assess the plant lifetime 
management and the development of the condition 
of components.
Responsible units/persons
Safety Management (TUR), resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jarmo Konsi (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of indicator
The number of repairs to Tech Spec components 
during power operation at the Loviisa plant de-
creased in 2004 from the number of the year be-
fore, which was substantial compared with those of 
the previous years. There were still approximately 
15% more failures than previously in the 2000s. At 
Loviisa 2 the volume of immediate operation re-
striction work has been increasing in the past few 
years. At Loviisa 2 there was twice as many (60) 
failures of Tech Spec components causing immedi-
ate operation restrictions as at Loviisa 1 in 2004. 
At Loviisa 1 there were 64 failures in 2004 that 
caused an operation restriction only when isolat-
ing the component for repair work; at Loviisa 2 the 
ﬁgure was 80.
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A signiﬁcant type of failure at both Loviisa 
units for the past couple of years have been the in-
spections and repairs of the containment hydrogen 
measurement, the rotameter cleanings of the ﬂow 
measurements of the steam generator blowdown 
lines, repairs to the radiation measurements in the 
ventilation of the controlled areas and the failure 
inspections and repairs of the diesels of the con-
tainment spray system.
The number of failures of Tech Spec compo-
nents at Olkiluoto during power operation also 
indicated an increasing trend in 2004 for the 
second successive year. Previously, the number of 
failures had been established as 50 to 60 per year, 
whereas in 2004 the failures causing an immediate 
operation restriction added up to 85. There were an 
exceptionally high number of faults causing an im-
mediate operation restriction in 2004, especially at 
Olkiluoto 1 (27), the overall number having previ-
ously been around twenty. The number of failures 
causing an operation restriction while isolating the 
component for repair work has been increasing at 
the Olkiluoto plant units. In 2004 the number was 
twice as high as the yearly numbers in the ﬁrst 
years of the 2000s.
The greatest number of failures occurred in the 
components of the relief system 314 at Olkiluoto 1: 
there were 10 failures altogether, 8 of which were 
failures in the control valve 314V21 caused by a 
single reason. One type of failure at Olkiluoto 2 
was the non-operation of a testing device in three 
internal isolation valves, detected during periodic 
tests. Two of the valves are located in the reactor 
core spray system (323) and one in the auxiliary 
feed water system. The same type of failure has oc-
curred in previous years as well.
The continued growth in failures may indicate 
a deteriorating plant condition and problems with 
component lifetime management.
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A.I.1b Maintenance of components subject 
to the Technical Speciﬁcations
Deﬁnition
As the indicator, the numbers of failure repairs 
and preventive maintenance work orders for com-
ponents deﬁned in the Tech Specs are followed by 
plant unit.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the plant work order 
systems, from which all preventive maintenance 
operations and failure repairs are retrieved.
Purpose of indicator
The indicator describes the volumes of failure re-
pairs and preventive maintenance and illustrates 
the condition of the plant and its maintenance 
strategy. The indicator is used to assess the main-
tenance strategy executed at the plant.
Responsible units/persons
Safety Management (TUR), resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jarmo Konsi (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of indicator
The overall volume of maintenance work on Tech 
Spec components has been on a slight increase at 
the Loviisa plant over the past three years. This 
is due to the fact that the yearly volume of failure 
repairs has increased slightly since 2000, espe-
cially at Loviisa 2. The volume of preventive main-
tenance has remained steady. Compared with the 
volume of failure repairs, the preventive mainte-
nance volume of Tech Spec components has there-
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fore been on a slight decrease at the Loviisa plant. 
The ratio has been below one at Loviisa 2 in the 
past two years. In 2004 there were more failures of 
Tech Spec components at Loviisa 2 than Loviisa 1, 
while Loviisa 1 had more preventive maintenance 
jobs than Loviisa 2. The yearly-changing numeri-
cal values have been due to a natural ﬂuctuation 
in the volume of preventive maintenance and fail-
ures, due to annual maintenance length among 
other things. In 2004 the annual maintenance out-
age lasted 47 days at Loviisa 1 and 22.5 days at 
Loviisa 2.
The overall number of maintenance operations 
on Tech Spec components in the 2000s has been 
around 600. In 2004 the yearly number of failure 
repairs at the Olkiluoto plant was 44% higher 
than that of the previous year; at Olkiluoto 1, the 
number was nearly twice as high as in 2003.
The preventive maintenance volume of Tech 
Spec components is on a decrease at the Olkiluoto 
plant compared with the volume of failure repairs. 
At Olkiluoto 1 the ratio of the number of preven-
tive maintenance operations to the number of fail-
ure repairs was way above one in 2004, whereas at 
Olkiluoto 2 the ratio was below one. The volume of 
preventive maintenance decreased at Olkiluoto 2 
and doubled at Olkiluoto 1 from that of the previ-
ous year. Preventive maintenance operations dur-
ing plant operation are deﬁned in the Tech Specs 
and their number thus stays a constant during the 
year. Failure repairs and preventive maintenance 
determined by outage duration affect the indicator. 
The duration of the annual maintenance outage 
was approximately 16 days for Olkiluoto 1 and ap-
proximately 9 days for Olkiluoto 2.
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A.I.1c Repair time of components subject 
to the Technical Speciﬁcations
Deﬁnition
As the indicator, the average repair time of failures 
causing unavailability of components deﬁned in 
the Tech Specs is followed. With each repair, the 
time recorded is the time of unavailability. It is cal-
culated from the detection of the failure to the end 
of repair work, if the failure causes an immediate 
operation restriction. If the component is operable 
until the beginning of repair, only the time of the 
repair work is taken into account.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the work order systems 
and maintenance and operational documents of the 
power plants.
Purpose of indicator
The indicator shows how quickly failed Tech Spec 
components are repaired in relation to the repair 
time allowed in the Tech Specs.
The indicator is used to assess the maintenance 
strategy, resources and effectiveness of the plants.
Responsible units/persons
Safety Management (TUR), resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jarmo Konsi (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of indicator
From 2000 to 2004 the average repair time of Tech 
Spec components at the Loviisa plant has varied 
between 30 and 40 hours. At Loviisa 1 there has 
been a clearly descending trend, the average repair 
time falling from 45 hours to 23 hours. At Loviisa 2 
a reverse trend has taken place, the average repair 
time rising from 28 hours to 52 hours in that time 
period. Work is prioritised in the realms of repair 
times, taking into account the safety signiﬁcance of 
the components and the resources available.
The 2003 peak value (55.6 hours) of the aver-
age repair time at Loviisa 2 was impacted by the 
failure inspections and repairs of the reactor build-
ing hydrogen control measurements (XW) and the 
diesels (EY05) in the containment spray system as 
well as the renewal of the EY05 start-up battery 
packs. The high value of 2004 was still impacted by 
the failure repairs to the reactor building hydrogen 
control measurements and the battery packs and 
rectiﬁers, the operation restriction of which (21 
days’ allowed repair time) comes into force as soon 
as the failure is detected.
From 1999 to 2004 the average repair times for 
Tech Spec components at the Olkiluoto plant units 
have varied between four and twelve hours. In 
2004 the average repair times at both plant units 
were low, approximately six hours. There is a slight 
increase from the 2003 average repair times of only 
4 to 5 hours.
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A.I.1d Common cause failures
Deﬁnition
As the indicator, the number of common cause fail-
ures of components or systems deﬁned in the Tech 
Specs is followed.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the reports 
by the utilities of operations causing an operation 
restriction.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the quality of maintenance.
Responsible unit/person
Safety Management (TUR)
Jukka Kupila
Interpretation of indicator
At the Loviisa plant no realised common cause 
failures were detected in systems deﬁned in Tech 
Spec in 2004.
At the Olkiluoto plant no realised common 
cause failures were detected in systems deﬁned in 
Tech Spec in 2004.
In connection with calculating the indicator, two 
emergency diesel generators were discovered to be 
inoperable simultaneously at the Olkiluoto power 
plant. This, however, was not a common cause 
failure; one of the emergency diesels was isolated 
to repair the failure detected in the periodic test. 
Later, in connection with a periodic test conducted 
for the second redundancy, a triggering error was 
discovered in the diesel, which was interpreted to 
have been latent for half the test period. The simul-
taneous unavailability took place on 7 April 2004 
between 7:55 and 13:15.
Number of common cause failures (CCF)  of Tech Spec
components or systems, Olkiluoto NPP
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A.I.1e Common cause failures preventing operation
Deﬁnition
As the indicator, the number of technical common 
cause failures (CCFs) causing unavailability of 
equipment or systems is followed for all plant sys-
tems.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the failure 
databases of the utilities. For the time being, the 
Olkiluoto indicator has been followed. The licensee 
has submitted the data in an Excel ﬁle, from which 
CCFs have been analysed. A corresponding proce-
dure for the Loviisa plant will be established after 
the completion of a study into CCFs.
Purpose of indicator
The indicator represents the number of CCFs of 
a technical origin. A CCF preventing a function 
refers not only to the failure of a safety system but 
includes all systems. Thus conclusions on the safe-
ty-signiﬁcance of CCFs are not to be made based 
on the indicator.
Responsible units/persons
Safety Management (TUR)
Jukka Kupila
Interpretation of indicator
The indicator was not measured in 2004.
According to the analysis, no CCFs assignable 
to the indicator area occurred at either Olkiluoto 
plant unit in 2003.
In the operating cycle 2001–2002 the number 
of CCFs assigned to this indicator area was half 
of that of the previous operating cycle at both 
Olkiluoto plant units, the total number of failures 
being nine. The most signiﬁcant were the accumu-
lation of dirt on the ﬁre detector system and the 
problems with the power supply, which were calcu-
lated as separate CCFs for both plant units.
Common cause failures (CCF) causing unavailability of
equipment or system, Olkiluoto NPP
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A.I.1f Potential common cause failures
Deﬁnition
The indicator is the number of potential CCFs of 
technical origin that have no effect on the avail-
ability of the equipment or systems but do have a 
bearing on the reliability of their operation (ageing, 
wear and tear, corrosion, etc.).
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the failure 
databases of the utilities. So far, only the indica-
tor for the Olkiluoto plant has been available. The 
licensee has submitted the data in Excel ﬁles from 
which CCFs have been analysed. A corresponding 
procedure will be established for the Loviisa plant 
after the completion of a study into CCFs.
Purpose of indicator
The indicator is an anticipatory sign for failures 
that could have developed into a failure preventing 
the operation of equipment or systems.
Responsible units/persons
Safety Management (TUR)
Jukka Kupila
Interpretation of indicator
The indicator was not measured in 2004.
The number of potential CCFs to be assigned 
to the indicator decreased at both Olkiluoto plant 
units due to a changed line of interpretation in 
2003. The most signiﬁcant problem was the cavi-
ties in the concrete bases beneath safety-important 
pumps, which has only now surfaced (indicators 
A.I.1a and A.I.3).
The most signiﬁcant problem in 2002 was the 
“bubbling” of the rubber coating of the service 
water channels. The sealing leakages of the main 
steam line isolation valves also increased the in-
dicator. The failure events also included precipita-
tions in heat exchangers, valve leakages and meas-
urement failures.
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Olkiluoto NPP
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
OL 1 9 7 11 18 6 10 20 6
OL 2 5 4 8 8 8 17 12 7
95-96 96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00 2000-01 2002 2003
80
STUK-B-YTO 241 STUK’S SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR NPPS IN 2004 APPENDIX 1
A.I.1g Production loss due to failures
Deﬁnition
Loss of power production caused by failures in rela-
tion to rated power (gross).
Source of data
Annual and quarterly reports submitted by utili-
ties.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the signiﬁcance of failures from the point 
of view of production.
Responsible unit/person
Safety Management (TUR)
Timo Eurasto
Interpretation of indicator
Production losses due to failures at the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto plant units have been relatively small.
The Loviisa 2 indicator value for 1997, which is 
an anomaly, was caused by an approx. 7-day-long 
shutdown to repair a leakage of the primary cir-
cuit and the 2003 anomaly was caused by work to 
replace the stator of a plant unit generator, which 
took 41 days, causing a 2.6% production loss.
Production losses due to failures remained small 
at the Loviisa plant in 2004, although in the ﬁrst 
quarter a stoppage of the primary coolant pump 
caused by sensor failure occurred at Loviisa 1. At 
Loviisa 1 there were also power reductions and 
a reactor scram caused by faults in the reactor 
protection system (SUZ). At Loviisa 2 the produc-
tion losses were due to malfunctions in turbine 
regulators, a turbine scram and turbine stop-
pages required to ﬁx the malfunctions. In addition, 
Loviisa 2 was brought to a start-up state on 20 
October 2004 for the purpose of a temporary repair 
to a cover seal leakage in the check valve of the 
secondary circuit feed water line. The plant unit 
also operated at 50% power for a while in order to 
repair the leakage of the impulse tube in the ﬂow 
measurement (RL74F01) of the feed water line.
The production losses due to failures at the 
plant units of Olkiluoto were higher in 2004 than 
the average of the past few years. The failures were 
not conﬁned to speciﬁc components, systems or 
technical ﬁeld, and the failures were in no respect 
exceptional.
The 0.78% production loss of Olkiluoto 1 was 
affected by the repair of a failure in the 314V21 
valve, for which the plant was brought to a hot 
shutdown. In the start-up following the repair out-
age one of the isolation valves in the main steam 
line closed without reason, and in order to repair 
that the plant was brought to a cold shutdown. In 
addition, production loss was caused in the third 
quarter by the opening of the safety valve of the 
cooling system and the consequent turbine scram.
At Olkiluoto 2 the production loss due to fail-
ures in 2004 was 1.2%. The most signiﬁcant reason 
for the production losses was the deterioration 
of the isolation resistance of the primary coolant 
pump P5, which caused the power of the plant to be 
restricted in the second quarter. In the third quar-
ter the production loss at Olkiluoto 2 was caused 
by the repairs to the generator cooling system and 
the condensate seawater leak. In addition, a minor 
production loss was caused at Olkiluoto 2 by the 
locating of a fuel leak.
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Loss of power production due to failures in 2004,
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A.I.2 Exemptions and deviations from 
the Technical Speciﬁcations
Deﬁnition
The number of non-compliances with the Tech 
Specs as well as the number of exemptions granted 
by STUK.
Source of data
Data for the indicators are collected from applica-
tions for exemption orders and from event reports.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the utilities’ activities in accordance with 
the Tech Specs: compliance with the Tech Specs 
and identiﬁed situations during which it is neces-
sary to deviate from them; of which conclusions 
can be made as regards the appropriateness of the 
Tech Specs.
Responsible unit/person
Safety Management (TUR)
Timo Eurasto
Interpretation of indicator
The number of non-compliances with the Tech 
Specs was small at both Loviisa and Olkiluoto in 
2004.
At the Loviisa plant there were two non-compli-
ances with the Tech Specs in 2004. There was a 
condition in non-compliance with the Tech Specs 
at Loviisa 2 when the activity measurements 
20SD30R001 and 20SD70R001 of the exhaust pipe-
lines of the turbine condenser’s main ejectors were 
not in an operational condition because of a design 
error. The measurements had been modiﬁed last 
summer in connection with the MONU project (the 
replacement of the ﬁxed radiation measurement 
system). The other condition in non-compliance 
with the Technical Speciﬁcations was a short-term 
disorder in the reactor’s decay heat removal (VF60) 
that happened during the annual maintenance of 
Loviisa 2 in cold shutdown.
Only one plant condition in non-compliance 
with the Tech Specs occurred at the Olkiluoto plant 
in 2004. It involved bypassing the protection limit 
that monitors condensate conductivity within the 
reactor protection system 516, which was done 
as a safety precaution for a preventive mainte-
nance check of the safety valve at both units of the 
Olkiluoto plant.
The number of exemptions from the Tech Specs 
granted to the Loviisa power plant fell in 2004 
from the previous year to nine exemptions, which 
corresponds to the long-term average. Of the ex-
emptions granted to the Loviisa plant, ﬁve were 
concerned with the need to deviate from the Tech 
Specs caused by modiﬁcations and improvement 
work.
At the Olkiluoto plant there were also nine ex-
emptions granted, which is slightly more than in 
the year before. Five exemptions were concerned 
with the construction of a new plant unit. This is 
a signiﬁcant number given that the construction 
has not even begun. One exemption was concerned 
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with improvement work and one with repairs at an 
operational plant unit. Two exemptions were con-
cerned with working instructions and procedures.
A.I.3 Unavailability of safety systems
Deﬁnition
As the indicators, the unavailability of safety sys-
tems is followed by plant unit. The systems fol-
lowed at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant are: the 
containment spray system (322), the auxiliary feed 
water system (327) and the emergency diesel gen-
erators (651…656). Those followed at Loviisa nu-
clear power plant are: the high pressure safety 
injection system (TJ), auxiliary feed water system 
(RL92/93, RL94/97) and emergency diesel genera-
tor (EY).
Essentially, the ratio of a system’s unavailability 
hours and its required availability hours are calcu-
lated as the indicator. Unavailability hours are the 
combined unavailability of redundant sub-systems 
divided by the number of subsystems. It does not 
indicate the simultaneous unavailability of several 
subsystems. Sub-system unavailability hours in-
clude the time required for planned maintenance 
of components and unavailability due to failures. 
The latter includes, in addition to the time spent 
on repairs, the estimated unavailability time prior 
to failure detection. If a failure is assessed to have 
occurred in a previous successful test, and is as-
sessed to have escaped detection, the time between 
periodical tests is added to the unavailability time. 
If a failure has occurred between tests such that 
its date of occurrence is unknown, half of the time 
period between tests is added to the unavailability 
time. Whenever the occurrence of the failure can be 
identiﬁed as an operational, maintenance, testing 
or other event, the time between the event and the 
fault detection is added to the unavailability time.
Annual plant criticality hours are the availabil-
ity requirement for the 322, 327, TJ and RL sys-
tems, and the requirement for diesels is continuous 
– i.e. annual operating hours.
Source of data
The data for the indicators is collected from the 
utilities. Licensee representatives submit the nec-
essary data to the relevant person in charge in 
STUK.
Purpose of indicator
To indicate the unavailability of safety systems; 
the condition and status of safety systems and 
their development can be monitored by means of 
the indicator.
Responsible units/persons
Safety Management (TUR), resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jarmo Konsi (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
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Interpretation of indicator
The unavailability of the safety systems chosen 
for the indicator system has been acceptably low, 
except for the trend indicating the unavailability 
of the emergency diesels of the Loviisa plant in the 
past three years.In the ﬁrst half of 2004 the emer-
gency diesel unavailability index at the Loviisa 
power plant indicated that the unavailability level 
was still increasing. STUK reviewed the factors af-
fecting the unavailability of the emergency diesels 
and asked the plant for an account of the validity 
of their WANO indicator and the type of failures or 
defects that have caused emergency diesel unavail-
ability.
According to the Loviisa plant, most of the una-
vailability was caused by synchronisation problems 
with the diesels, caused by failures in electronic 
boards and impaired operation of the control servo. 
After the causes were pinned down, the measure-
ment technique has been developed in order to 
quickly work out certain failures. The inspection of 
the adjustment circuit during maintenance events 
has also been made more effective, and the unavail-
ability levels are, therefore, assumed to decrease. 
Another signiﬁcant group of reasons for unavaila-
bility has been the maintenance and repairs to the 
start-up air system. The maintenance program has 
been modiﬁed so that all preventive maintenance 
work is done during annual maintenance instead 
of during operation, which was the earlier situa-
tion. In addition, unavailability has been caused 
by miscellaneous diesel repair and maintenance 
operations. Part of the repairs have been so-called 
latent failures. Typical examples include leaks in 
the lubricant system, ageing of seals, breaks in so-
lenoid winding, and pipe fatigue fractures caused 
by engine vibration. STUK discovered in its own 
examinations that there had also been errors in 
the calculation of the diesel unavailability times. 
These errors had existed for approximately two 
years. There had also been errors in the evaluation 
of failure consequences. The errors have now been 
corrected and the value of the indicator represent-
ing the emergency diesel unavailability at Loviisa 
for 2004 fell to the pre-2001 level.
The indicator representing the emergency die-
sel unavailability at the Olkiluoto plant for 2004 
was more than 20 times the very small value of 
2003. The indicator for 2004 is identical to the in-
dicator for 2002. In the periodic tests of emergency 
diesels there occurred, among other things, diesel 
stoppages due to failures in limit boards and power 
adjustment problems caused by relay failures.
The unavailability of the containment spray 
system (322) of Olkiluoto 2 increased further from 
2003 due to vibration problems with the system’s 
pumps. The pumps’ concrete bases had to be ﬁlled 
out because the original concrete castings proved 
insufﬁcient. (See indicator A.I.1a). The periodic 
tests of the system in the second quarter of 2004 
also indicated a switch gear fault in the valve 322 
V207 due to improper fuses at the location in ques-
tion.
The unavailability of the auxiliary feed water 
system (327) of Olkiluoto dropped from the 2003 
values to a normal low level at both plant units.
Unavailability of shut-down cooling system (321) or
containment spray system (322), Olkiluoto NPP
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A.I.4 Occupational radiation doses
Deﬁnition
As the indicators, collective radiation exposure by 
plant site and plant unit is followed as well as the 
average of the ten highest yearly radiation expo-
sures.
Source of data
The data on collective radiation exposure is ob-
tained from quarterly and annual reports. The data 
on individual radiation doses is obtained from the 
national dose register.
Purpose of indicator
The indicators are used to control the radiation 
exposure of employees. In addition, the compli-
ance with the YVL Guide’s calculatory threshold 
for one plant unit’s collective dose averaged over 
two successive years is followed. The threshold 
value, 2.5 manSv per one gigawatt of net electri-
cal power, means a radiation dose of 1.22 manSv 
for one Loviisa plant unit and 2.10 manSv for one 
Olkiluoto plant unit. The collective radiation doses 
describe the success of the plant’s ALARA pro-
gramme. The average of the ten highest doses in-
dicates how close to the 20 mSv dose limit the 
individual occupational doses at the plants are, at 
the same time indicating the effectiveness of the 
plant’s radiation protection unit.
Responsible unit/person
Radiation protection (SÄT)
Suvi Ristonmaa
Interpretation of indicator
The indicators show no signiﬁcant changes in ra-
diation doses compared with the previous years. 
Most doses are incurred in work done during out-
ages; thus outage duration and the amount of work 
having a bearing on radiation protection affects the 
yearly radiation doses.
The radiation doses for the workers were be-
low the personal dose limits at the Olkiluoto and 
Loviisa plants. The Radiation Decree (1512/1991) 
stipulates that the effective dose for a worker from 
radiation work may not exceed the 20 mSv/year 
average over any period of ﬁve years or 50 mSv in 
any one year.
The collective occupational radiation dose at 
the Loviisa plant units was 2.492 manSv and 
at Olkiluoto 1.512 manSv in 2004. The collective 
occupational doses were slightly higher than in 
the year before. The average of the ten highest 
individual doses at Loviisa was 14.93 mSv and at 
Olkiluoto 7.96 mSv.
If at one plant unit the collective occupational 
radiation dose average over two successive years 
exceeds 2.5 manSv per one GW of net electrical 
power, the utility is to report the causes of this to 
STUK, and any measures possibly required to im-
prove radiation safety (Guide YVL 7.9).
The reporting threshold of collective radiation 
dose was exceeded at Loviisa 1 in 2004. It has 
been exceeded a few times before: at Loviisa 1 in 
2000, 1996 and 1992, as well as at Loviisa 2 in 
1994. The reasons were the higher-than-usual col-
lective radiation doses. The annual maintenance 
outages of those years were of long duration and 
the work done contributed to radiation exposure. 
Collective dose (manSv) in 2004
Loviisa NPP
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Collective occupational radiation dose (manSv),
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86
STUK-B-YTO 241 STUK’S SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR NPPS IN 2004 APPENDIX 1
In the Loviisa 1 annual maintenance outage 2000 
work relating to the preparation for severe ac-
cidents (the SAM project) was carried out as well 
as the replacement of the feed water collectors of 
two steam generators. During the 1996 annual 
maintenance outage the Loviisa 1 reactor pressure 
vessel was annealed and extensive modernisation, 
maintenance and inspection work was carried out. 
During the 1992 annual maintenance outage the 
Loviisa 1 main shutdown valves were inspected 
and repaired and the piping of a steam generator 
blow-down system was replaced. In the 2004 annu-
al maintenance outage of Loviisa 1 operations such 
as reactor work and insulation work contributed to 
a higher radiation dose than estimated.
Early in the Loviisa 2 annual maintenance 
outage of 1994 the entire primary circuit was 
decontaminated because of elevated radiation lev-
els. Work due earlier at the plant unit had been 
Loviisa 1 and 2
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postponed to this outage and a 1.53 mSv collective 
dose was incurred from it. Eight manSv was as-
sessed as the collective dose saved thanks to the 
decontamination. The collective radiation dose of 
those carrying out the decontamination was small, 
15.3 manmSv.
The annual maintenance of the Loviisa power 
plant is sequenced so that inspections and the 
most extensive maintenance jobs are conducted in 
connection with the longer annual maintenance 
periods that take place every four years. During 
the annual maintenance periods in question a 
larger collective occupational radiation dose is also 
incurred and more work done contributing to radi-
ation exposure. Because of the four-year sequence 
of annual maintenance, the Loviisa power plant 
has begun to monitor the four-year sliding average 
of collective occupational radiation dose by plant 
unit. The power plant aims at a declining trend.
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Collective occupational radiation dose (manSv),
Olkiluoto NPP
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A.I.5 Radioactive releases
Deﬁnition
As the indicators, radioactive releases into the sea 
and the atmosphere (TBq) from the plant are fol-
lowed as well as the calculated dose due to releases 
to the most exposed individual in the vicinity of the 
plant.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the quar-
terly and annual reports of the utilities. STUK’s 
Research and Environmental Surveillance 
Department (TKO) calculates the dose for the most 
exposed person in the plant vicinity and submits it 
to the person in charge of this indicator.
Purpose of indicator
To monitor the amount and trend of radioactive re-
leases and assess factors having a bearing on any 
changes in them.
Responsible unit/person
Radiation protection (SÄT), Suvi Ristonmaa (re-
lease data)
Research and Environmental Surveillance (TKO), 
Environment of nuclear power plants (YVL)
Seppo Klemola (dose calculation)
Interpretation of indicator 
(releases into the atmosphere)
Radioactive releases into the environment from the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants were 
small in 2004. They are well below the set limits.
Gaseous ﬁssion products, noble gases and io-
dine isotopes originate in leaking fuel rods; in the 
minute amounts of uranium left on the outer sur-
faces on fuel cladding during fuel fabrication; and 
in reactor surface contamination from earlier fuel 
leaks. At both Loviisa and Olkiluoto the numbers 
of fuel leaks have been very small. The ﬁgures 
show the interdependence between iodine releases 
and fuel leaks (indicators A.III.1).
The releases of noble gas activities and iodine 
isotope activities into the atmosphere from the 
Olkiluoto plant were below the detection limits in 
2004. The noble gas releases from the Loviisa plant 
are dominated by argon-41, an activation product 
of argon-40, found in the airspace between the re-
actor pressure vessel and the biological shield.
At the Loviisa plant releases of iodine activities 
and aerosols have been on a slight increase since 
2001. Aerosols released from the Olkiluoto plant 
were of the same magnitude as in the preceding 
years. Aerosol nuclides (including activated corro-
sion products) are released during maintenance 
work.
Radioactive releases into the environment from 
the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants 
were small. They are well below the set limits.
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Noble gas releases (Bq 87Kreq), Loviisa NPP
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Interpretation of indicator 
(releases into the sea)
Releases into the sea from the Loviisa power plant 
reduced to their present level after the commis-
sioning of a caesium separation device in 1992. 
Towards the end of 2004 the plant made a control-
led discharge of clariﬁed, low-active waste water 
from storage tanks into the sea. For this reason, 
the cumulative activity of releases into the sea was 
slightly larger at Loviisa than in the previous year. 
Gamma activity of liquid effluents (Bq), Loviisa NPP
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Similar discharges were previously made in 1998 
and 2001. They appear in the trend ﬁgure as sig-
niﬁcantly larger activity values.
Releases into the sea from the Olkiluoto nu-
clear power plant reduced to their present level in 
1998 when the plant commissioned new process 
water puriﬁcation and treatment equipment, mak-
ing possible the recirculation of discharged process 
water back into the processes.
Interpretation of indicator (Calculated 
dose due to radioactive releases)
The calculated radiation dose for the most exposed 
individual in the vicinity of the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant was of the same magnitude as in the 
previous years. In the vicinity of Loviisa the dose 
for the most exposed individual was affected by 
the controlled discharge of low-activity evaporation 
residues into the sea.
The calculated doses of the most exposed in-
dividual in the vicinity of both plants are less 
than 0.3% (objective less than 1% of limit) of the 
100 microSv limit established in the Government 
Resolution (395/1991).
Annual dose limit 100 μSv Annual dose limit 100 μSv
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A.I.6 Keeping plant documentation current
Deﬁnition
This indicator area follows the need to update docu-
ments and their realisation by the start-up follow-
ing the next annual maintenance. The documents 
to be followed-up are: the Technical Speciﬁcations, 
the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), safety 
classiﬁcation documents and diagrams, PSA docu-
mentation, operation and maintenance procedures, 
emergency and disturbance instructions, and proc-
ess ﬂow-charts. The ratio of the number of imple-
mented document revisions to the number of iden-
tiﬁed document revisions is followed.
Source of data
The data for the indicator calculation is obtained 
from STUK’s plant modiﬁcations register.
Purpose of indicator
To follow plant quality management and the abil-
ity to maintain plant documentation.
Responsible unit/person
Plant projects (HAN)
Tapani Virolainen
Interpretation of indicator
Identiﬁcation of document amendments and revi-
sions pertaining to modiﬁcations at the Loviisa 
plant is mostly by pre-inspection documents and 
training notices. In addition, a list of necessary 
changes to the operating manual maintained at 
the Loviisa plant is used in the identiﬁcation of 
amendments and revisions. The indicator for the 
Olkiluoto plant is based on the modiﬁcation project 
control system (PH2), which includes control forms 
(AV forms) describing the need to update modiﬁ-
cation documents and its realisation. In addition, 
STUK reviews the realisation of document amend-
ments and revisions in the main control rooms of 
both plants.
The updating situation of document revisions 
needed after plant modiﬁcations (entered into reg-
ister) in 2004 was 86% for the Loviisa units and 
100% for the Olkiluoto units by the start-up after 
annual maintenance. The indicator does not yet 
include revisions to documents that need to be up-
dated by the next annual maintenance. The corre-
sponding ﬁgures for 2002 were 96% at Loviisa and 
86% at Olkiluoto. These ﬁgures include revisions 
to all documents under surveillance. The improved 
result at Olkiluoto is mainly due to the fact that 
few safety-signiﬁcant or extensive modiﬁcation 
operations were conducted there in 2004. The 
monitoring of the realisation of document revisions 
needed in 2004 focused on Olkiluoto 1 because no 
signiﬁcant (monitored) modiﬁcation work was con-
ducted at Olkiluoto 2.
Teollisuuden Voima Oy has improved the use of 
AV forms by including the updates of safety clas-
siﬁcation documents and diagrams. In the previ-
ous year the estimate regarding these documents 
and diagrams was based on an assessment by the 
person in charge of the indicator. In addition, the 
somewhat insufﬁcient information of the AV forms 
had to be made more speciﬁc by the Olkiluoto plant 
modiﬁcations planning unit, since a review based 
only on the AV forms would have yielded a signiﬁ-
cantly weak result for Olkiluoto.
As regards the Loviisa power plant, the result 
can be considered reasonable, although more devi-
ations were detected than in the previous years; in 
general, the procedures used by the Loviisa plant 
to update the operations manual, the Tech Specs 
and the PI ﬁgures has proved effective. It needs to 
be mentioned that at Loviisa, unlike Olkiluoto, ﬁ-
nal, approved instructions are introduced at start-
up instead of hand-written versions of instructions 
and PI ﬁgures. The assessment has also been made 
against these ﬁnal instructions.
Keeping plant documentation current
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A.I.7 Investments in facilities
Deﬁnition
Investments on plant maintenance and modiﬁca-
tion in current value of money improved by the 
building cost index.
Source of data
The licensee submits the necessary data directly to 
the person responsible for the index.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the amount of investments in plant main-
tenance and their ﬂuctuations.
Responsible unit/person
Plant projects (HAN)
Tapani Virolainen
Interpretation of indicator
The indicator shows the relative ﬂuctuation of in-
vestments. Sums in Euro are business informa-
tion of the companies involved, not to be published 
here.
The ﬂuctuation in the indicator clearly shows 
the investments made in 1997–2000 in the plants’ 
power upgrades and modernisation projects. The 
investments of 2004 indicate an increasing trend 
at both the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto plant.
The main investments at the Loviisa plant 
during the past couple of years have been the 
provisions for severe reactor accidents and the 
modernisation of the turbine. Main investments 
for 2004 also included the control system for main-
tenance, spare parts and laboratory data (LOKE4), 
launching the modernisation project for automa-
tion (facilities and planning), renovation of the 
laboratory building, and renewing the radiation 
monitoring system and personal monitors (MONU 
and HEMU). For the time being, the investments 
for the solidiﬁcation facility are not included in the 
values.
The main investments in the Olkiluoto power 
plant in 2004 included the renewal of the TIP 
neutron ﬂux calibration system and the turbine 
plant renewal project (TIMO). As regards the lat-
ter, the investments for 2004 were concerned with 
preparation and planning, involving the renewal 
of high-pressure turbines, pre-heaters, the turbine 
automation (TARMO) and the steam dryer. The 
signiﬁcant investments also included the extension 
to the central ofﬁce building and the renewal of the 
cafeteria and the kitchen.
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A.II Operational events
A.II.1 Number of events
Deﬁnition
As the indicators, the numbers of events reported 
in accordance with Guide YVL 1.5 (events war-
ranting a special report, scrams and operational 
transients) are followed.
Source of data
The data for the indicators is obtained from STUK’s 
document administration system (YTD) and/or the 
events follow-up table kept by TUR.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the number of events important for safe-
ty.
Responsible unit/person
Safety Management (TUR)
Timo Eurasto
Interpretation of indicator
In 2004 the number of events warranting a spe-
cial report at the Finnish plants was 5. At the 
Olkiluoto plant there were two events warranting 
a special report, so the number has decreased to 
the level prior to the two previous years. At the 
Loviisa plant there were three events warranting 
a special report, which is the average level of the 
past few years. The events included the deviations 
from the Tech Specs mentioned in connection with 
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indicator A.I.2. In addition, spent fuel handling 
malfunctions occurred in the spent fuel storages at 
both plants. The factors behind the events included 
similar reasons, such as design errors in modiﬁca-
tions, non compliance with instructions and defects 
in work management.
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In 2004 six operational transient reports were 
submitted from the Olkiluoto plant and nine from 
the Loviisa plant. The disorders were not con-
centrated on any speciﬁc system or an individual 
device.
One reactor scram occurred at both plants. The 
scram at Loviisa 1 was due to a failure in the reac-
tor protection system. At Olkiluoto 1 there was a 
reactor scram caused by the closing of the steam 
line valve. The closing was caused by a soiled valve 
magnet.
The report made by the plant on the fatal ac-
cident in electrical work during the annual main-
tenance of Loviisa 1 is not included in any of the 
aforementioned event reporting categories.
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A.II.2 Risk-signiﬁcance of events
Deﬁnition
As the indicators, the risk-signiﬁcance of events 
caused by component unavailability is fol-
lowed. As the risk measure, an increase in the 
Conditional Core Damage Probability (CCDP) as-
sociated with each event is employed. Events are 
divided into three groups: 1) unavailabilities due 
to component failures, 2) planned unavailabili-
ties and 3) initiating events. In addition, events 
are grouped into three categories according to 
their risk-signiﬁcance (CCDP): the most risk-sig-
niﬁcant events (CCDP≥1E–7), other signiﬁcant 
events (1E–8≤CCDP<1E–7) and other events 
(CCDP<1E–8). The indicator is the number of 
events in each category.
Unavailabilities caused by work for which 
STUK has granted exemption orders are in group 
2. Possible non-compliances with the Tech Specs 
are in group 1, if they can be utilised for this in-
dicator. Non-compliances with the Tech Specs are 
dealt with under indicator A.I.2.
N.B.! Calculations for the Loviisa plant are 
based on an internal-initiating-event model, mak-
ing them indicative only of a trend.
Source of data
Data for the calculation of the indicators are col-
lected from utility reports and applications for ex-
emption orders.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the risk-signiﬁcance of component una-
vailabilities and to assess risk-signiﬁcant initiat-
ing events and planned unavailabilities. Special 
attention is paid to recurring events, CCFs, simul-
taneously occurring failures and human errors. In 
addition, an objective in event analysis is to sys-
tematically identify signs of deteriorating organi-
sational and safety culture.
Responsible unit/person
Risk assessment (RIS),   
Ari Julin (PSA computation)
Safety Management (TUR) (failure data)
Interpretation of indicator
Loviisa
One reactor scram occurred at Loviisa 1 that was 
classiﬁed an initiating event. It was due to a failure 
in the reactor protection system. All safety systems 
functioned according to design, the causes of the 
scrams have been determined and action has been 
taken to reduce the probability of their recurrence.
The unavailabilities in the other events falling 
into the most risk-signiﬁcant category related to 
latent defects in the emergency diesel generators, 
the auxiliary feed water system (RL92/93) and the 
containment spray system (TQ). In addition, the 
most signiﬁcant events include the annual mainte-
nance of the back-up emergency feed water system 
because of the conservative method of modelling 
(the TK-RY coupling has not been taken into ac-
count).
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The number of analysed events falling into the 
least risk-signiﬁcant category (CCDP < 1E–8) has 
increased because there has been a shift in the 
reporting towards a policy in accordance with the 
Guide YVL 1.5 (the unavailability of all Tech Spec 
components are presented in monthly or quarterly 
reports). This is shown in the enclosed ﬁgures. The 
kind of events analysed now were partly eliminat-
ed from the analysis in the previous years.
The analysed events are considered part of nor-
mal nuclear power plant operation and no further 
measures were required from STUK.
Olkiluoto
At Olkiluoto 1 a reactor scram was caused by the 
closing of the steam line valve. The closing was 
caused by a soiled valve magnet.
The unavailability of other events falling into 
the most risk-signiﬁcant category related to latent 
defects in the emergency diesel generators. In 
addition, a latent defect in the shutdown reactor 
intermediate cooling system (721) at OL2 was dis-
covered in the periodic test.
The number of analysed events falling into the 
least risk-signiﬁcant category (CCDP < 1E–8) has 
increased because there has been a shift in the 
reporting towards a policy in accordance with the 
Guide YVL 1.5 (the unavailability of all Tech Spec 
components are presented in monthly or quarterly 
reports). This is shown in the enclosed ﬁgures. The 
kind of events analysed now were partly eliminat-
ed from the analysis in the previous years.
The analysed events are considered part of nor-
mal nuclear power plant operation and no further 
measures were required from STUK.
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A.II.3 Direct causes of events
Deﬁnition
As the indicators, the direct causes of events re-
ported in accordance with Guide YVL 1.5 are fol-
lowed. The event causes are divided into technical 
failures and erroneous operational and mainte-
nance actions (non-technical, human errors).
Source of data
Data for the indicators are collected from special 
reports, scram reports and operational transient 
reports, and are entered on an event follow-up ta-
ble maintained by TUR.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the division of the causes of reported 
events into technical and non-technical. “Non-tech-
nical causes” denote failures caused by erroneous 
operational and maintenance actions. The indica-
tor may be descriptive of an organisation’s opera-
tion.
Responsible unit/person
Safety Management (TUR)
Timo Eurasto
Interpretation of indicator
A total of 12 events were reported from the Loviisa 
power plant in 2004, 9 of which were classiﬁed 
technical and 3 as caused by human error. Of the 
7 events at the Olkiluoto plant, ﬁve were due to a 
technical failure and two mainly to a human error.
The ratio of technical failures to human er-
rors has varied greatly during the past few years. 
In 2004 technical failures were the determining 
causes of events at both plants.
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A.II.4 Number of ﬁre alarms
Deﬁnition
As the indicators, the numbers of ﬁre alarms and 
actual ﬁres are followed.
Source of data
The data for the indicators is collected from the 
utilities. The licensees submit the data needed for 
the indicator to the person responsible for the indi-
cator at STUK.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the effectiveness of ﬁre protection at the 
nuclear power plants.
Responsible unit/person
Power Plant Technology (VLT)
Heikki Saarikoski
Interpretation of indicator
No actual ﬁres occurred onsite at either plant. 
Correct actuations caused by dust or steam domi-
nated the automatic ﬁre detector alarms at both 
plants in 2004.
The automatic ﬁre detectors were upgraded at 
Loviisa in 2000 and at Olkiluoto in 2001. The num-
bers of alarms increased at both units after that 
because of more sensitive equipment and equip-
ment failures.
The distinct reduction in alarms at the Loviisa 
plant since 2003 and at the Olkiluoto plant since 
2004 is due to pre-alarms no longer being in-
cluded in the calculations; an individual detector 
examines the air quality and pre-warning before 
the actual ﬁre alarm. After the modiﬁcation the 
number of alarms caused by equipment failures 
decreased signiﬁcantly at both plants. At Loviisa 
the number of true detector alarms decreased as 
well, in 2004 being on the same level (50 alarms) as 
before the system was upgraded. At the Olkiluoto 
plant the number of true detector alarms has been 
on a steady increase for several years. In 2004 the 
number was 67, which is twice as high as the level 
prior to the system upgrade.
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Number of fire alarms, Loviisa NPP
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A.III Structural integrity
A.III.1 Fuel integrity
Deﬁnition
As the indicators, the parameters below are fol-
lowed by plant unit:
• the maximum activity concentration level of 
the primary coolant (Loviisa: as I-131 equiva-
lent; Olkiluoto: I-131 only) and the peak value 
of maximum activity concentration on even, 
steady-state operation (Loviisa: the sum of 
the iodine isotope activity concentrations in 
hot standby, start-up state or power operation; 
Olkiluoto: I-131 activity in power operation). 
The maximum values are compared with the 
Tech Spec limit in a graphic presentation;
• the maximum activity concentration of I-131 
during depressurisation while entering shut-
down or after reactor scram; and
• the number of leaking fuel rod bundles removed 
from the reactor.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is obtained from the utili-
ties’ quarterly reports (reactor operation and fuel 
behaviour). The licensees submit the indicator val-
ues concerning maximum activity concentrations 
directly to the person in charge of the indicator at 
STUK.
Purpose of indicator
The indicators depict fuel integrity and the fuel 
leakage volume during the operating cycle. The in-
dicators for the shutdown situations also describe 
the success of the shutdown concerning radiation 
protection.
Responsible unit/person
Power Plant Technology (VLT)
Kirsti Tossavainen
Interpretation of indicators (Primary 
coolant activity, Loviisa)
There were no fuel leaks at the Loviisa plant units 
in 2004 and the activity concentration of the pri-
mary coolant remained unchanged. In addition 
to the activity concentration calculated as I-131 
equivalents, the sum of the activity concentrations 
of different iodine isotopes of the primary coolant 
Primary coolant maximum activity concentrations in 
power operation, Loviisa:
Primary coolant maximum activity concentrations 
during shutdown, Loviisa:
Fuel integrity: Iodine maximum activity concentration of
primary coolant (kBq/m³) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
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Primary coolant maximum activity concentrations in 
power operation, Olkiluoto:
Primary coolant maximum activity concentrations 
during shutdown, Olkiluoto:
is followed at the Loviisa plant. According to the 
Tech Specs, the sum activity may not exceed the 
value 1.0E+8 kBq/m³. At both plant units the sum 
activities have been around 0.1% of the Tech Specs 
limit.
The I-131 activity concentration of the primary 
coolant when plant units are being shut down and 
during reactor scrams has been followed as the 
STUK indicator since 2002. No signiﬁcant changes 
have occurred in the iodine activity concentra-
tions when plant units are being shut down at the 
Loviisa plant because there have been no fuel leaks 
at the plant units during the monitoring period.
Interpretation of indicators  
(primary coolant activity, Olkiluoto)
The activity concentration of Olkiluoto 1 primary 
coolant remained unchanged in 2004. The increase 
in the activity level in the third quarter is due to 
a fuel leak observed at Olkiluoto 2 on 30 August 
2004. Up to the end of 2004 the leak has remained 
a minor primary damage. The maximum value of 
the I-131 activity concentration of the primary 
coolant was 3.1 MBq/m³, which is 0.14% of the Tech 
Specs limit. The leaking fuel bundle was located 
in a group of four fuel rod bundles on 16 October 
2004.
The increases in coolant activity caused by 
fuel leaks in 2003 at Olkiluoto 1 and in 2002 at 
Olkiluoto 2 are shown as notably larger I-131 ac-
tivity concentrations while shutting down plant 
units for annual maintenance outages. In the other 
reactor shutdowns or scrams the coolant I-131 ac-
tivity concentrations have not been exceptional.
Fuel integrity: Iodine maximum activity concentration level
of  primary coolant (131I kBq/m³), Olkiluoto NPP
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Number of leaking fuel bundles, Loviisa NPP
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Interpretation of indicator  
(number of leaking fuel rod bundles)
There were no leaking fuel bundles at either the 
Loviisa or the Olkiluoto plant units during the op-
erating cycle 2003–2004. A fuel leak was observed 
at Olkiluoto 2 on 30 August 2004. The leaking fuel 
bundle will be removed from the reactor in the 
2005 annual maintenance outage at the latest.
Fuel leakages have been uncommon at the 
Loviisa plant units since 1995. The large number 
of fuel leakages at Loviisa 2 in 1995 was caused 
by corrosion products accumulating in the fuel 
rod bundles after decontamination of the primary 
circuit surfaces in the 1994 annual maintenance 
outage. Crud gradually attaching to the fuel rod 
bundles and their spacer grids reduced coolant 
ﬂow and brought about vibration in the bundles. 
Fuel rod damage resulted from spacer grids touch-
ing the rods.
Fuel leakages have occurred almost every year 
at the Olkiluoto plant units. They have been small 
and the leaking fuel bundles have been removed in 
annual maintenance outages following leak detec-
tion.
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A.III.2 Primary circuit integrity
Deﬁnition
The water chemistry indicators are
• international chemistry performance indices 
used by the utilities, depicting the effectiveness 
of water chemistry control in the secondary 
circuits of PWRs and in the reactor circuits of 
BWRs. A new secondary circuit chemistry index 
was introduced at the Loviisa plant in 2003. 
This new index observes corrosive impurities 
and contents of corrosion products in steam 
generator blow-down and feed water. For steam 
generator blow-down, the calculation includes 
the chloride, sulphate and sodium concentra-
tions and acid conductivity; for feed water, it 
includes the iron, copper and oxygen concen-
trations. The chemistry index of the Olkiluoto 
plant is affected by the chloride and sulphate 
concentrations of the reactor water and the iron 
concentration in the feed water. The indices for 
both plants only cover the aforementioned val-
ues during power operation.
• the maximum chloride concentration of the 
steam generator blow-down (Loviisa) and the 
reactor water (Olkiluoto) during operation com-
pared with the Tech Spec limit in the monitor-
ing period. At the Olkiluoto plant the maximum 
sulphate content of reactor water on even, 
steady-state operation is followed as well.
• corrosion products released from the surfaces 
of the reactor circuit and the secondary circuit 
into the coolant. For the Loviisa plant, the 
iron concentration of the primary coolant solid 
material and the secondary circuit feed water 
(maximum values of the monitoring period) are 
followed. For the Olkiluoto plant, the iron con-
centration of reactor water (maximum value of 
the monitoring period) is followed. In addition, 
the maximum Co-60 activity concentration of 
the reactor coolant while bringing the plant to 
a cold shutdown or after a reactor scram is fol-
lowed for both plants.
The indices below are used to follow identiﬁed 
and unidentiﬁed primary circuit leakages at the 
Olkiluoto plant units:
• total volume (m³) of identiﬁed (from contain-
ment to collection tank 352 T1 of the controlled 
leakage drain system) and unidentiﬁed (total 
volume of leakages into the sump of the control-
led ﬂoor drainage system, 345 T33) containment 
internal leakages during the operating cycle, 
and
• highest containment internal leakage volume 
during the year in relation to the allowed leak-
age volume in the Tech Specs (outﬂow water 
volume of water condensing in the air coolers of 
the containment cooling system 725/Tech Specs 
limit).
Source of data
The licensees submit indicators describing the wa-
ter chemistry control to the respective responsi-
ble person at STUK. The concentration levels of 
corrosive substances and corrosion products are 
obtained from quarterly reports submitted by li-
censees.
Purpose of indicator
To monitor and control primary and secondary cir-
cuit integrity. The monitoring is done by indices 
depicting water chemistry control and by chosen 
corrosive impurities and corrosion products.
Responsible units/persons
Power Plant Technology (VLT),   
Kirsti Tossavainen (chemistry indices)
Safety Management (TUR),   
Jarmo Konsi (primary circuit leaks)
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Water chemistry conditions, Loviisa
Interpretation of indicators
Chemistry index
The increase in the chemistry index of Loviisa 1 in 
the second and third quarters compared with that 
of the ﬁrst quarter is due to a reactor scram that 
occurred at the plant unit on 29 June 2004, causing 
the release of impurities from the surfaces of the 
secondary circuit. At Loviisa 2 the high value of the 
index is due to a seawater leak in the condenser of 
the other turbine (50) (see below).
The maximum chloride contents of steam 
generator blow-down
As the STUK indicator, the maximum chloride 
concentrations of steam generator blow-down (the 
greatest value of the chloride concentrations of all 
six steam generators) have been followed since 
2002. According to the Tech Specs, the chloride con-
centration of steam generator blow-down may not 
exceed the value 0.5 mg/kg. If the excess is minor 
(0.5–1.0 mg/kg), the plant has one week to bring 
the concentration to agree with the Tech Specs. If 
the deviation is greater (1.0–5.0 mg/kg), the plant 
has one day to restore the concentration. If the 
deviation is even greater than that, the plant unit 
must be shut down.
At Loviisa 1 the chloride content of steam gen-
erator blow-down has been higher than normal 
in the ﬁrst and third quarter of 2003. The ﬁrst 
occurrence was due to seawater momentarily get-
ting into the main condenser and then to the other 
turbine’s (50) steam generators during the connec-
tion of the surface measuring system. The chloride 
content was brought to the normal level by power 
venting. The second occurrence was due to the 
shutdown for annual maintenance.
There had been a seawater leak in the condens-
er of the other turbine (50) at Loviisa 2 since 2002, 
which had caused the chloride concentration of the 
steam generator blow-down to become greater than 
normal. The leak was repaired in the annual main-
tenance outage in 2004, after which the chloride 
concentration was also restored to pre-leak level.
Iron content of feed water
The iron concentration of the feed water has been 
followed in the STUK indicators since 2002. No 
signiﬁcant changes have taken place in the indica-
tor values.
Iron in primary coolant
The maximum values of the iron concentration of 
the primary coolant are from situations when plant 
units have been brought to an annual maintenance 
outage. The iron content of the cooling circuit is at 
its peak in these situations because the changes in 
the process circumstances release corrosion prod-
ucts from the surfaces. The indicator has been fol-
lowed since 2002, and, during the monitoring, there 
has not been any trend away from the ordinary in 
the maximum values of the iron concentration of 
the primary coolant.
Integrity of the secondary circuit: Chemistry index,
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Cobalt-60 concentration in shutdown
No fundamental changes have taken place in the 
Co-60 activity concentrations at either plant unit 
in Loviisa.
Water chemistry conditions, Olkiluoto
Interpretation of indicators:
Chemistry index
At Olkiluoto 1, the chemistry index remained close 
to the target value (1.00) in 2004. At Olkiluoto 2, 
the third quarter value, which is signiﬁcantly 
greater than the target value, is due to a leak in 
the turbine condenser (see “chloride content in re-
actor water”).
Chloride content in reactor water during 
operation
Chloride is a signiﬁcant factor for stress corro-
sion in stainless steel. The Tech Specs limit for the 
chloride concentration of reactor water is 0.1 ppm 
(100 µg/l), which sets restrictions on the use of the 
plant. A chloride concentration higher than the 
limit is only allowed for 330 hours a year. If the 
requirement cannot be complied with, the plant 
must be brought to a cold shutdown. The plant 
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products
Maximum iron concentration in primary coolant (Fetot µg/l),
Loviisa NPP
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must immediately be brought to a cold shutdown if 
the chloride content of reactor water exceeds 2 ppm 
(2000 µg/l).
The chloride content during operation has usu-
ally been around one per cent of the limit set in the 
Tech Specs at both plant units. In the third quarter 
of 2004 there was a chloride content higher than 
normal at Olkiluoto 2. This was due to a leak in the 
turbine condenser, during which seawater got into 
the reactor water and the chloride content rose to 
21.3 µg/l. The leak was detected on 19 August 2004 
and repaired on 21 August 2004.
Sulphate concentration in reactor water
Both Olkiluoto plant units have had the problem 
of a sulphate concentration higher than the reactor 
water target value. Under certain circumstances, 
sulphate is a signiﬁcant factor in stress corrosion. 
The sulphate in the reactor water originates in the 
sulphate released from the ion-exchange resins of 
the condensate cleaning ﬁlters. Temperature is one 
of the factors in the release of sulphate from the 
ﬁlter resins. The temperature of the condensate 
entering the ﬁlters was previously set by a partial 
pre-heater bypass at 60 °C. Changes have been 
made at the plant units to reduce the tempera-
ture of the water entering the condensate cleaning 
ﬁlters by changing the place of the condensate 
system pre-heater. The pre-heater was relocated 
after the condensate cleaning ﬁlters, whereas it 
was earlier located before the ﬁlters. Thanks to the 
modiﬁcation, the temperature of the condensate 
entering cleaning ﬁlters decreased to an average of 
50 °C. The modiﬁcation was made at Olkiluoto 2 in 
2003 and at Olkiluoto 1 in 2004.
Teollisuuden Voima Oy has set a target value of 
5 µg/l for the sulphate concentration in reactor wa-
ter. This target value may not be exceeded. Since 
the plant modiﬁcations the sulphate concentration 
has remained below the target level at both plant 
units, excluding the third quarter of 2004 when 
the maximum concentration at Olkiluoto 2 was 
8,3 µg/l. There is no straightforward reason for the 
sulphate concentration being higher than normal. 
A possible reason may be the decomposition of the 
ion-exchange resins.
Iron concentration in feed water
A small amount of iron dissolves into the reactor 
water from the components in the reactor circuit. 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy has set a target value of 
1 µg/l for the iron concentration in the water sup-
plied to the reactor. This target value may not be 
exceeded during plant operation. The target value 
has not been exceeded during the indicator moni-
toring by STUK, which began in 2002.
Cobalt-60 concentration in shutdown
As the STUK indicator, the Co-60 activity concen-
tration when bringing plant units to cold shutdown 
has been followed since 2002. Radioactive cobalt-60 
isotope is generated as an activation product of ma-
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terials containing cobalt in components within the 
reactor circuit. Co-60 isotope is a signiﬁcant source 
of radiation exposure at nuclear power plants. In 
the STUK indicator system the activity concentra-
tion of Co-60 isotope while bringing the plant to 
cold shutdown is used to describe the amount of 
corrosion products released from the surfaces of 
the reactor circuit, and the success of the shutdown 
procedures.
No fundamental changes have taken place in 
the Co-60 activity concentrations at either plant 
unit in Olkiluoto.
Primary circuit leakages, Olkiluoto
Interpretation of indicator
There were no fundamental changes in the identi-
ﬁed leaks inside the containment in the operating 
cycle 2003–2004 compared with the previous cycle. 
The leaks at Olkiluoto 1 are slightly larger than 
those of Olkiluoto 2. Generally, the leak volumes 
have remained the same for several years.
During the operating cycle 2003–2004, the 
volumes of unidentiﬁed leaks were low at both 
Olkiluoto plant units. During the previous operat-
ing cycle of 2002–2003, the leak volume was fairly 
high at Olkiluoto 1, which was due to a leak in the 
underpressure valve of the relief system 314, which 
took place for the whole operating cycle.
In the operating cycle 2003–2004 the ratio of 
the greatest leakage volume inside the contain-
ment to the leakage amount allowed by the Tech 
Specs was restored to the level of the operating 
cycle 2001–2002. The high ratio of Olkiluoto 1 
in the operating cycle 2002–2003 was due to the 
aforementioned unidentiﬁed major leak in the con-
tainment. In general, the monitoring indicates that 
maximum leaks have been greater at Olkiluoto 1 
than at Olkiluoto 2.
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A.III.3 Containment integrity
Deﬁnition
As the indicators, the parameters below are fol-
lowed:
• overall as-found leakage of outer isolation 
valves compared with the highest allowed over-
all leakage of the outer isolation valves
• percentage of isolation valves tested during 
the year in question at each plant unit that 
passed the leakage test at ﬁrst attempt (i.e. as-
found leakage smaller than acceptance criteria 
of valve and no consecutive exceeding of the 
so-called attention criteria of a valve without 
repair)
• combined leakage rate of containment penetra-
tions and airlocks in relation to their highest 
allowed overall leakage at each plant unit. The 
combined leakage rate at Olkiluoto includes 
leakages in personnel airlocks, the maintenance 
dome and the containment dome. In Loviisa the 
combined leakage rate is comprised of the leak-
age test results from personnel airlocks, the ma-
terial airlock, the cable penetrations of inspec-
tion equipment, the containment maintenance 
ventilation systems (TL23), the main steam 
piping (RA) and the feed water system (RL) 
penetrations; the seals of blind-ﬂanged penetra-
tions of ice-ﬁlling pipes are also included.
Source of data
Data is extracted from the utilities’ leaktightness 
test reports submitted by the licensee to STUK for 
information within three months of the completion 
of annual maintenance. STUK calculates the over-
all as-found leakages, since the reports give total 
leakages as they are at the end of an annual main-
tenance outage (i.e. after completion of repairs and 
re-testing).
Purpose of indicator
To follow the integrity of the containment isolation 
valves, penetrations and air locks.
Responsible unit/person
Reactor and Safety Systems (REA),
Päivi Salo
Interpretation of indicator
Loviisa
The overall as-found leakage of the Loviisa 1 outer 
isolation valves has grown but is still below the set 
limit; 43% of the overall leakage is from eight sump 
line isolation valves in the low-pressure emergency 
reactor cooling system (TH), tested in groups of 
four valves. Because the leakage volume of single 
valves is not known, the leakage measured for the 
whole group is recorded as the leakage for each 
valve. However, the multiple entries are not taken 
into account when calculating the overall leakage. 
A more valid picture of the containment leakage 
would result from reducing the group tests, or 
modifying the calculation method so that it would 
correspond to that of TVO. The overall as-found 
leakage of the Loviisa 2 outer isolation valves has 
remained below the set limit.
The percentage of isolation valves which passed 
the leaktightness test at ﬁrst attempt has re-
mained high, although there is a decrease from the 
previous year.
The overall as-found leakage of containment 
penetrations, which, at Loviisa, includes leaktight-
ness tests of the bellows seals of the personnel air-
lock, the emergency personnel airlock, the material 
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airlock, the reactor pit, the inward relief valves, 
cable penetrations, the containment maintenance 
ventilation systems (TL23), the main steam line 
(RA) and the feed water system (RL), has clearly 
grown, but still does not exceed the set limit. At 
Loviisa 1 the overall leakage of containment pen-
etrations has decreased.
At Loviisa 1, 64% of the overall as-found leak-
age comes from a leaking material airlock. At 
Loviisa 2, approx. 88% comes from a leaking pen-
etration bellows seal in the maintenance ventila-
tion system (TL 23).
The integrity of the Loviisa containment build-
ing has remained good. The leaktightness of the 
rubber bellows of penetrations has been problem-
atic over recent years and they will, therefore, be 
transformed into a metal structure.
Olkiluoto
The overall as-found leakage of the Olkiluoto 1 
outer isolation valves had slightly increased but 
was, as in previous years, below the limit set in the 
Tech Specs. Approx. 50% comes from leaks in two 
isolation valves in scram system 354. The valve 
leaks in the 354 system are apparently caused by 
impurities loosened in a scram. Approx. 8% of the 
leakage consists of leaks in the isolation valves 
in the main steam line (311), probably caused by 
hollows in the ﬁlter surfaces brought about by the 
self-closing of the valves.
Of the overall leakage of the outer isolation 
valves at Olkiluoto 2, approx. 46% is from a leak in 
one isolation valve (311V5) in the main steam line, 
and 25% from a leak in one valve (326V3) in the 
spray system of the reactor pressure vessel head.
The percentage of isolation valves that passed 
the leaktightness test at ﬁrst attempt has slightly 
decreased at both Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2.
The overall as-found leakage rate of contain-
ment penetrations, which, at the Olkiluoto plant, 
includes leakages in the upper and lower personnel 
airlock, the maintenance dome and the contain-
ment dome, has remained small.
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Loviisa nuclear power plant
Construction of a back-up decay 
heat removal system
A new reactor decay heat removal system has been 
constructed at Loviisa plant. It is designed for use 
during the unavailability of the normal decay heat 
removal system. It handles decay heat removal 
when the reactor has cooled down enough to fa-
cilitate decay heat removal by cooling down the 
water recirculated on the steam generator second-
ary side. The pumps and heat exchangers of the 
system normally used for this purpose are located 
in the plant unit’s turbine hall and could be lost 
in a turbine hall ﬁre. Before the completion of the 
new system, it would have been impossible to bring 
the reactor into a cold shutdown state in such a 
situation; instead, it would have been necessary to 
release decay heat as steam into the atmosphere 
through the relief valves of the steam generator. In 
such a situation, the temperature of the primary 
circuit would have exceeded 100 °C.
The pumps and heat exchangers of the new 
system are located in a separate building external 
to the turbine hall. Piping and their connections to 
the steam lines and the feed water lines are in a 
section of the turbine hall that is protected against 
ﬁres. Power supply for the system is ascertained 
such that it can be connected to the emergency 
diesel generators of both Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2 
as well as to a bus supplied electrical power by 
the nearby Ahvenkoski hydropower station. The 
system is shared by both Loviisa plant units and 
it can, where necessary, bring either one or both of 
the two reactors into cold shutdown. The system’s 
heat exchangers can be cooled using the service 
water systems of either plant unit. The service 
water systems are modiﬁed, too, to improve the 
reliability of decay heat removal in the event of the 
occurrence of frazil ice, algae and ﬂooding.
The construction of the system started in the 
spring of 2002 and the piping modiﬁcations were 
made in the winter of 2004. Test operation began 
in the 2004 outages and will be completed during 
a shutdown relating to a 2005 outage. The system 
was completed during the 2004 outages to such 
extent as to make the system available for use, if 
needed. The service water circuit installations are 
due for completion in 2006.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Condensate puriﬁcation 
system modiﬁcations
The condensate system of the Olkiluoto plant units 
has been modiﬁed to improve the operational con-
ditions of the ion-exchange resins of the system’s 
ﬁlters. The system of Olkiluoto 1 was modiﬁed dur-
ing the 2004 annual maintenance outage and that 
of Olkiluoto 2 in 2003.
The condensate system pre-heats the conden-
sate coming from turbine condensers and transfers 
it to the feed water system, which injects it to the 
reactor. Prior to entering the reactor, it passes 
through the ﬁlters of a puriﬁcation system. The 
condensate puriﬁcation systems of the Olkiluoto 
plant units comprise seven ion-exchange ﬁlters.
Reactor water sulphate concentrations above 
target value water have been a problem at both 
plant units. Sulphate signiﬁcantly contributes to 
stress corrosion under certain circumstances. The 
sulphate concentrations have been low enough, 
however, not to have essentially contributed to cor-
rosion. The sulphate in reactor water comes from 
sulphate released from the ion-exchange resins of 
the condensate puriﬁcation ﬁlters. The service life 
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of strong cationic ion-exchange resins has been 
restricted to decrease the sulphate concentrations. 
In addition, sulphate-free ion-exchange resins have 
been used.
Temperature is one of the factors contributing 
to the release of sulphate from ion-exchange resins. 
The temperature of condensate passing through 
the ﬁlters has been adjusted to 60 °C previously 
by partially bypassing the pre-heater. In modiﬁca-
tions made at the plant units in 2003 and 2004, the 
temperature of water passing through the conden-
sate puriﬁcation ﬁlters was lowered by moving the 
pre-heater of the condensation system such that it 
is now after the ﬁlters when it was formerly before 
them in the process. The temperature of conden-
sate passing through the ﬁlters was thus reduced 
to approx. 50 °C.
After the 2003 modiﬁction, Olkiluoto 2 has been 
able to give up restrictions on ﬁlter resin service 
life and the use of sulphate-free resins. Filter res-
ins have also stayed operational for considerably 
longer periods with no signiﬁcant increase in the 
sulphate concentration of the reactor water. The 
longer service life of the resins reduces the volume 
of medium-level waste at the plant.
Rectiﬁers replaced at Olkiluoto 1
At the 2004 annual maintenance outage of 
Olkiluoto plant, a modiﬁcation project was started 
to replace ageing rectiﬁers with new ones carrying 
out corresponding functions. A total of 18 rectiﬁers 
will be replaced at both plant units. In normal op-
erational conditions the rectiﬁers feed DC power 
to components that need it and, simultaneously, 
maintain batteries on ﬂoat charge.
Rectiﬁers in the 110 V, 48 V, 24 V and ±24 V DC 
power systems will be replaced at both plant units. 
This is due to the ageing of the rectiﬁers currently 
in use, the decreasing availability of spare parts 
and increasing maintenance costs.
Five new rectiﬁers were installed and commis-
sioned in the 2004 annual maintenance outage of 
Olkiluoto 1. Teollisuuden Voima Oy plans to re-
place the rest of the rectiﬁers in 2006−2007.
Modiﬁcation of the turbine/reactor 
power monitoring system
In the 2004 annual maintenance outage of Olki-
luoto 1, the plant’s monitoring system for turbine/
reactor power was modiﬁed by adding a function 
which, in the event of a turbine/reactor power dis-
equilibrium, partially trips the reactor and limits 
reactor power to a level consistent with the turbine 
plant.
The designing of the monitoring system began 
in early 2002 with the objective of ﬁnding a way of 
preventing a reactor/turbine power disequilibrium 
independently of the trip signal. The importance of 
the modiﬁcation was accentuated by a disturbance 
in the 400 kV network of Olkiluoto 1 on 20 April 
2002. The event is described in the 2002 annual 
report (STUK-B-YTO 224).
The modiﬁed system detects a break in the 
power supplied by the 400 kV network without 
the help of an external signal; it is also capable 
of switching the plant unit over to internal power 
supply in case of the loss of external power supply, 
whether it be caused by human error or by a purely 
technical fault.
The monitoring system was implemented by 
digital technology programmed into the turbine 
pressure control system.
Olkiluoto 2 was similarly modiﬁed in the 2003 
annual maintenance outage.
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Loviisa nuclear power plant
Fuel handling error at the Loviisa 
plant spent fuel storage
Spent fuel was being moved from a transfer rack 
to the storage pool at the spent fuel storage of the 
Loviisa plant on 20 January 2004 when one fuel 
assembly was erroneously lowered to a wrong stor-
age slot and on top of a fuel assembly already in 
the slot.
During a fuel assembly’s transfer from the 
transfer rack to the spent fuel storage pool, its posi-
tion is monitored by co-ordinates of the fuel trans-
fer machine. During the lowering of the assembly 
in question to its planned slot, the driver misread 
the co-ordinates and placed it to an occupied slot 
where it remained standing on top of the assembly 
below. The co-driver noticed the error during the 
transfer of the next assembly to the pool. After a 
brieﬁng at the plant it was decided to ﬁx the situa-
tion by carefully gripping the assembly, using a tv 
camera for help, and moving it to its correct slot.
The event was due to inadequate transfer ma-
chine design and human error to which the work’s 
routine character contributed. The x-co-ordinate of 
the transfer machine is visible only to the driver 
through a window on the ﬂoor of the machine’s car-
riage. During fuel transfer, the driver is assisted by 
a co-driver who gives him the co-ordinates of the 
assembly’s storage location. The co-driver cannot 
verify the x-co-ordinate of an assembly without 
disturbing the driver.
The diameter of the cylindrical inner opening 
of the top piece of a fuel assembly is smaller than 
the external diameter of its lower end piece. The 
assembly lowered on top of the one already in the 
slot thus could not be inserted but was left stand-
ing on the conical surface of the other assembly’s 
top piece.
The assembly could have toppled down in a 
situation like this and, in the worst case, the clad-
dings of the fuel rods could have sustained damage, 
releasing radioactive gases from the rods. Later 
analyses showed that the situation would not 
have signiﬁcantly endangered the workers or the 
surrounding population. The event was classiﬁed 
INES Level 0.
After the event, the fuel transfer machine was 
ﬁtted with a camera from whose display both the 
driver and the co-driver can verify a bundle’s loca-
tion.
Inoperability of activity 
measuremenents at Loviisa 2
In April 2004 an exceptionally large volume of dirt 
and humidity was discovered in the sampling ﬁlter 
of the off gas activity measurement system of the 
secondary circuit of Loviisa 2. Further investiga-
tion showed that the sampling ﬂow to the activity 
monitor did not function as designed.
The two inadequately operating monitors are 
in the exhaust line of the main ejectors of the 
turbine condensers. The ejectors remove air and 
uncondensed gases from the condenser and blow 
them to the atmosphere. The activity measure-
ments are continuous.
To facilitate the measuring of gaseous samples 
entering the activity monitors of the main ejectors, 
the sampling ﬂow undergoes cooling and conden-
sate removal prior to measurement. The sampling 
system includes a water seal. The system’s water 
seal at Loviisa 2 was too low and the suction of the 
sampling pump had emptied it. This had made it 
possible that some of the sampling ﬂow to the ac-
tivity monitors of the main ejectors had come from 
the turbine hall through the ﬁlling opening of the 
empty water seal.
The Technical Speciﬁcations set availability re-
quirements for the activity monitors of the main 
ejectors. If they are unavailable, corresponding 
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live steam line activity mesurements must be op-
erational, with their alarm limits doubled against 
background activity. Steam-generator speciﬁc 
measurements of live steam lines as well as other 
radiation measurements to monitor radioactivity 
on the turbine side were in operation during the 
event. They are more sensitive than the activity 
measurement of the main ejectors now found inop-
erative. In addition, weekly laboratory analyses of 
gases sampled from the live steam lines have been 
regularly carried out. It has thus been ensured 
that no releases have occurred during the insuf-
ﬁcient operation of the activity measurements. The 
secondary circuit does not normally contain radio-
activity above natural background.
The ﬁxed radiation measurement systems of 
both Loviisa plant units have been modernised. 
The sampling systems were replaced as well: those 
of Loviisa 1 in 2002 and of Loviisa 2 in 2003. The 
systems are not identical since the supplier of the 
Loviisa 2 radiation measurement monitors fully 
implemented a sampling system planned by them 
whereas at Loviisa 1 the components were sepa-
rately purchased. Sampling at Loviisa 1 has been 
faultless.
The sampling line was temporarily modiﬁed to 
ﬁx the fault. The Loviisa 2 sampling line was re-
newed in the 2004 annual maintenance outage to 
make it correspond to that of Loviisa 1.
The event was classiﬁed INES Level 0.
Reactor scram at Loviisa 1 preceded 
by a protection system malfunction
Loviisa 1 was operating at full power on 29 June 
2004 when a reactor scram occurred after the pro-
tection limit for the neutron ﬂux of the reactor 
power range was exceeded in consequence of an 
unknown malfunction. The plant’s systems oper-
ated according to design during the scram.
The scram was attributed to a latent defect 
whose symptoms were observed earlier; these had 
disappeared, however, thus making the detection of 
the defect impossible. It was attributed to the neu-
tron ﬂux protection function of protection group 1, 
in all of whose power range channels the protection 
limit had dropped from 110% to 88%. The electron-
ics units and a card for control electronics relating 
to the neutron ﬂux monitoring limits were replaced 
in two electronics cubicles for neutron ﬂux meas-
urement. This was done to prevent recurrence of 
the malfunction although the defect was not unam-
biguously determined.
The plant unit was restarted after inspection 
and repair. During the start-up, functional inspec-
tions of the protection system were made and 
neutron ﬂux measurements were calibrated. The 
plant unit resumed electricity generation on 30 
June 2004.
During steady-state operation, the neutron ﬂux 
measuring system malfunctioned again and trou-
ble-shooting was continued. It yielded no new 
information, however. Investigations during the 
plant unit’s annual maintenace, which started on 
24 July 2004, attributed the malfunctioning to 
a speciﬁc condenser of the reactor power protec-
tion system. After that all neutron ﬂux measuring 
channels were replaced during the Loviisa 1 and 2 
annual maintenances of 2004.
The plant unit’s safety was not signiﬁcantly 
reduced during the scram or the disturbances pre-
ceding it. The scram was classiﬁed INES Level 0.
An electrical accident at Loviisa 1
A fatal accident occurred at Loviisa 1 on 29 July 
2004 during annual maintenance. An experienced 
electrician, employed by a contractor, was assigned 
to clean and inspect 6 kV switchgears under the 
supervision and control of work management. The 
work was to be done with the switchgears de-ener-
gised.
During the work, a bus in a switchgear short-
circuited as the switchgear had been re-energised 
without the electrician having been told about it. 
In consequence of the short-circuit, an arc occurred 
that set his clothes on ﬁre. He got an electric shock 
and was severly burned; despite intensive care 
treatment, he died in hospital a week later. Two 
other electricians in the immediate vicinity of 
the scene of the incident were only slightly burnt. 
The event did not directly affect nuclear and ra-
diation safety at the plant. It revealed signiﬁcant 
shortcomings in procedures relating to electrical 
installation work however. This was the ﬁrst fatal 
accident at work in the operation history of the 
Loviisa plant.
Several safety authorities have been investigat-
ing the event and its causes. In addition, a team 
of experts of the licensee has exhaustively looked 
into the course of the event and its possible causes. 
In accordance with what is prescibed by law about 
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the division of duties between authorities, lead 
responsibility in the investigation of accidents 
at work rests with the labour protection authori-
ties; Loviisa comes under the occupational safety 
and health inspectorate of Uusimaa. The Finnish 
Safety Technology Authority (TUKES), the expert 
authority on electrical safety and accidents, has 
set up its own team of investigators to look into the 
event. STUK is the authority regulating nuclear 
and radiation safety; its task is to ascertain that 
this event and the procedures followed in connec-
tion with have no bearing on nuclear and radiation 
safety.
An ofﬁcial report on the event is underway.
Disturbance in decay heat 
removal at Loviisa 2
During the annual maintenance of Loviisa 2, on 
16 September, the reactor’s decay heat removal 
stopped momentarily in connection with the repair 
of a valve in the service water system.
During annual maintenance, decay heat is re-
moved from the reactor via two steam generators 
and the decay heat removal system into the serv-
ice water system and further to the sea. As of 12 
September, the normal ﬂow path from the service 
water system to the sea was being prepared for 
repairs and maintenance. The control room tried to 
open a service water system valve to re-route the 
water to be discharged. This failed and the valve 
was manually opened on the spot. A work order for 
checking the valve’s control settings was issued, 
which only covered electrical and I&C work. It did 
not prohibit the operation of the valve since the 
electrical and I&C work to be performed did not re-
quire that. At the time of the work order’s writing, 
water from the service water system did not pass 
through the valve under repair.
During the repairs, the fault was found to be 
mechanical by nature. The supervisor of electri-
cal works on 16 September added the repair of a 
mechanical fault into the work order and gave it to 
the supervisor of mechanical works. It was further 
given to the contractor’s supervisor for execution 
of the work. The situation onsite had changed and 
the waters from the service water system passed 
through the valve under repair. After the valve was 
ﬁxed, the mechanics tested its operation by closing 
it manually. The ﬂow in the service water system 
stopped and the system pressurised at approx. 
8 bar. Due to the pressure increase, the operator 
stopped one of the two service water system pumps 
in operation. The mechanics opened the valve after 
a few minutes and normal ﬂow resumed in the 
system. The stopping of the ﬂow was indicated in 
the control room by alarm signals displayed on the 
process computer.
The short-term stopping of the ﬂow had no bear-
ing on plant safety. In case of a lengthier situation, 
a gradual warming up of the reactor coolant would 
have followed. The operators would have had sev-
eral hours to open the closed valve or to take into 
use the option of routing the water from the service 
water system to Loviisa 1 before the reactor cool-
ant would have reached boiling point.
The event was classiﬁed Level 0 on the INES 
Scale.
The event was caused by erroneous handling of 
the work order. According to the procedures, after 
additions had been made to it, it should have been 
taken to the control room where a prohibition to 
operate the valve would have been added.
Due to the event, training sessions for mechan-
ics and supervisors will emphasise that the status 
of apparatuses may not be changed without the 
permission of the control room. In addition, rou-
tines pertaining to work orders will be discussed 
during training.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Fuel handling error at the Olkiluoto 
plant spent fuel storage
A handling error occurred at the spent fuel storage 
on 2 February 2004 when spent fuel was moved 
from transfer rack to storage pool. The fuel han-
dling machine erroneously grabbed the fuel ele-
ment, which consists of the fuel assembly and its 
shroud tube, by the assembly alone, and not by the 
shroud tube. The shroud tube consequently sled 
down, causing the fuel element to slant when the 
lower end of the shroud tube hit the edge of the 
hauling gallery.
The gripper of the transfer machine has two 
alternative positions enabling gripping on the fuel 
assembly alone or on both the assembly and its 
shroud tube. In this case the gripper had only 
grabbed the assembly. At some stage, either dur-
ing the lifting or transfer of the fuel element, the 
shroud tube sled off of the assembly for approx. 1 m 
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but held its position due to the friction between it 
and the fuel assembly. The transfer proceeded until 
a bang was heard when the lower end of the fuel 
element hit the threshold of the gate between the 
pools. The entire fuel element was found slanted, 
its lower end resting on the edge of the threshold. 
The fuel assembly seemed bent but the fuel rods 
were undamaged. The fuel transfer machine lacks 
automatic stopping to provide for such events. The 
element was supported in its position for the night 
and was returned to its shroud tube the next day 
by carefully reversing the transfer machine.
In consequence of the event Teollisuuden Voima 
Oy revised the fuel handling measures plus related 
procedures. The transfer machine’s programmable 
controller was modiﬁed to assure simultanous 
gripping of fuel assembly and shroud tube by the 
gripper. In addition, the transfer machine was ﬁt-
ted with a more powerful camera.
The event was of minor safety signiﬁcance. Had 
the fuel assembly sustained damage, even then 
the radiation safety of workers or the environment 
would not have been endangered. The event was 
classiﬁed INES Level 0.
A reactor scram at Olkiluoto 1 after 
the inadvertent closing of an isolation 
valve of the main steam line
Olkiluoto 1 had resumed full power operation after 
the completion of a repair outage on 6 March 2004. 
Soon after that, a reactor scram occurred in the 
early hours of 7 March 2004 when a main steam 
line valve closed inadvertently from full power.
The chain of events leading to the scram was 
initiated by the inadvertent closing of a steam line 
isolation valve. Reactor pressure and power conse-
quently increased and the inner isolation valves of 
three other steam lines closed from increased ﬂow. 
The reactor tripped from high neutron power. The 
safety systems needed during a reactor scram op-
erated as planned and the event did not endanger 
the safety of the plant or the surrounding popula-
tion.
After the scram the plant unit was placed in 
cold shutdown to examine and repair the valve in 
question. The valve’s internals were replaced with 
equivalent serviced parts. An inspection of the re-
moved internals showed the event was due to the 
signiﬁcantly weakened performance of the perma-
nent magnet that normally keeps the valve open. 
After inspections and functional tests following the 
repairs, the plant unit resumed electricity genera-
tion on 8 March 2004.
At STUK’s request the licensee clariﬁed the 
functional criteria for permanent magnets after 
the event. In addition, the acceptability of the mag-
netising forces of the inner isolation valves of other 
steam lines was ascertained in the 2004 annual 
maintenance outage.
The event was classiﬁed INES Level 0.
Cracks detected in the feedwater 
distributor of the reactor circuit
In inspections performed at an annual mainte-
nance outage of Olkiluoto 2, cracks were detected 
in the supporting plates of lugs at the ends of the 
feedwater distributor. All four distributors were 
cracked in the same place. The feedwater distribu-
tors are inside the reactor pressure vessel and dis-
tribute colder feedwater evenly with water recircu-
lated inside the reactor pressure vessel. Because 
of the power uprating implemented in 1998, it was 
decided to renew the distributors to make them 
correspond to the ﬂow prevalent at the new power 
level. At the same time, a decision was made to 
change the perforated section of the distributor 
such that cold water would not cause thermal fa-
tigue when hitting the metallic parts close by. The 
feedwater distributors of Olkiluoto 2 were replaced 
in the 2003 annual maintenance outage.
The cracked point does not in the ﬁrst place 
carry the load caused by pre-tensioning but there 
is a sharp angle in this particular spot that con-
centrates stresses. The cracking is preliminarily 
attributed to stress corrosion from cold working 
during manufacturing. This sensitises stainless 
steel to stress corrosion. Thermal fatigue may be 
a factor as well, caused by hot/cold water ﬂuctua-
tions in the area of the ﬁxing point of the feedwater 
distributor.
The event is of minor safety signiﬁcance. Crack 
growth by stress corrosion would stop at the 
welded seam between support plate and lug at the 
latest. A distributor cracked in the same way has 
been in operation at a nuclear power plant abroad 
for over ten years.
To assure safety, the distributors of Olkiluoto 2 
were replaced with older distributors. Olkiluoto 1 
had been provided with new distributors in its 
2004 outage, which was before that of Olkiluoto 2. 
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The feedwater distributors of Olkiluoto 1 are due 
for inspection in the 2005 annual maintenance 
outage.
Samples have been taken from the cracked sec-
tions of the feedwater distributors removed from 
Olkiluoto 2 to further investigate the cause of their 
cracking. Thereafter, repair plans will be made.
A disturbance in the generator 
cooling system and a partial 
reactor scram at Olkiluoto 1
Olkiluoto 1 was operating at 100 % reactor power 
on 7 July 2004 when a relief valve in the gen-
erator water cooling system opened, causing a low 
level in the system’s pressure containment tank. 
A turbine shutdown and a partial reactor scram 
automatically followed. The plant unit came off the 
national grid and its power decreased to approx. 
30%. Power was further reduced to approx. 15%, 
and the leaking relief valve was replaced. After 
this, power ascension was started. The plant unit 
resumed electricity generation on the next day and 
was operating at full power on 9 July.
The relief valve opened due to a 0.5 bar increase 
in operating pressure caused by a system modiﬁca-
tion in a 2004 outage. That and a pressure ﬂuc-
tuation in the system brought about the rising of 
pressure close to design pressure and the opening 
of the relief valve.
The licensee intensiﬁes the follow-up of process 
values to prevent recurrence of the event. It also 
negotiates with the plant’s vendor to increase the 
margin between operating and design pressure.
The event had no bearing on safety and it was 
classiﬁed INES Level 0.
Non-compliance with the Tech Specs 
occurred when protection limits 
were bypassed during testing
It was found out at the Olkiluoto plant on 9 
December 2004 that, during the testing of asafety 
valve in the feed water sampling system, one chan-
nel of the reactor protection system had been brief-
ly bypassed at both plant units. The Tech Specs 
allow the bypassing of one channel for repairs but 
not for preventive maintenance of the kind now in 
question.
The bypassed channel belongs to a measure-
ment in the sampling system to control the qual-
ity of water injected into the reactor. This control 
measure reveals a potential pipe failure in a tur-
bine condenser cooled by sea water. The condensate 
line is ﬁtted with four measurements. One thresh-
old-exceeding measurement from the condensate 
trips a channel in the protection sequence belong-
ing to the reactor protection system. The trip-
ping of two channels is followed by an automatic 
reactor scram. When one channel is bypassed the 
reliability of the protection sequence is reduced. 
Measurement equipment must be isolated from the 
condensate line for valve maintenance and testing, 
and the sampling ﬂow does not then enter them. 
When the equipment are isolated from the conden-
sate line, the protection condition is bypassed as 
well.
Equipment maintenance procedures were re-
newed in 2002 and eight years was deﬁned as the 
inspection interval for the safety valves in ques-
tion. The ﬁrst preventive maintenance work in 
accordance with the new procedure was entered 
into the work order system in the autumn of 2004. 
Safety measures are deﬁned during the ordering of 
a piece of work, and it went unnoticed in this case 
that the Tech Specs prohibit the bypassing of a 
protection system channel during preventive main-
tenance testing. The work permits for the tests had 
been reviewed at work order review meetings but 
nobody was aware of the Tech Specs requirement 
on the bypassing of a control sequence channel.
The relief valve was tested at Olkiluoto 2 on 6 
October 2004. The protection system’s channel was 
bypassed for about an hour. Olkiluoto 1 began to 
prepare for the test on 1 December 2004 and the 
channel was bypassed. The shift manager noticed 
that the the work was in non-compliance with the 
Tech Specs and he did not give it a go-ahead. The 
subcondition was in the bypassed state for about 
15 mins. The work permit was left in the control 
room. Testing resumed on 9 December 2004 when 
the shift manager on duty processed the work per-
mit and okayed the work to begin. The work was 
done but the shift manager noticed afterwards that 
it had been in non-compliance with the Tech Specs. 
The channel was in the bypassed state for about 
four hours.
The event was caused by the preventive main-
tenance testing of the safety valves having been 
erroneously scheduled to take place during op-
eration. This may have been due to correspond-
ing protection systems being routinely bypassed 
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during repairs. In addition, the requirements on 
preventive maintenance are scattered throughout 
the Tech Specs in a way making them hard to ﬁnd 
and take in.
In the future the preventive maintenance of 
safety valves in the sampling system is carried out 
during annual maintenance. Teollisuuden Voima 
Oy will make more speciﬁc procedures pertaining 
to the processing of unﬁnished work. The event 
will be discussed in training events for operating 
and maintenance personnel to inform as many as 
possible of the lesson learned.
The event was assigned to INES Level 0.
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APPENDIX 4 STUK’s periodic inspection programme
Basic programme
Inspections in 2004
Loviisa nuclear power 
plant
Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant
A. Safety management x
B. Main functions
B.1. Assessment and improvement of safety 
B.2. Operation
B.3. Plant maintenance and ageing management x x
C. Inspections by functional unit and ﬁeld of competence
C.1. Plant safety functions x
C.2. Electrical and I&C systems x
C.3. Mechanical engineering x x
C.4. Structures and buildings x x
C.5. PSA and safety management x
C.6. Document and information management
C.7. Chemistry x x
C.8. Nuclear waste x x
C.9. Radiation protection x x
C.10. Fire protection x x
C.11. Emergency preparedness x x
C.12. Physical protection x x
C.13. Training / Human resources and training x x
C.14. Quality assurance x
C.15. Operating experience x
STUK-B-YTO 241
119
APPENDIX 5 Licences in accordance 
with the Nuclear Energy Act
C214/255, 17 February 2004,   
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Import of replacement control rods from Sweden 
for spare parts. Valid until 31 December 2004.
A214/50A, 19 February 2004,   
Fortum Power and Heat Oy
Import of fresh nuclear fuel from Spain. A total of 
max. 27 000 kg of Russian origin uranium. Provided 
with the Euratom obligation code ‘P’. Valid until 31 
December 2007.
A214/50B, 19 February 2004,   
Fortum Power and Heat Oy
Import of fresh nuclear fuel from Spain. A total 
of max. 1500 kg of Kazakstan-origin uranium. 
Provided with the Euratom obligation code ‘P’. 
Valid until 31 December 2005.
A214/54, 8 April 2004, Fortum Power and Heat Oy
Licence to import three neutron ﬂux detectors from 
Hungary. Valid until 30 June 2004.
Y214/82, 7 June 2004, University of Jyväskylä, 
Department of Physics
Licence to posses, use, handle and store nuclear 
materials for research purposes at the accelerator 
laboratory of the Department of Physics, University 
of Jyväskylä. A total of max. 10 g of special ﬁssion-
able material. Valid until 31 December 2014.
A214/59, 9 July 2004, Fortum Power and Heat Oy
Licence to export an in-core detector to Canada. 
Return of defective detector to manufacturer. Valid 
until 31 December 2004.
C214/258, 16 August 2004, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Import of steam dryers from the Czech Republic. 
Two steam dryers for the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant units OL1 and OL2. Valid until 31May 2006.
C214/259, 7 December 2004,   
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Import of fresh nuclear fuel from Spain. A total of 
max. 4850 kg of enriched uranium. The obligations 
of an exchange of notes pertaining to the peace-
ful uses of nuclear materials between the authori-
ties of Finland and the People’s Republic of China 
apply to the uranium to be imported. Provided 
with the Euratom obligation code ‘N’. Valid until 31 
December 2005.
C214/260, 7 December 2004,   
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Import of fresh nuclear fuel from Sweden. A total 
of max. 8900 kg of enriched uranium. The obliga-
tions of the Finnish-Russian co-operation agree-
ment on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy ap-
ply to the uranium to be imported. Provided with 
the Euratom obligation code ‘P’. Valid until 31 
December 2005.
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APPENDIX 6 STUK-ﬁnanced safety research and 
techical support projects completed in 2004
Nuclear Power Plants
Projects in the FINNUS research 
program (1999−2002)
Safety assessment of programmable automation 
(PASSI); Development of reliability assessment 
methods (FINNUS/PASSI/REL+); VTT Industrial 
Systems
EU-Benchmark on safety evaluation of compu-
ter-based systems; (BE-SECBS); VTT Industrial 
Systems
Projects in the SAFIR-research 
program (2003−2006)
Concrete Technological Studies Related to the 
Construction, Inspection and Reparation of the 
Nuclear Power Plant Structures SAFIR/CONTECH; 
2003; VTT Building and Transport
Emergency preparedness supporting studies − 
SAFIR/OTUS; 2003; VTT Processes
Interaction approach to development of control 
rooms − SAFIR/IDEC; Development of MCR-con-
cept evaluation framework; 2003; VTT Industrial 
Systems
Integrity and lifetime of reactor circuits − SAFIR/
INTELI; INPUT; 2003; VTT Industrial Systems
Integrity and lifetime of reactor circuits − SAFIR/
INTELI; INSEL; 2003; VTT Industrial Systems
Application Possibilities of Systematic Require-
ments Management in the Improvement of Nuclear 
Safety in Finland − SAFIR/APSREM; 2003; RAMSE 
Consulting Oy
Enhanced methods for reactor analysis − SAFIR/
EMERALD; 2003; VTT Processes
Wall response to soft impact − SAFIR/WARSI; 
2003; VTT Industrial Systems
Principles and Practices of Risk-Informed Safety 
Management − SAFIR/PPRISMA; Maintenance 
strategies; classiﬁcation and analysis for manage-
ment of safe and competitive production, HRA-
data; reliability analysis methods of programmable 
systems; VTT Industrial Systems
Application Possibilities of Systematic Require-
ments Management in the Improvement of 
Nuclear Safety in Finland − SAFIR/APSREM; 
Requirements management in the FIN5 regulatory 
project − basic design; RAMSE Consulting Oy
Integrity and lifetime of reactor circuits − SAFIR/
INTELI; INCOM; 2003; VTT Industrial Systems
Ruthenium studies; Behaviour of ruthenium in se-
vere accidents; 2003; VTT Processes
Potential of Fire Spread − SAFIR/POTFIS; Effects 
of smoke and temperature in equipments; ﬁre 
spread; active and operational ﬁre prevention; 
2003; VTT Building and Transport
High-burnup upgrades in fuel behaviour modelling 
− SAFIR/KORU; 2003; VTT Processes
Technical support for regulatory 
decision-making
FIN5 − STUK’s safety review during construction 
licence phase. Comparative analysis readiness de-
velopment to analyse the reactor behaviour during 
disturbance situations; VTT Processes
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FIN5 − STUK’s safety review during construction 
licence phase. Comparative analysis readiness de-
velopment in order to analyse the reactor circuit be-
haviour during accident situations; VTT Processes
FIN5 − STUK’s safety review during construction 
licence phase. Comparative analysis readiness de-
velopment in order to analyse the behaviour of 
the containment during accident situations; VTT 
Processes
FIN5 − STUK’s safety review during construction 
licence phase. Comparative analysis readiness de-
velopment in order to analyse the reactor and con-
tainment behaviour during severe accidents; VTT 
Processes
OL3 − Water chemistry of primary circuit; VTT 
Industrial Systems
OL3 − Radiation doses population in environment; 
Comparative calculations of doses; VTT Processes
Loviisa NPP, new I&C premises; Inspection of con-
struction plans; VTT Building and Transport
OL3 − Structural engineering and structures; ex-
pert opinions; VTT Building and Transport
Effect of sea wind to radiation releases; Antti Jylhä-
Ollila, Master’s Thesis; HU / Institute of physical 
sciences
FIN5 − STUK’s safety review during construction 
licence phase. Comparative thermohydraulic ex-
periments for cooling of core melt; Lappeenranta 
University of Technology
OL3 − Independent comparative analyses for 
STUK’s safety evaluation; Institute for Safety and 
Reliability (ISaR)
Nuclear waste management
Projects in the KYT research 
programme (2002−2005)
Radiation protection of the environment – code 
testing for non-human dose calculation; STUK, 
Laboratory of Ecology and Food chains
Glacial meltwaters as geochemical indicators of re-
dox conditions at Palmottu; University of Helsinki, 
Laboratory of Radiochemistry
Seabed gas investigations at Olkiluoto site; 
Geological Survey of Finland
On-line monitoring of copper corrosion and redox 
conditions in compacted bentonite; VTT Industrial 
Systems
DECOVALEX III, Glacial effects, especially the 
formation of permafrost; Helsinki University of 
Technology, Laboratory of Structural Mechanics
Modelling of Out-Diffusion experiment applied 
to Palmottu granite; University of Helsinki, 
Laboratory of Radiochemistry
In-situ study of rocks – Characterization of 
pore space geometry by C-14-PMMA impregna-
tion; University of Helsinki, Laboratory of Radio-
chemistry
The relationship between REE and U mobility in 
a glacial scenario – implications for the evolution 
of a radwaste repository; Helsinki University of 
Technology, Laboratory of Rock Engineering
IAEA coordinated research project (CRP). Natural 
geochemical concentrations and ﬂuxes on the Baltic 
shieds in Finland as indicators of nuclear waste re-
pository safety; Prof. D. Read 2003; Enterpris Ltd, 
United Kingdom
Technical support for regulatory 
decision-making
Baseline survey of the Olkiluoto nuclear waste 
repository site using earth observation; VTT 
Information Technology
Review of the bedrock movement studies at the 
Olkiluoto site; University of Helsinki, Institute of 
Seismology
Review of Posiva’s baseline studies at Olkiluoto; 
prof. S.K. Frape; University of Waterloo, Canada
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Support Group on Investigations and Modelling of 
Geological Structures (IMGS); Prof. Siivola, Espoo.
Support Group on Investigations and Modelling 
of Geological Structures (IMGS); Cosgrove 2003; 
Royal School of Mines, Imperial College, United 
Kingdom
Support Group on Investigations and Modelling of 
Geological Structures (IMGS); Tirén; Geosigma AB, 
Sweden
Review of Posiva’s R&D programme; Research, 
development and technical design for 2004–2006; 
University of Reading, United Kingdom
Support Group on Investigations and Modelling of 
Geological Structures (IMGS); Mr. Jarkko Jokinen, 
Geological Survey of Finland
Review of Posiva’s R&D programme; 2004–2006 
(TKS-2003); University of Helsinki / Laboratory of 
Radiochemistry
Review of Posiva’s program for R&D and technical 
design; for 2004–2006 and participation to work of 
STUK’s external expert group; Helsinki University 
of Technology / Laboratory of Engineering 
Materials
STUK’s support group for the regulatory control 
of Posiva’s underground rock characterisation fa-
cility; and STUK’s review of Posiva’s programme 
for research, development and technical design for 
2004–2006; Geosigma, Sweden
Review of Posiva’s R&D programme; Research, 
development and technical design for 2004–2006; 
Quintessa Limited, United Kingdom
Review of Posiva’s program for R&D and technical 
design; 2004–2006; Monitor Scientiﬁc LCC, USA
Review of Posiva’s program for R&D and technical 
design; Chin-Fu Tsang 2004; Lawrence Berkeley 
National Laboratory, USA
STUK’s support group for the regulatory control 
of Posiva’s underground rock characterisation fa-
cility; (ONKALO) and STUK’s review of Posiva’s 
programme for research, development and techni-
cal design for 2004–2006; Prof. Ove Stephansson, 
Germany
Technical support for development 
of regulatory control
Focused modelling of bedrock fracture zones in 
Olkiluoto; Geological Survey of Finland
Development of rock modelling system; TerraRock, 
Rollcon Oy, Finland
